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ABSTRACT
JUST WAR THEORY: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
ANALYSIS
MAY 1990
PAUL CHRISTOPHER, B.S. NORWICH UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF LA VERNE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews
Pacifism and realism both presuppose an unbridgeable
gap between war and morality. The pacifist, abhorring the
suffering caused by violence, concludes that war is the
consummate evil and rejects it under any circumstances.
The realist, beginning from a similar assessment regarding
the evil of war, concludes that those who bring war on a
peaceful nation deserve all the maledictions its people
can pour out. These views reflect the negative duty not
intentionally to harm innocent persons, on one hand, and
the positive obligation that innocent persons be
protected, on the other. The pacifist views the
prohibition against harming others as more fundamental;
the realist accepts the positive duty to protect others as
more basic. Historically, the just war tradition has
provided an alternative to these extremes. Recent events
in the conduct of wars around the world have, however,
called into question the relevancy of certain aspects of
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In this work Ithe just war tradition for modern wars,
critically examine the notion of a just war in terms of
both jus ad bellum, or the justifications for going to
war, and jus in bello, or the just means of waging war, as
it is reflected in international law. I begin with a
discussion of various formulations of the realist's and
pacifist's positions and argue that the just war tradition
provides a reasonable alternative to either of these
extremes. I then briefly trace the historical development
of the just war tradition beginning with Roman Law. The
purpose of this historical analysis is to identify those
moral principles and arguments that inspired the
development of various aspects of the just war tradition
so that these same principles and arguments can be used as
a basis for reevaluating existing rules in light of modern
tactics and technology. Finally, I expose and discuss
serious deficiencies with the way the just war tradition
is reflected in current international law and offer
proposals for how these problems might be addressed. My
conclusion is that the just war tradition can provide
effective guidelines for ameliorating the tragedy of war
now and into the 21st Century if the issues I identify are
adequately addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
Hugo Grotius, writing in the 17th Century, observed
that concerning war we must not believe either that
nothing is allowable, or that everything is. Today we
might refer to the views Grotius was rejecting as
pacifism and realism. The pacifist, abhorring the
suffering caused by violence, concludes that war is the
consummate evil and rejects it under any circumstances.
The realist, beginning from a similar assessment
regarding the evil of war, concludes that those who bring
war on a peaceful nation deserve all the maledictions
that its people can pour out. These views reflect a
tension between the negative duty not intentionally to
harm innocent people, on one hand, and the positive
obligation that innocent persons be protected, on the
other. These two moral inclinations or precepts seem to
be at the center of debate concerning when to wage war
and how to wage it. The pacifist views the prohibition
against harming others as the more fundamental of the
two; the realist takes the positive duty to protect
others as the more basic. Historically, the just war
tradition has provided an alternative to these two
extremes
.
Today the tenets of this tradition are reflected in
both the national laws of individual states and the
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international laws of war as formalized in the Geneva and
Hague Conventions and the United Nations Charter.
Recent events in the conduct of war have, however,
called into question the relevance of certain aspects of
the just war tradition for modern wars. Examples from
Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Central America, and the
Middle East seem to provide strong evidence that the just
war tradition and the international laws that reflect it
are ineffective in protecting innocents and ameliorating
suffering in wartime. It is important and timely to
reevaluate the viability of the just war tradition, I
believe, in light of both the paradigmatic changes in the
technology of offensive and defensive weapons and the
widespread adoption of guerrilla and terrorist tactics.
If the just war tradition and the laws that reflect it
need revision in light of the profound changes in the way
that modern war is conducted, we should identify the
shortfalls and work to make these changes before another
war occurs.
In this work I undertake a critical examination of
just war tradition in terms of both jus ad bellum, or the
justifications for going to war, and jus in bello, or the
just means of waging war, as it is reflected in the
international law. I begin with a discussion of various
formulations of the realist's and pacifist's positions
and argue that there are serious problems with each. My
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purpose here is to show that some type of just war
tradition is the best means of resolving the tension
between the positive duty to protect oneself and others
snd the negative duty to do no harm. This is the focus
of Chapter 1-3.
In Chapters 4-6 I outline how the modern concept
of just war evolved from a fusion of early Roman law and
Judeo-Christ ian teachings. Beginning with Ancient Rome,
I briefly trace the development of the just war tradition
through the middle ages, and show how it was transformed
into a corpus of international law following the Thirty-
years War. My objective here is to explore the reasoning
behind the key elements of modern just war doctrine and
the laws of war that reflect it by studying their
origins. If we can understand the moral or prudential
principles that motivated the development of the tenets
of the just war tradition, we will be better able to
evaluate its relevance in light of modern technology and
tactics
.
In Chapters 7 and 8 I address more specifically the
relationship between the just war tradition and the
international laws of war. The goal here is to determine
why the laws of war have often been largely ignored on
the modern battlefield. We will want to determine
whether this inefficacy is a product of the formulation
of the laws themselves, or whether it is inherent in the
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very notion of having laws without a common authority to
legislate them and enforce compliance, as is the case
with international law.
In Chapter 9-11 I will explore specific
inadequacies in the formulation of the laws of war. My
intention here is to demonstrate that if the just war
tradition is going to be a viable factor today and in the
future, certain ambiguities in its formulation,
especially as it is currently reflected in international
legal documents, must be resolved.
While I've written each section so that it may be
read independently of the others, I've used a building
block design where subsequent arguments are grounded in
previous ones. My primary and final objective in this
work is to persuade my readers that with appropriate
modifications, the just war tradition can provide a
suitable framework for resolving the issues of when and
how to wage war today, and in the 21st Century.
A final note. I often use the expression 'we' to
invite you, my readers, to join with me in tackling a
particular question or pondering a troublesome point.
Accordingly, I've attempted to develop my arguments in
ways which invite discussion, and I ask that none of the
issues I discuss be accepted uncritically. I sincerely
hope that this work will inspire serious inquiry and
debate about certain important and controversial just war
4
issues as they
national laws,
explore any of
correspondence
.
are manifested in international and
I would welcome the opportunity to
the issues raised in this work through
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York 10996
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CHAPTER 1
REALISM AND GOING TO WAR
Pacifism and realism both presuppose an unbridgeable
gap between war and morality. The pacifist claims that
violence, or the taking of human life, is never
justified. The realist, on the other hand, argues that
moral considerations have no place in warfare. Neither
view is new: neither is without staunch supporters. The
purpose of this section is to examine critically the
arguments generally offered on behalf of each of these
positions
.
In international relations, political realism,
sometimes called 'realpolitick, ' refers to the theory
that each state's own self-interest is the only relevant
factor for leaders of that state to consider in
determining its policies vis-a-vis other states. Those
who hold this view deny the jus ad bellum aspect of the
just war tradition. Variations of this position will be
the topic of Chapter One. In Chapter Two we will examine
the view, also referred to as realism, that in war there
are no restrictions on what can reasonably be done for
the sake of victory. We will call this 'military
realism.' Military realists differ from political
realists in that they don't necessarily deny that moral
considerations should govern most political intercourse
6
between states, only that no such considerations should
appiy during war. Chapter Three will be an examination
of various versions of pacifism.
There are a number of variations on the realist
argument. One might take the extreme position, as does
Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic, that the paradigm state
should do whatever it can to hold other states in
subjection. Or one might argue that states have moral
responsibilities to one another which are analogous to
the responsibilities which individuals bear toward one
another in domestic society. Of course, if you believe
that individuals have no natural responsibilities to
each other, as Thomas Hobbes did, then you would argue
that neither do states have any such responsiblit ies
.
And finally, some realists argue that politics differs
from morality in that politics is always a practical
exercise motivated solely by self-interest; that is, the
analogy between individual rights and responsibilities,
and those of states, fails. Under this view a state is
an autonomous political entity whose only responsibility
is to protect or improve the well-being of its citizenry.
It is, therefore, impossible for an independent state to
behave immorally toward another state. Proponents of
this position do not deny that human beings have rights
and moral obligations, only that such rights or
7
obligations do not exist between states. We will look at
examples of each of these views.
Thucydides
In The History of the Peloponnesian Wars, Thucydides
grounds his realist's account of the events of his day in
a pessimistic assessment of human nature . 1
The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities
were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always
wiH occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the
same... In peace and prosperity states and individuals
have better sentiments, because they do not find
themselves suddenly confronted with imperious
necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily
wants, and so proves a rough master that brings most
men's characters to a level with their fortunes.
Later, in his famous account of a meeting to decide
the fate of Melos which occurred between envoys sent by
the Athenian Generals, Cleomedes and Tisias, and the
magistrates of Melos, Thucydides provides us with an
example of how his theory of human nature appears in
practice. The city of Melos has attempted to remain
neutral in the war between Athens and Sparta, but the
Athenians demand capitulation . 2
ATHENIANS: For ourselves, we will not trouble you with
specious pretences—either of how we have a right to our
1 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian Wars, The Crawley
Translation (New York: The Modern Library, 1982), pp. 198-9.
Michael Walzer uses Thucydides' account of Athens' aggression
against Melos in his criticism of realism. Much of the impetus for
my discussion of this topic comes from Walzer' s cogent analysis.
2 Ibid., Bk V, chapters 89 & 105; pp. 351 & 353.
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empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now
attacking you because of wrong you have done us--and make
a long speech which would not be believed; and in turn we
hope that you... will aim at what is feasible, holding in
view the real sentiments of us both; for you know as well
as we do that ...the strong do what they can and the weak
suffer what they must.
* * *
. . .of men we know that by a necessary law of their nature
they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were
the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made:
we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to
exist forever after us; all we do is to make use of it,
knowing that you and everybody else, having the same
power as we have, would do the same as we do.
The Melians refused to give in to the Athenians and,
after a siege of a few months, were forced to surrender,
whereupon the Athenians "put to death all the grown men,
and sold the women and children for slaves, and
subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and
inhabited the place for themselves."
Whether or not such a dialogue ever took place is
not important. What is at stake is the position that
Thucydides gives us, through the Athenian negotiators,
that talk of morality is merely a ruse to conceal what is
always the real issue--self-interest . Justice,
Thucydides argues, is no more than the will of the
stronger party. Thucydides is using psychological egoism
as the grounding for his ethical egoism ; he is telling
his readers not only that self-interest is always the
motive behind human behavior, but also that it ought to
be. The move from "is" to "ought," although
controversial, need not concern us here. Instead, we
9
will focus on the reasons which the Athenians offer
concerning why they must force the subjection of Melos;
and as these constitute Thucydides' own arguments on
behalf of realism, it is worthwhile to examine them in
some detail.
First, the Athenians argue that it is a natural
process for the stronger to subjugate the weaker: "if any
[city] maintain their independence it is because they are
strong, and if we do not molest them it is because we are
afraid." Moreover, if it becomes apparent that Athens is
afraid, it will be a sign of weakness both to Athenian
subjects, and to other colonies which Athens may wish to
subjugate. This might cause rebellion within the
existing empire, as well as increased resistance to the
city's expansionist designs, conditions which would be
undesirable for Athens . 3
It is worthwhile to point out that some of these
attempts at providing a justification for violating
another people's rights sound familiar to us even today.
The first premise states that subjugation of the weak by
the strong is a necessity of nature. But surely
Thucydides does not mean that stronger parties are
naturally driven to subjugate weaker ones when there is
nothing to be gained by it; presumably he means that when
there is a conflict of interests resolution will
3 Ibid., Bk V, chapters 89, 97, & 105.
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ultimately be determined by the respective power of the
opposing parties. Of course, this conflict of interest
might be no more than the tension caused by one party'
s
desire to acquire certain benefits through the
subjugation of the other, coupled with the second party's
desire not to relinquish the same. Formulated this way,
the "necessity of nature" to which Thucydides refers is
not really a "necessity" at all, but simply a propensity
to pursue one' s own self-interests by whatever means are
available
.
Returning to Thucydides' example, this justification
would be applicable only if there were conflicting
interests between Melos and Athens--but this certainly
does not seem to be the case in the situation as
Thucydides has described it for us. In fact, even when
the Melians guarantee neutrality and make offers of
friendship, the Athenians refuse because, they claim,
such action would jeopardize their own security by making
them appear weak--and this is something which the
Athenians cannot allow to happen.
This brings us to Thucydides' second justification,
which is also based on a highly questionable "necessity":
Athens must subjugate Melos in order to protect their
reputation and, ultimately, their security. This is not
simply an argument from self-interest; e.g., if we
subjugate Melos we will enjoy some benefit. That
11
argument is never raised in the dialogue. In order for
the argument that Thucydides does give us to make any
sense at all, the Athenians must maintain that if they
don't subjugate Melos, then they will suffer some
undesirable conseguences
. Thus it is necessary for the
Athenians to subjugate the Melians in order to prevent
some evil from happening to themselves. There are two
obvious problems with this premise. The first is that it
is not at all clear that damage to Athens' reputation as
a tyrantical power would result in a degradation in their
security. The very most that the Athenians can claim is
that if their reputation as a tyrannical power is
damaged, this might result in a degradation in their
security as such a power. Or, put another way, it is
necessary to do A in order to prevent the possibility of
B. But obviously one could justify almost anything under
the umbrella of absolute certainty. It is apparent that
the subjugation of the Athenians is not a "necessity" at
all.
Second, the claim that anything less than
unconditional surrender by Melos will damage Athens'
reputation seems highly questionable. The Melians have,
after all, offered to be "friends to you [Athenians] and
foes to neither party, " and to "make such a treaty as
shall seem fit to us both ." 4 Even if we accept the
4 Ibid., Bk V, chapter 112.
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dubious contention that Athens must act in a way which
prevents even the possibility of a lessened security, it
seems highly unlikely that even this would justify their
brutal behavior to the Melians. In fact, neither of
these "excuses" offered by Thucydides seems to justify,
or even adequately explain, Athens' actions.
There is, however, a final objection even more
serious than the previous ones. This very process by
Thucydides of attempting to justify the aggression of the
Athenians shows that this behavior was out of the
ordinary— it required justification ! If Thucydides
himself believed, or expected his readers to believe,
that the aggression by Athens in this case was no more
than a "natural process, " then he would not have needed
to try to justify it by appealing to necessity--
especially when the "necessity" he employs is so
obviously unnecessary. Thucydides' own efforts to
justify realism by appealing to necessity themselves
provide a decisive argument against the very realism he
sought to defend.
Callicles, Thrasymachus , and Glaucon
Plato must certainly have been familiar with
Thucydides' work. In addition to his attacks on realists
in the Republic and the Gorgias (like Callicles and
Thrasymachus)
,
who are reminiscent of Thucydides, we
13
also get a satire of Thucydides in the Menexenus
.
5
In
each case Plato seems to accept without question that
whatever should govern relationships between individuals
should also govern relationships between states (i.e. the
domestic analogy). Let's examine Plato's attack on two
versions of the realist position.
In the Gorgias, Plato has Socrates argue, against
Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, that man should always act
justly because virtue brings happiness and it is
impossible for a wrongdoer (one who acts unjustly) to be
happy. When Callicles enters the argument, he begins by
attacking Socrates' premise that "it is more disgraceful
to do than to suffer in justice" (482d9-el) . ^ He does not
dispute that justice is good and injustice bad (as
Thrasymachus is forced to do in the Republic at 348d-e)
,
but instead argues that Socrates has confused what is
just according to nature with what is just according to
convention .
^ This point is discussed nicely by R.E Allen in The Dialogues of
Plato, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 319-327.
I am also indebted to Allen for pointing out the relationship between
this passage and the Melian dialogue in Thucydides. He argues
convincingly that Plato was familiar with Thucydides' work, and that
he is referring to it directly in the Menexenus
,
as well as
responding to sections of it in the Socratic debates with Callicles
(Gorgias
)
and Thrasymachus ( Republic
)
.
Other references to
Thucydides by Plato occur at Laches 178a and Meno 94c.
6 Plato, The Collected Dialogues
,
ed. by Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) . All
quotations from Plato will be from this source.
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For by nature everything that is worse is more shameful,
suffering wrong for instance, but by convention it is
more shameful to do it.... those who framed the laws are
the weaker folk, the majority. And accordingly they
frame the laws for themselves and their own advantage,
and so too with their approval and censure, and to
prevent the stronger who are able to overreach them from
gaining the advantage over them, they frighten them by
saying that to overreach others is shameful and evil, and
injustice consists in seeking the advantage over
others... But in my view nature herself makes it plain
that it is right for the better to have the advantage
over the worse, the more able over the less (483a-d)
.
This passage is especially significant because it is
perhaps the first time we find a clear differentiation
between laws of nature and manmade laws . 1 Callicles'
view expresses the same distinction to which Thucydides
alludes in the dialogue between the Athenian generals and
the leaders of Melos: morality is an invention of the
weak to protect themselves from the strong; true justice
can be found in man' s natural inclination to dominate
according to his ability.
And both among all animals and in entire states and races
of mankind it is plain that this is the case—that right
is recognized to be the sovereignty and advantage of the
stronger over the weaker.... We mold the best and
strongest among ourselves, catching them young like lion
cubs, and by spells and incantations we make slaves of
them, saying that they must be content with equality and
that this is what is right and fair. But if a man rises
endowed with a nature sufficiently strong, he will, I
believe, shake off all these controls, burst his fetters,
and break loose. And trampling upon our scraps of paper,
our spells and incantations, and all our unnatural
conventions, he rises up and reveals himself our master
who was once our slave, and there shines forth nature's
true justice [my italics] (483d-484a)
.
7 I am indebted to R.E Allen for this insight. See The Dialogues of
Plato, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 217.
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Callicles does not mean this argument to apply just
to individuals; he explicitly uses aggression by states
as his examples of "just" or natural action. Of course,
if what he says is true, not only would war itself be the
fundamental, natural instrument of justice, but there
would be no constraints on the conduct of that war.
Callicles' argument does not, however, stand up to
examination. As Socrates points out, if justice is
merely the will of the stronger, then the laws of the
majority (which is stronger than the minority) do
themselves constitute what is just; conventions are,
therefore, according to Callicles' own argument, natural
laws (489a-b) . Morality, then, which Callicles himself
calls the will of the many, constitutes justice, and
Callicles' argument is defeated.
In the Republic Plato has Thrasymachus provide
Socrates with another argument for realism which is not
subject to the same objection as Callicles'
.
Thrasymachus argues not only that people should do
whatever they can "get away with" (to include stealing
purses [348d5]), but also that the best state is one
"whose injustice is most complete" (351b4-5)
.
Socrates
responds that it is impossible to have any society
whatsoever without some conception of morality. Even
among thieves, he argues, there must be some concept of
justice in order for them to engage in any cooperative
16
activity (351c7)
. Thrasymachus is forced to conclude
that some justice is a necessary condition for society,
and thus, he too, is decisively refuted.
Glaucon and his brother Adimantus, however, do not
give up. 8 Suppose, they ask, that one could separate
just behavior from the rewards normally associated with
it? Or, put another way, is it true that justice is its
own reward? Glaucon uses the fable of the Ring of Gyges 9
to illustrate the position that justice might not be good
of itself; that when separated from the good consequences
that are associated with it— such as honor, wealth,
power, and other sources of happiness, both in this life
and in the hereafter
—
justice is no better than
injustice. 10 In each case, goodness must be measured in
terms of desire satisfaction.
Plato's response is, in part, that there is often a
great difference between what people desire and what they
would desire if they were in possession of true beliefs
concerning what is good for them. Because all men want
what is good for them, even though they pursue many
8 Neither Glaucon nor Adimantus believes the position which they ask
Socrates to refute. Plato uses them here because they are
philosophers who understand Plato's Theory of Forms and hence will be
able to engage in a purely philosophical discussion.
9 A magic ring which could make the wearer invisible at will so that
he could do whatever he wished without anyone knowing. See Plato,
Republic
,
Bk. II, 359c-360b, in the Collected Dialogues of Plato, p.
607 .
10 Ibid., Glaucon' s and Adimantus' arguments are on pages 358b-367e
(pp. 606-614) .
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^ fferent ends, we must distinguish between the ideal
desires which everyone would choose if he had the power
and knowledge, and ersatz desires which people often
choose because of a misunderstanding concerning what is
good. In order to respond to Glaucon and Adimantus,
Plato must show that justice is something which everyone
would choose if they were in possession of true belief
concerning what is good for them.
Plato argues that every person must desire to live
in a community that has some degree of justice because no
matter what desire fullfillment one believes will produce
happiness for them, one must postulate a just environment
in which to realize these desires . 11 The ideal state is
always the one which is the most just because each
individual's conception of happiness is accessible to
that person through predictable paths; anything less
represents some degree of social chaos that even those
who advocate injustice invariably oppose because
injustice is only effective in a just environment. For
11 We must remember that Plato does not view either justice or
happiness as absolutes except theoretically. Particular actions can
partake of the form of justice to varying degrees. Thus it is
possible to be happy to some degree without being just but it is
impossible to be just without being happy to some degree. Plato
regards justice as a good which is desired both for its own sake and
for the good consequences which result from it. The challenge here
is to show that it would still be desirable without the good
consequences the same way that knowledge, sight, and health are
(357c)
.
Admittedly, I am unable, in this brief discussion, to do justice to
the intricate, aesthetic argument of the Republic . My objective here
is to "piggyback" just as far as necessary for my own enterprise.
18
example, if one believes that honor and prestige will
bring happiness, then in order to be able to attain these
goods, one must will a community where honor and prestige
follow predictably from certain behaviors. Likewise, if
one believes that material possessions are the key to
happiness, they must will a community where acguisions
follow from similar predictable patterns. In fact, even
if one thinks that lawless actions are a legitimate means
of seeking goods, as Thrasymachus does, he nevertheless
must postulate a just community in order for lawlessness
to reap "benefits." Even the philosopher who desires to
spend all of his time doing philosophy and enjoying the
pleasure of contemplating truth realizes that this is
best accomplished in a polis where those with his
learning and knowledge rule, so he consents to spend some
of his time ruling in order to maximize his pleasure in
the long term . 12 So it goes with the guardians and
laborers who contribute to a just community because it is
the best way to insure desire satisfaction. In every
case, rationality demands that one seek a just
environment. Of course, a just community is one in which
the members act justly. It is inconsistent to will, on
one hand, an ideal community in which all citizens behave
12 The most just community is one which is ruled by philosophers
whose knowledge allows them to recognize true justice and its
relationship to happiness. They are the only ones who clearly
recognize the ersatz goods which others desire as such.
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justly, and then to hypothesize oneself as a member of
that community who behaves unjustly.
Moreover, in order for a just environment to
maintain itself, it must educate its members in the
principles of justice and employ laws and social
sanctions to reinforce just behavior
.
13 Thus one aspect
of the ideal community which Plato and his interlocutors
identify is that it teaches and inculcates in its
citizens a desire for true justice as perceived by the
philosopher-ruler (s) . It follows that those who will
such a community in which to live (which is everyone as
Plato has shown), also implicitly will for themselves a
mandate to behave justly--regardless of the motivation--
as this is a requisite aspect of residency therein . 14
Thus Glaucon' s position is shown to be inconsistent.
Plato shows us that reason dictates that we seek
justice as the best means for long term desire
1 *3
Plato notes that the purpose of education is "the drawing and
leading of children to the rule which has been pronounced right by
the force of law." Laws II, 659d, p. 1256.
14 This is only one dimension of Plato's enterprise. He goes on to
argue, for example, that just as the state which is governed by a
false notion of justice is capable of less total happiness than one
governed by knowledge of true justice, so is an individual whose
reason is usurped by a love of honor or love of material possessions
destined to be less happy than the philosopher who sees clearly the
relationships between these desires and the ersatz happiness they
produce and consequently allows himself to be governed by true
justice and happiness. His point here is that each of us seeks
justice and happiness even though we may disagree as to what
constitutes the former and what will provide us with the latter.
Hence knowledge is fundamental as a means to behaving justly and
thus achieving happiness
.
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satisfaction. He defeats the realist arguments of
Callicles, Thrasymachus, and Glaucon by showing that they
are inconsistent with our notion of man as a rational,
social being. if, however, one were willing to forgo
this assumption regarding man' s social nature, then the
realist's position could be made more formidable. Let's
examine the argument of one realist who takes this tact.
Thomas Hobbes
Another realist who accepts the domestic analogy is
Thomas Hobbes. Prior to formulating his own views, he
translated Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars
into English and was undoubtedly greatly influenced by
it. In his Leviathan
,
he takes realism and develops it
into a coherent political theory— one which is not
vulnerable to the objections which Plato uses against
Callicles and Thrasymachus. Hobbes maintains that
morality and justice are not natural inclinations of
mankind and do not exist outside of a civitas formed by a
covenant or social contract. Prior to forming a
covenant, man lives in a state of nature, which, in
Hobbes' famous phrase, is "a war of every man against
every man ." 15 Moreover:
To this war of every man against every man, this also
is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions
15 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C.B Macpherson (New York: Peguin
Books, 1984), ch. 13; p. 185 .
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of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no place.
Where there is no common power, there is no law, where nolaw, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two
cardinal virtues.
There are, according to Hobbes, two fundamental laws
of nature which man can ascertain through his reason: "to
seek peace" and "to defend ourselves ." 16 These cause man
to make a pact or covenant with his fellows to the effect
that they all give up certain natural rights (including
"the right to every thing; even to one another's body")
to a common authority (the sovereign or Leviathan) in
order to secure peace. The sovereign, of course, is not
subject to any authority, and is therefore "subject to no
laws whatsoever ." 17 As Hobbes puts it, "nothing the
sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what
pretence soever, can properly be called injustice or
injury,
"
to include, he adds. putting to death an
innocent person ! 18 Moreover, those who are not
participants in the covenant. i.e. citizens of other
nations, are enemies, and "the infliction of what evil
soever. on an innocent man. that is not a subject. if it
be for the benefit of the commonwealth, is not a breach
of the law of nature ." 19
ibid.
,
ch
.
14; p- 190.
ibid. ch 29; p. . 367.
Ibid. ch 21, p- 264-5.
Ibid. ch 00(N p- 360. This would justify genocide for the "good"
of the state.
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One consequence of this is that in the international
community, individual states or nations, not having
formed a covenant and recognizing no common authority,
remain in a constant state of war with one another.
( War consists not [simply] in actual fighting; but the
known disposition thereto, during all the time there is
no assurance to the contrary." 20 ) Therefore the same
characteristics which describe man's natural (pre-
covenant) relationships--" the notions of right and wrong,
justice and injustice have no place"— are always
applicable to international relationships.
It is easy to see the relationship between Hobbes's
account of realism and that of Thucydides and Callicles.
First, all three accept that the relationships which
should obtain between states are the same as those which
do obtain between individuals— au naturel . Thucydides
holds that there is no difference in the standards of
behavior of men and nations: when either is "confronted
with imperious necessities, " it is a law of nature that
"the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what
they must." Callicles, however, accepts Thucydides'
account of man's natural, self-interested disposition,
but rather than deny all selfless behavior, he explains
it as a misguided convention. And finally, Hobbes adopts
these earlier "realistic" views of human nature, but
Ibid., ch . 13; p. 186.
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instead of using them to justify self-interested
behavior, uses them to provide a rationale for adopting
standards of conduct.
There are a number of well-known difficulties for
Hobbes's position
.
21 One might, for example, simply deny
Hobbes' assessment of human nature. While it is
certainly true that in those situations where laws are
not applicable men often act in their own interests (i.e.
selfishly)
,
it is not at all clear that they always do.
Others might argue that Hobbes' subjective definiton of
good and evil (he defines "good" as that which is desired
and evil as that to which one has an aversion) allows the
same thing to be both good and not-good--a conclusion
which many find disconcerting. For our purposes,
however, it is enough to simply point out these issues,
and focus our discussion on two more decisive problems
with Hobbes' argument.
By giving men in a state of nature the right to
defend themselves against physical attack, Hobbes creates
a kind of self-administering justice based on an
atomistic assessment of man's capabilities. In the
following passage Marshall Cohen notes one consequence of
this position : 22
21 See Michael Oakeshott, "Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas
Hobbes," in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, (New York:
Methuen, 1984), pp. 249-300.
22 Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," in
Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (Fall 1984): 321.
24
We may concede that in the state of nature individualshave a right to defend themselves against physical
attack. Indeed, we may think they act justly when they
do so, and argue that this in itself insures the notion
of justice application in the state of
nature [because] in the state of nature men are equal
in the sense that even the weakest can kill the
strongest. But, in fact, young children, and those who
are seriously incapacitated by injury or disease, will
often constitute no threat even in the Hobbesian state of
nature. To rape or kill them would clearly be unjust.
Not even for all practical purposes does the right of
~defense yield a right of universal aggression.
. . . If
individuals are prohibited from attacking those who do
not threaten them, so are nations. Even in the
international state of nature it will not be permissible
to attack ... those who do not constitute a physical
threat
.
We recall that although Hobbes has argued that to
attack innocents is not unjust if it "provides a benefit
to the commonwealth, " Cohen' s is a case where attacking
innocents would result in no such benefit. Of course,
Hobbes can still claim that even arbitrary or completely
"unjustified" cruelty is natural and not unjust, but this
leads us to a second, and even more serious objection.
Hobbes identifies nineteen "laws of nature" which
"are not properly laws, but qualities which dispose men
to peace and obedience ." 23 Only when a commonwealth is
established do the laws of nature become "actual" (civil)
laws because then there is a sovereign power which
obliges men to obey them. These laws of nature include:
seek peace, enter covenants, perform covenants once
23 Leviathan, ch . 26; p. 314. The nineteen laws of nature are found
in ch. 15, pp. 201-216.
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entered, return good will for good will, complaisance
toward fellows, forgiveness, equal treatment, sharing
with others, etc. The problem for Hobbes is his
contention that in the state of nature these laws of
nature do not apply, but once a covenant is entered into,
they then become the basis for justice and injustice. 24
Why then, it is reasonable to ask, would anyone always
obey the covenant? Hobbes answers this question with the
claim that two of the laws of nature are: a) man shall
enter convenants; and b) that he shall obey them when
entered. But surely the laws which result from such
covenants have no force until after the covenant is
established! It seems circular to argue that men ought
to obey the laws of nature because of the covenant, when
obeying the covenant is one of the laws of nature— i.e.
men ought to obey the covenant because of the covenant.
Thus Hobbes cannot account for just behavior solely on
the basis of the social contract--there must be grounding
for morality in human nature itself. As a minimum, man
must be naturally disposed to promise-making and promise-
keeping in order for Hobbes' argument to work. These
traits, however, are clearly those of social beings, not
of brutes who equate force with justice and are in a
continual state of war with one another.
24 ibid., p. 314.
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One might attempt to answer this objection by
arguing that the sovereign or Leviathan—the mortal God
on earth--provides the impetus for obeying the terms of
the covenant. This is inadequate, however, because it
would only explain conformity to the terms of the
covenant under the prospect of being caught and punished;
everyone would ignore the terms of the covenant except
in those instances where they believed they would be
found out by the central authority; and such an
interpretation is inconsistent with Hobbes / language
which declares that men "ought to obey the covenant" and
that they "have a duty" not to hinder those to whom
rights are granted. Moreover under these conditions it
seems that life in the commonwealth would be no better
than life in the state of nature—and in fact, it
probably would be even worse. At least in the state of
nature you know what to expect from everyone; in this
commonwealth not only would each individual still have to
worry about his fellows, but he would also have to
contend with an adversarial what-can-I-get-away-with
relationship with the government.
In the final analysis then, Hobbes' version of
realism fails because it cannot adequately account for
the fact that man sometimes acts in accordance with moral
precepts. Let's now turn to a modern realist who
27
accepts a moral dimension to man's nature, but denies
that it is relevant to international relations.
Hans J. Morgenthau25
Like Thrasymachus
,
Hans Morgenthau argues that the
test of political success is the degree to which one is
to maintain or increase one's power over others. 26
He defines international politics as "a continuing effort
to maintain and to increase the power of one's own nation
and to keep in check or reduce the power of other
nations. ^7 Politics is different from interpersonal
relations, he argues, because while the latter is often
governed by ethical considerations, the former never is.
This distinction between the ethical realm of
interpersonal relations and the political realm of
international relations is central to Morgenthau ' s
position
.
Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception
of human nature. Real man is a composite of "economic
man," "political man," "moral man," "religious man," etc.
A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a
beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral
2 S
I can add very little of substance to the the many excellent
critical analyses of Morgenthau' s position. See for example,
Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," in
Philosophy and Public Affairs 13, no. 4 (Fall 1984); Charles R.
Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979.
26 Hans J. Morgenghau, "Trying to Be Just," in Truth and Power:
Essays of a Decade
,
1960-10, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p.
62.
27 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1973), p. 230.
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constraints. A man who was nothing but "moral man" would
be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in
prudence
.
°
One should not conclude from this that Morgenthau
believes that men generally behave justly toward one
another--only that they often are motivated by "good
intentions." This is proper for man in society, even
though he is rarely successful in his well-meaning
designs; but it is completely improper, and in fact
false, to lay claim to such a disposition in the
international arena. Morgenthau does not stop here; he
goes on to identify political behavior as the antithesis
of moral behavior.
That political action and doing evil are inevitably
linked becomes fully clear only when we recognize ... that
it is unattainable for an action at the same time to
conform to the rules of the political art (i.e. to
achieve political success) and to conform to the rules of
ethics (i.e. to be good in itself). The test of political
success is the degree to which one is able to maintain,
to increase, or to demonstrate one's power over others.
The test of a morally good action is the degree to which
it is capable of treating others not as means to the
actor's ends but as ends in themselves. It is for this
reason alone inevitable that, whereas nonpolitical action
is ever exposed to corruption by selfishness and lust for
power, this corruption is inherent in the very nature of
the political act (my emphasis). ^9
28 Ibid., p. 14.
2 ^ Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 196.
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Although Morgenthau identifies himself with other
realists such as Thucydides, Thrasymachus, and Hobbes
,
30
his version of realism is distinct because of the
disparity he recognizes between precepts governing
individual behavior and those governing political
behavior. What man labels as ethics in the political
arena, he argues, is really no more than the animus
dominandi struggle for "power after power which ceases
only in death" couched in "ideological justifications and
rationalizations ." 31 He concludes that any efforts toward
moral behavior in the international arena are both false
and dangerous. False, he claims, because all such action
is actually motivated by self-interest; and dangerous,
because it deludes the citizenry into believing that
their ideology is somehow superior to that of other
nations . 32 It is this belief in the moral superiority of
one's cause (or ideology) which contributes to zealotry
and ideological wars (or crusades )
.
33 And furthermore,
not only does belief in the superiority of one's ideology
lead to war, the type of war to which it leads is
especially catastrophic for the participants because "you
o
ft See Truth and Power, p. 62; Politics Among Nations, pp. 8 & 38;
and In Defense of National Interest, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1951), p. 34.
31 Idem, Politics Among Nations, p. 89 ff. The earlier quotation in
this sentence is from Hobbes', Leviathan, p. 161, ch . XI.
33 Ibid., pp. 90-1.
33 Ibid., pp. 94-5 & 240.
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you cannot compromisecan compromise interests, but
principles .
"
34
The citizen of a modern warring nation ... "crusades for an
"ideal," a set of "principles," a "way of life," for
which he claims a monopoly of truth and virtue. In
consequence, he fights to the death or to "unconditional
surrender" all those who adhere to another, a false and
evil, "ideal" and "way of life.". ..the distinctions
between fighting [soldiers] and disabled soldiers,
combatants and civilians—if they are not eliminated
altogether are subordinated to the one distinction that
really matters: the distinction between... the right and
the wrong philosophy and way of life. The moral duty to
spare the wounded, the sick, the surrendering and unarmed
enemy, and to respect him as a human being who was an
enemy only by virtue of being found on the other side of
the fence, is superseded by the moral duty to punish and
to wipe off the face of the earth the professors and
practitioners of evil. 35
Morgenthau's argument is that a lack of realism in
politics does not prevent or curtail man's innate
disposition to political domination, and in fact worsens
the means by which political intercourse is conducted.
He concludes, therefore, that a straightforward
declaration of interests--along the lines of the
Athenians in the Melian dialogue--is the proper method
for conducting international relations.
There are a number of objections one might make to
Morgenthau's postion. One might respond that his all-or-
nothing view of morality and prudence is misconceived.
On his account, morality is defined as sacrificing one's
34 Idem, "The Primacy of the National Interest," in American Scholar,
Spring 1949.
35 Idem, Politics Among Nations, p. 240.
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own interests for the good of others, while prudence is
placing one's own interests ahead of others. Because the
two are mutually exclusive, whenever we act in our own
interests we are acting immorally. And even if one
accepts the questionable contention that actions have no
moral worth unless they involve self-sacrifice, it is
unreasonable to suppose that all actions motivated by
sslf interest are immoral (or, as he claims, evil)
.
Surely the only time actions motivated by self-interest
are immoral is when they have at least some detrimental
effect on the well-being of another; prudent actions
which do not adversely affect others are at least amoral
rather than immoral. Morgenthau would respond, however,
that this objection takes what might be true in
interpersonal relations, and attempts to apply it to
international relations. Self-interested action by a
nation which does not affect another nation is not
politics; politics, by its very definition, means the
effort to "increase or maintain one's power over
another ," 36 and is therefore, evil. Moreover, what is
purported to be moral behavior in politics is simply the
means whereby nations rally their citizenry behind some
ideology
.
One problem with this response is that it does not
seem to match the empirical evidence. Even Thucydides
36 Ibid., p. 230. Cited previously at footnote 19.
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describes a case where the Athenians repent of a
political decision because of its cruelty, and hasten to
modify it before it is carried out. As Thucydides tells
it, the Athenians had voted to put to death the "entire
adult male population of Mitylene, and to make slaves of
the women and children," and had dispatched a galley to
carry out the orders. The order was not carried out
however, because "the morrow brought repentance with it
and reflection on the horrid cruelty of a decree which
condemned a whole city to the fate merited only by the
guilty." This "change of heart" was motivated by
conscience, not ideology.
And this points out a second difficulty for
Morgenthau. One wonders how he proposes to separate the
agents who carry out the political objective—who he
concedes are motivated by a desire to act morally— from
the political objectives themselves--which he maintains
are the antithesis of morality. Given his account,
statesmen (and those who carry out policy) would have one
pattern of moral behavior which they use when interacting
with others within the same political community, and a
second standard of conduct for those in a different
community. Not only does this seem unreasonable in
practice, but it raises the enormous problem of how one
is to determine what constitutes a political community.
If we accept Morgenthau' s definition that politics is
33
simply a process of gaining power over others by any
means possible, then what is the basis for placing any
constraints on political groups within a particular state
or community? And if Morgenthau responds that he is
referring only to international politics, how can he be
so certain that some people (or nations) don't recognize
a world community?
A third problem for Morgenthau is his selected use
of the domestic analogy. In order to maintain that a
nation can have interests
,
one must imagine either that
they are derived from a consensus of the individual
interests of the members of that nation, or that nations
are analogous to individuals in that they attempt to
"behave" in ways which maximize their own well-being. If
the former provides the basis for crediting a state with
having interests, then it seems ludicrous to accept a
desire for moral action as a primary motive in human
behavior, and then simply to omit it as a factor in
actions based on a group consensus
!
In other words. if
each member of a group individually recognizes certain
moral obligations, it seems unreasonable to suppose that
the same group will adopt policies which ignore these
obligations. The other alternative is to think of a
group or nation as analogous to a person; and just as a
person can have interests, achievements, and well-being,
so can a nation. But it seems highly questionable to
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derive our concept of how a group can and should act
based on an analogy between groups and individuals (or
families)
,
and then to omit selectively what we recognize
to be crucial human characteristics. If we are going to
argue that states are analogous to individuals in that
both have interests which often provide the impetus for
action, then it seems unreasonable not to accept
analogous motives. Morgenthau concedes that individuals
are frequently motivated solely by a desire to help
others in civil society, and that this is how it should
be, but he wants to exclude this as acceptable behavior
in the society of nations. It seems to me that he must
either accept this "human" propensity for states as well-
-or provide some concrete reasons why it does not apply.
Hence in seeking to avoid the problem which proved a
nemesis for Hobbes (i.e. accounting for the fact that
individuals occasionally behave morally when it is not to
their advantage to do so)
,
Morgenthau has created an
insurmountable obstacle for himself--viz
. ,
accounting for
a disparity in the motives for action which he wishes to
attribute to individuals and groups.
And finally, there is yet another, probably the most
serious, objection to Morgenthau' s realism--and it is
offered by Morgenthau himself. In discussing genocide,
he maintains that it is morally wrong and that it should
35
not be done even when it is in a nation's interests to do
it . 37
The limitation [against genocide] derives from an
absolute moral principle, which must be obeyed regardless
of considerations of national advantage. A foreign
policy of this kind, therefore, actually sacrifices the
national interest where its consistent pursuit would
necessitate the violation of a moral principle, such as
the prohibition of mass killings in times of peace. This
point cannot be too strongly made...
Morgenthau goes on to argue that even necessity
cannot be used as a justification for mass killings.
Considering his previous definition of politics as simply
the "no holds barred" quest for power, one wonders where
he proposes to ground this "absolute moral principle"
against genocide! Moreover, he seems to allude to other
moral principles which also override considerations of
national interest. This directly contradicts his previous
argument that moral principles have no place in
international politics. It seems that even Morgenthau
himself is not prepared to accept all of the logical
consequences of his own theory, and hence we may
ourselves safely reject it.
A reasonable alternative to the realist arguments
that we have been considering is to take the position
that there exists an international society of states
which is analogous to civil society in that each member
37 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations
,
p. 234.
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has certain rights and duties that others acknowledge and
that inhibit unrestrained aggression. in later
discussions we will examine in some detail what these
rights and duties might be.
The realists we've discussed so far have all taken
the broad position that self-interest is (or should be)
the only consideration in international politics. One
consequence of this line of reasoning is that there is no
such thing as jus ad bellumi i.e., all wars are just wars
(except, perhaps, wars fought for moral considerations,
which Morgenthau says are unjust!)
. A military realist
,
however, might agree with our conclusion that justice and
morality do have a place in the international arena, but
argue that once a war has begun, then there are no
constraints which one can reasonably place on how that
war should be fought. This individual accepts the
conventional concept of jus ad bellum, but denies jus in
bello .
37
CHAPTER 2
REALISM AND FIGHTING WARS
Imagine that you have been unjustly attacked by a
dangerous opponent, and that you are fighting for your
Are there any reasonable limits which you should
place on your actions--in terms of whom you can attack
and how you can attack them--especially when doing so
might give your opponent, who recognizes no such
restrictions, a decided advantage? The military realist
answers this in the negative, and uses the domestic
analogy to conclude that no such restrictions should
apply to nations which are fighting a defensive or just
war. Those who start wars commit crimimal acts, they
argue, and when war fighting becomes necessary as a means
of distributing justice, the rules and constraints which
normally restrain behavior are overridden by the
requirement for self-defense. In fact, it would be
ludicrous to make rules to govern criminal activity.
Inter arma silent leges: in war the law is silent. Those
who take this view deny the force of jus in bello, or
justice in war. They argue that in war there are no
constraints on either who can be attacked or how one can
attack them. Let's examine the arguments of two
theorists who have been credited with variations of this
view
.
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Carl von Clausewitz
Clausewitz differs from the realists discussed
previously in that he recognizes a clear distinction
between the precepts which should govern political
methodology and the ones that pertain to military
affairs. Although he recognizes war as "a branch of
political activity," and "an instrument of policy," he is
always careful to emphasize that it is "a continuation of
political intercourse carried on with other means ." 1
Thus he can consistently advocate unrestricted action on
the battlefield while still maintaining a notion of
justice in international relations.
Clausewitz describes war as "nothing but a duel on
a larger scale, " and goes on to conclude that "to
introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of
war itself would always lead to logical absurdity .... that
war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to
the application of that force ." 2 Thus while war must
always be responsive to the political objectives which
give it birth, its methods belong to it alone. Or as he
puts it, "Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not
its logic ." 3
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and tr. by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976). These quotations are
from pp. 605, 88, & 87 respectively. The emphasis in the last
quotation is my own.
^ Ibid., pp. 75, 76, & 77.
3 Ibid., p. 605.
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Based on observations such as these, Clausewitz has
come to be regarded as the paradigm realist. 4
Interestingly, the best response to the position which
has often been attributed to Clausewitz may be found in
Clausewitz' s own work. Clausewitz was a contemporary of
Immanuel Kant, and was greatly influenced by him in his
approach to his study of war.
5
He sought to isolate
absolute war from its empirical content in order to
understand it in a purely conceptual manner. It is
crucial to note that he draws a sharp distinction between
what he calls "the theory of war"--which refers to war in
an absolute sense—and "real war" or war in practice.
When considering war in practice he is quick to point out
that one must always "take the human factor into
account.... The art of war deals with the living and with
moral forces. Consequently, it cannot attain the
absolute. "6 And regarding his own work, he cautions his
readers
:
7
4 For a discussion of Clausewitz as a realist see Michael Walzer,
Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 23-33. According to a note which Clausewitz
left attached to the manuscript of On War
,
only the first chapter of
Book One is complete. He warned that if he did not live to complete a
revision of the entire work, it "would remain a shapeless mass of
ideas ... sub ject to much half-baked criticism." Unfortunately, this
insight proved prophetic.
5 Peter Paret, "The Genesis of On War,” an introductory essay to
above cited edition of On War, pp. 14-15. For a good discussion of
Clausewitz' s distinction between absolute and real war, see Robert L.
Phillips, War and Justice (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1984), pp. 116-130.
6 Ibid., p. 86
7 Ibid., p. 88.
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...it must be observed that the phrase, the natural
tendency of war, is used in its philosophical, strictly
logical sense alone and does not refer to the tendencies
of the forces that are actually engaged in fighting
—
including for instance, the morale and emotions of the
combatants
.
For Clausewitz, war taken purely in an ideal or
conceptual manner does not recognize things such as: a)
the moral, intellectual and emotional qualities of the
combatants; b) political objectives; or c) physical con-
straints present on the battlefield— all of which are of
paramount importance when considering actual war. "If
then civilized nations do not put their prisoners to
death or devastate cities and countries, it is because
intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of
warfare .
"
Those who cite Clausewitz' s theory of war as an
argument for military realism have failed to grasp his
crucial distinction between the concept of war, where no
moral rules apply, and the practice of war, where human
considerations are paramount— and in the final analysis,
it is the latter which governs the direction which war
takes . 8 Let's now turn to another realist, also a
successful military leader, who claims to recognize no
such distinction.
8 Ibid., p. 87.
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William T. Sherman
War is hell," General Sherman writes, and the best
thing one can do in hell is whatever is necessary to get
out of it as soon as possible. Unlike Clausewitz,
Sherman recognizes no moral constraints on the conduct of
war. He argues that the justice of one's cause is the
only considerat ion--that warfare is a means of
distributing justice in the political arena, and that
whatever actions most expeditiously bring this about are
justified: the ends justify the means.
Sherman's position is perhaps most poignantly
expressed in the correspondence he exchanged with General
Hood, the Commander of the Confederate Army at Atlanta,
in September 1864. General Sherman, the Commander of the
U. S. Forces in Georgia, initiated the correspondence
with a letter which stated that he had "deemed it in the
interest of the United States that the citizens now
residing in Atlanta should remove...." 9 When General
Hood protested "in the name of God and humanity" that
"the unprecedented measure you propose transcends, in
studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before
brought to my attention in the dark history of war, "
Sherman wrote the following response: 10
9 William T. Sherman, "War is Hell!": William T. Sherman's personnal
narrative of his march through Georgia, ed. by Mills Lane (The
Beehive Press: Savannah, 1974), p. 106.
10 Ibid., p. 107-8.
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In the name of common-sense, I ask you not to appeal to
a just God in such a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the
midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into
war dark and cruel war—who dared and badgered us to
battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and
forts... long before any overt act was committed by the
(to you) hated Lincoln government;... If we must be
enemies, let us be men, and fight it out as we propose to
do, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and
humanity
.
Sherman argues that because the Confederacy
committed the crime of starting the war, they have
forfeited their right to protection under the laws of
that system which they wish to destroy. In a letter
which Sherman wrote to the Mayor of Atlanta during the
same period, he makes this point quite clearly: "War is
cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought
war on our country deserve all the curses and
maledictions a people can pour out ." 11 According to this
view, there is nothing which cannot legitimately be done
in the name of justice; the only consideration is jus ad
bellum, or the justice of one's cause. The more just
one's cause, the less restrained one is in the means
which one might use to realize this cause.
The most obvious problem with this position is that
it ignores the fact that often both sides in a conflict
believe that their cause is just. Even the Athenians in
the Melian dialogue were at pains to argue that their
11 Quoted in John M. Gibson, Those 163 Days (New York: Coward-McCann,
Inc
. ,
1961)
,
p. 21
.
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actions were justified, as we saw in Chapter One.
Indeed, it is difficult even to imagine a war in which
one side believes that they are fighting unjustly. And
given the position that there are no restrictions on what
can be done in the name of justice, it follows that when
belligerents believe their cause to be just, there will
be no restrictions whatsoever on how they conduct the
war; i.e. anything which might contribute to victory
would be justified. On this account, there would (as
Morgenthau predicted) be no distinction between
combatants and injured soldiers, prisoners of war,
innocent civilians, and other noncombatants. Indeed,
such a war would transcend even our views of hell, where
at least suffering is governed by the idea of justice.
There are other difficulties for Sherman' s argument
as well. The most serious of these is that his view
presumes to distribute the responsibility for the actions
of a nation equally to all the citizens of that nation.
Even if we grant that the South was the aggressor in this
war (a debatable contention)
,
certainly the noncombatants
(mostly women and children) of Atlanta were not
themselves individually culpable for the crime of
starting the war! And although Sherman seems to hold that
each individual constituent's rights are forfeited
because of the actions of the state of which he/she is a
citizen, his own words and deeds run contrary to this
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post ion
. The content of his letters to Hood, as well as
his actions regarding the citizens of Atlanta, show that
Sherman recognized a moral dimension to the conduct of
war. "God will judge us in due time, and he will
pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town
full of women and the families of brave people at our
back, or to remove them in time to places of safety among
their own friends and people ." 12 Presumably Sherman means
that God will judge the morality of his treatment of the
people of Atlanta, a pointed acknowledgment that he had
some some obligation for their welfare.
Sherman certainly acknowledges his responsibility to
protect the lives and welfare of the people of Atlanta,
though Hood (and we) disagree as to the sufficiency of
the protection and the means he used to achieve it. As
Michael Walzer notes in Just and Unjust Wars, "General
Sherman, though he insisted that the cruelty of war could
not be refined, claimed nevertheless to be refining
12 War is Hell, pp. 108-9.
Most interestingly, some pacifists offer just such an argument in
support of nonviolence. Stanley Windass, for example, notes,
"Strictly speaking, there are no general rules of warfare; there are
only rules for the conduct of war by the just side--the others have
no right to be fighting at all, and their only duty would be to
surrender. You would not expect just war thinkers to draw up rules
about how a policeman should be assaulted, or how a judge should be
assassinated!" and later: "As war is essentially an act of
international justice against an international criminal, it makes no
sense to talk about 'rules of war' applying to both sides, for the
wrong side has no right to be fighting at all." He later concludes
that no war can ever be justified because of the inevitable violence
which violates Christian principles. Christianity Versus Violence
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1964), pp. 75 & 134 respectively.
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it ." 13 in Sherman's case, the question is not whether
there are some restrictions on who can be killed in the
name of justice, and how, but rather what these
restrictions ought to be.
One might respond that Sherman did not follow his
own beliefs about the way war ought to be conducted
because of the nature of the war in which he was engaged:
a war of neighbor against neighbor, American against
American. Suppose that a nation was fighting a defensive
war against an enemy who recognized no constraints on who
could be attacked, or how. Would one side still be
obligated to recognize restraints that were not
reciprocal? Some argue that "International law is not
applicable to uncivilized peoples," and that "the rules
of International law apply only when both parties
understand them and are prepared to carry them out ." 14 Is
it reasonable in such cases to expect "civilized" nations
to accept one-sided restraints on how they conduct the
war--especially when such constraints would give the
enemy a decided advantage? Suppose, for example, that a
nation is fighting a war against an alien force from
another planet that indiscriminately attacks population
J Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1977) p. 33.
14 The first quotation is from Prof. Jesse S. Reeves, quoted in "How
to Fight Savage Tribes, " by Captain Elbridge Colby in American
Journal of International Law XXI (1927), p. 280; the second is from
the British Manual of Military Law (1914), p. 235, quoted in the same
source
.
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centers and places no value whatsoever on human life or
suffering. Surely under such circumstances it would be
unreasonable for the defenders to accept certain
constraints when the attackers do not. In order to
answer this question, let's return briefly to our
domestic analogy.
Imagine that a person is defending himself in a life
and death struggle against a wild animal that is
attempting to kill him. Even in a situation such as this
there are limits to what one might reasonably do to
secure his own safety . It would be wrong, for instance,
to kill or incapacitate other innocent people as a means
of diverting the threat from oneself. Thus while there
might be no constraints on the force one might use
against the attacking animal, there are limits on what
can be done to innocents in the name of self-defense.
Likewise, it would be wrong for a state to destroy
knowingly its own cities and citizens for some strategic
or tactical purpose, regardless of the enemy's
willingness to do the same. In a later section we will
examine the moral principles that support these
prohibitions and I will argue that the same
considerations which govern the protection of one's own
innocents, should also dictate how the innocents of a
belligerent nation should be treated. For now, however,
it is enough to say that in all cases there are certain
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moral limits on what methods can be used to fight wars
even when they are just wars fought against aggression.
48
CHAPTER 3
PACIFISM
Before we can begin our discussion of justum bellum,
or just war, we must establish that it is possible for
wars to be just--that there are occasions where the use
of force is morally permissible. Pacifists deny the idea
of justum bellum on a number of grounds; we will examine
each of them.
Situational Pacifism
We begin by distinguishing between pacifism as an
explanation of one's political views and pacifism as a
moral doctrine. When one adopts a pacifist stance
because of a belief that violence is not a justifiable
alternative in a particular context, this might be called
situational pacifism
.
It takes considerable courage to
abjure violence in the face of governmental and societal
pressure, and those who take such action often elicit a
certain respect and sympathy from those who do not—even
when both groups completely disagree over the rationale
for the pacifist's stance. This is Thoreau's challenge
in Civil Disobedience when he writes: "The soldier is
applauded who refuses to serve in an unjust war by those
who do not refuse to sustain the unjust government which
makes the war; is applauded by those whose own act and
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This view
authority he disregards and sets at naught ." 1
does not
,
however, provide an example of pacifism as a
moral doctrine. A citizen could adopt a pacifist stance
regarding a particular war or situation, and still
believe that the use of violence would be justified in
other situations. Likewise, one might adopt a kind of
private pacifism and refuse to participate in any act of
violence himself, without condemning others who do so.
We can imagine someone applauding or even encouraging
others who employ violence as a means of stopping
genocide or preventing a heinous crime, while refusing to
take such actions themselves.
We must also take care to distinguish between an
opposition to the use of military force and an opposition
to conscription. Although it is often the latter which
manifests itself as a pacifist movement, and though we
often refer to those who espouse the latter as pacifists,
an opposition to mandatory military service does not
necessarily mean an opposition to the use of force to
achieve political objectives.
Each of these examples illustrates the difference
between adopting a pacifist stance in a particular
context and taking the position that everyone always
ought to do so. In order for pacifism to qualify as a
1 Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in Thoreau: Walden and
Other Writings, (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1965), p. 91.
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moral doctrine, it must be formulated so that it applies
universally ; 2 but the situational pacifist doesn't make
any such universal normative claims. It is not enough,
therefore, to argue that nonviolent methods are sometimes
(even usually) preferable to violent ones; pacifists must
defend the position that nonviolence is always the only
correct moral choice . 3
Some pacifists attempt to meet this criterion of
universality by drawing a distinction between war as a
form of violence, and violence per se. Teichman, for
example, argues that a state's internal violence (police
action) and external violence (military action) are
different because the various components of the judicial
system are missing in military actions.
In a civilized country punishment is in the first place
a matter for the courts and subsequently a matter for the
prison service .... it is easy to see that there are at
least three different jobs here; there is the job of
2 See Richard B. Brant, "Two Tests of Ethical Principles: Consistency
and Generality" Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and
Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Princeton Hall, Inc., 1959),
Chapter 2, pp. 16-36. Also Marcus G. Singer, "Generalization in
Ethics," Mind, Vol. 64 (1955).
3 Duane Clady attempts to defend pacifism by placing it and what he
calls "warism" on a "moral continuum." He concludes that: "It would
be foolish to claim that nonviolent action always succeeds against
any enemy, just as it would be foolish to claim that violence always
succeeds against any enemy.... The pragmatic objections to pacifism,
once examined, are not decisive refutations at all." From Warism to
Pacifism: A Moral Continuum (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1989), pp. 104-5. It is difficult to understand Clady' s point here,
unless it is a trivial one. I don't know of anyone who argues that
peaceful settlements of disputes are not almost always preferable to
violent ones, or that civil disobedience and nonviolent resistence
aren't sometimes appropriate means for bringing about change.
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deciding on guilt, the job of deciding on the proper
amount of punishment, and the job of carrying out thepunishment once decided. The task of the police is afourth.... in warfare there is no parallel division of
roles. If we insist on the alleged analogy we will have
to allow that the battlefield is police beat, courtroom,
gaol and execution block all rolled into one. 4
Teichman seems to misunderstand the role of the
military in "civilized" countries. Surely we recognize
that the military establishment in this country does not
decide when to go to war, or even when to quit fighting
—
these are political decisions. The power to declare war
(thereby passing judgment on another nation's actions) is
reserved for Congress, not the military establishment.
Strategic decisions regarding the conduct of the war are
largely political rather that military. The decision to
cease fighting is likewise a political rather than a
military one. Finally, negotiations concerning the terms
surrounding the cessation of hostilities (punishments)
are part of the political franchise. Indeed, in this
country military officers are prohibited by law from
being active in any political activities. Perhaps it is
worthwhile to recall Clausewitz's maxim that war is
merely an extension of politics .. .political intercourse
carried out by other means.
When a civilized nation resorts to violence as a
means of settling a dispute it is a political decision
4 Jenny Teichman, Pacifism and the Just War: A Study in Applied
Philosophy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 41.
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made by the due process of a legitimate government. The
relationship which warriors of belligerent nations bear
to each other is not one of judge, jury, or jailer, but
of opposing pawns in the business of politics. The
proper employment of both soldiers and police officers is
as agents engaged in the enterprise of sustaining a just
communal order on behalf and at the request of their
community's citizens.
Teichman notes that perhaps the confusion between
war and other kinds of violence is caused because at one
time the military was responsible for internal order, but
that this is no longer so; we might add that at
particular times the military has also been the body
which made the political decisions, but that this is no
longer so. Additionally, it is worthwhile to note that
the idea of subordinating the military to the political
is not a modern innovation. Plato affirms that "the art
that generals practice is but a servant of
statesmanship ." 5 The distinction in roles to which
Teichman refers is due to specialization, rather than
conceptual innovation. The argument that military
violence is different in kind from police violence
because of the comingling of roles (i.e. soldiers are at
once judge, jailor, etc.) is a vacuous one. Later we
5 Plato, Statesman 305a9, in Plato: Collected Dialogues , ed. by Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 1066. See also Protagoras 322b4-5, p. 319.
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will return to the topic of how duties are assigned to
various roles or offices and will explore whether or not
there are any limitations on such duties and, if so, what
they are.
For now, however, let's examine two alternative
arguments which delineate a distinction between war and
other forms of violence. Both of these conclude that
while certain types or instances of violence might, on
occasion, be justified, the use of violence to achieve
political objectives (i.e. war), is never justified.
The first of these arguments objects to the notion
of jus ad bellum on utilitarian grounds. Proponents of
this view hold that the inevitable consequences of war
are so disastrous, so catastrophic in terms of human
suffering, that its evil effects invariably outweigh the
value of any political objectives for which it might be
fought. Even in the name of self-defense, they argue, it
is irrational to consciously employ human suffering for
the purpose of preventing suffering, since the amount of
suffering caused always exceeds that which one is
attempting to prevent. Because the objectives in going
to war are never worth the costs associated with fighting
it, war is immoral . 6
6 For one example of this popular view see Barbara Deming in
"Nonviolence and Casualties," in Peace and War, ed. by Charles R.
Beitz and Theodore Herman (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company,
1973), pp. 375-377. "One can... be certain that if one adopts the
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This argument is not new
.
Arjuna presents Vishnu,
Krishna and disguised
similar objection just
battle
.
7
In the Bhagavad-Gita,
the Supreme God, incarnated as
as Arjuna' s charioteer, with a
as they are about to enter
Krishna ! as I behold, come here to shed
Their common blood, yon concourse of our kin.
My members fail, my tongue dries in my mouth,
A shudder thrills my body, and my hair
Bristles with horror;
. .
.
It is not good, 0 Keshav! nought of good
Can spring from mutual slaughter!...
Shall I deal death on these
Even though they seek to slay us?...
If they be
Guilty, we shall grow guilty by their deaths;
* *
Better I deem it, if my kinsmen strike,
To face them weaponless, and bare my breast
To shaft and spear, than answer blow with blow.
A second argument for pacifism is based on the
premise that it is impossible for war--especially modern
war to be fought justly. Modern long range and area
type weapons are far too indiscriminate in their lethal
effects for them to be employed justly. A war which
cannot discriminate between the deaths of combatants and
discipline of nonviolence that in the long run one will receive fewer
casualties" (p. 376)
.
Bhagavad-Gita, tr. by Sir Edwin Arnold, in Sacred Writings vol. 2
of Harvard Classics vol. 45, ed. by Charles W. Elliot (New York: P.F.
Collier & Son, 1938), pp. 787-9. Krishna responds to Arjuna "if thou
shunn'st this honorable field, .. knowing thy duty and thy task—that
will be sin ...
.
Find full reward in doing right in right ! Let right deeds be thy
motive, not the fruit which comes from them" (pp. 793-4)
.
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the deaths of innocents violates jus in bello and is,
therefore, immoral. As one author puts it:
. . .whatever excuses Thomas Aquinas or Luther might find
for the local and professional conflicts of their days
are wholly irrelevant to the mass-murder, the bestiality
3nd the terrorism of weir as it is todey.®
It is important to notice that those who support
either of these views have no argument against violence
per se, but only against violence under certain
circumstances. If, for example, a war could be fought
which didn't indiscriminately kill innocents. or for
which the objectives achieved were worth the cost of
fighting the war, then such a war might be justified
under either of these views . 9
O
Charles E. Raven, War and the Christian (New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1972), pp. 143-4.
Another variation of this argument is proposed by Donald Wells who
states: "Conceivably some medieval sword thrusts might have been made
justly, and some fortified cities justly sacked. The entire
distinction vanishes, however, once we admit weapons that shoot
farther than the eye can see. And clearly this distinction has been
lost once we use mega-weapons, and even what are called conventional
weapons, like fragmentation bombs and napalm." Struckmeyer responds
to this position by noting that not only have long range weapons such
as canons and longbows existed for hundreds of years, but that modern
wars are not more catastrophic in terms of numbers of deaths—both
military and civilian—than were earler wars (e.g. in China where
single wars have killed tens of millions of people) . "The key
philosophical question," Struckmeyer notes, "is whether we should
ever be prepared, under some circumstances, to go to war. In short:
are wars ever justified?" See Wells, "How Much Can the Just War
Justify?" Journal of Philosophy 66 (December 4, 1969) : 819-29;
Frederick R. Struckmeyer, "The 'Just War' and the Right of Self-
defense," Journal of Philosophy 82 (October 1971): 48-55.
9 Thomas Nagel raises an interesting variation to this argument by
formulating it in rule utilitarian terms: " [it] might be claimed
that a uniform policy of never resorting to military force would do
less harm in the long run, if followed consistently, than a policy of
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The obvious response to both of these positions is
to argue that they are not supported by historical facts.
The systematic genocide perpetrated on innocents by the
likes of Adolf Hitler, Idi Amin, and Pol Pot was
abhorrent enough not only to justify the use of force,
but to make its use obligatory as a means of bringing an
end to such catastrophic humanitarian abuses. In cases
such as these, the utility comparison supports the use of
force
.
10
Nor is it inevitable that war always result in the
widespread, indiscriminate deaths of innocents. Both
the Seven Day War between Israel and Egypt and the
Falkland Island War between England and Argentina are
examples of recent wars which did not result in
indiscriminate civilian deaths.
Even in the absence of these historical examples,
however, one need only point out that it is possible for
deciding each case on utilitarian grounds (even though on occasion
particular applications of the pacifist policy might have worse
results than a specific utilitarian decision) " see "War and
Massacre," in War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1974), pp. 5-6. We will consider a variation of
this position in our discussion of nuclear weapons later in this
chapter
.
I® While Teichman argues that war is "intrinsically evil" and that
"even from a Utilitarian standpoint it is clear that war is the worst
possible way of resolving differences," she goes on to add however:
"On the other hand, it is possible for a national leader to be faced
with a forced choice between the two specific evils of engaging in a
defensive war and allowing some dreadful catastrophe such as genocide
to overwhelm his people .... faced with that forced choice, a national
leader ought to opt for the former...." Pacifism and the Just War,
p. 109.
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some war to be fought justly. Once the possibility is
acknowledged, the problem becomes one of determining what
the conditions are for the just conduct of war.
Rather than providing a justification for pacifism
as a moral doctrine, these two arguments for situational
pacifism provide us with crucial considerations for the
notions of jus ad bellum and jus in hello which we will
develop in a later chapter. For now, however, it is
enough to point out that neither of these pacifist
stances convinces us that all war is immoral—only that
war under certain conditions is; it will remain for us
to determine later, and with more detail, precisely what
those conditions are.
Before we turn our attention to moral arguments
against violence, there is a slightly different but
similar argument specifically against war which merits
our attention: the anti-nuclear argument.
Proponents of this view maintain that given the
proliferation of nuclear weapons it is inevitable that
eventually modern war will escalate to nuclear war, and
the consequences of nuclear war are too catastrophic to
be justifiable under any circumstances. As Pope John
XXIII writes in Pacem in Terris: "in this age which
boasts of its atomic power it no longer makes sense to
maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to
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repair the violation of justice .*’ 11 Those who defend
this view argue that the use of nuclear weapons will make
a mockery of both jus ad helium and jus in hello: of the
former because the long term dangers of radioactive
fallout and environmental contamination—potentially
against one's own population or that of one's allies
—
make the utilitarian objection insurmountable, and of
the latter because nuclear weapons are far too
indiscriminate in whom they kill— in both the long and
the short term for them ever to be employed justly. A
renowned psychologist, Eric Fromm, expresses these
sentiments this way:
Whatever the rationale of previous wars may have been
—
defense against attack, economic gain, liberation, glory,
the preservation of a way of life—such rationale does
not hold true for nuclear war. There is no defense, no
gain, no liberation, no glory, when at the very "best"
half the population of one's country has been incinerated
within hours, all cultural centers have been destroyed,
and a barbaric, brutalized life remains in which those
still alive will envy the dead. 1 ^
One response to this rule utilitarian line of
reasoning is to question the contention that the use of
11 Pacem in Terris, 1st ed., S.264 (London: Catholic Truth Society,
1967), para. 127. Quoted in "A Christian Unilateralism," Bruce Kent,
in Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence, ed. by Geoffrey Goodwin (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 56.
1 9 •Eric Fromm, The Heart of Man, Volume 12 in Religious Perspectives
Series, ed. by Ruth Wanda Anshem (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p.
56. Reprinted in "The Impossibility of Civilized Warfare," in The
Morality of Peace and War, ed. by Martin T. Woods and Robert
Buckenmeyer (Santa Barbara, California: Intelman Books, 1974), p.
229.
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nuclear weapons is inevitable. Numerous wars have been
fought since 1945 where at least one belligerent
possessed nuclear capability, and there has not been a
single case where a nuclear weapon, even a tactical one,
has been used. 13 Here the pacifist must contend that we
should refrain from choosing an alternative which we
would generally acknowledge to be the right one because
of possible future events which don't bear any
recognizable causal relationship to the present
alternative which we reject--a perverse form of post hoc
ergo propter hoc .
Another difficulty for this position is that it,
like the two previous ones, is not an argument against
war per se, but against a particular type of war.
Perhaps it is true that the use of nuclear weapons
against another people can never be justified. If so,
then it is because of the effects of such weapons--i
. e
.
they violate our notions of justum beHum--not because
they are nuclear weapons. This can easily be seen if one
imagines a case where the detonation of a nuclear weapon
might be an acceptable alternative. Suppose, for
example, that one could deter a large scale conflict by
demonstrating the power of a nuclear explosion on a
1 *3 Examples include the Korean War, Vietnam War, Falkland War, and
Afghanistan War. Nations which are known or believed to have the
ability to produce nuclear weapons include U.S., U.S.S.R., England,
France, India, South Africa, Canada, China, and Israel.
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lifeless volcanic island (or underground); or imagine
deterring an alien attack by detonating a nuclear weapon
on the moon (or in space)
. In such cases the use of such
a weapon might be a reasonable alternative. If so, then
the objection to nuclear weapons must be stated in terms
of effect; and consequently, the use of any type of
weapon—conventional, nuclear, or yet to be discovered—
which would produce like effects would likewise be
immoral. And surely we would want to hold that it would
be immoral to use any weapon which would indiscriminately
kill millions of innocents. Again, this seems to be an
issue which should be addressed when determining
constraints on the just conduct of war, rather than the
justifiability of war itself. The nuclear argument then,
like the previous examples of situational pacifism, will
be examined in our later discussions of just war
doctrine
.
Finally, suppose that a pacifist were to argue that
violence is not necessarily wrong, but that taking a
human life is always wrong. This argument is not a
utilitarian one: e.g. even if killing a wrongdoer bent on
evil (with a bomb or a missile, for example) will save
lives, it is still forbidden because the prohibition
against killing is an absolute one. Comparisons of
consequences (i.e. choosing the lesser or two wrongs) do
not justify breaking the principle.
61
The problem with this formulation is that if we
accept violence as a legitimate alternative, there is
always the possibility that death might inadvertently
result from the same. And if we modify the principle so
that it is only the intentional taking of human life
which is always wrong, we have simply invoked a variation
of the principle of double effect
.
14 Under this caveat
one could take actions which will result in human deaths
(bad effect) provided that the deaths are the unintended
and unavoidable result of a separate and proportional
good effect toward which we are aiming. Notice that the
bad effect (loss of life) need not be unforeseen—after
all, the use of extreme violence against another always
raises the possibility of fatal injury—merely
unintended
.
This example of what Elizabeth Anscombe has called
"double think" is a ruse whereby the "absolutist" may
interject considerations of consequences (in terms of
good and bad effects) into his moral reasoning . 15 And as
Melzer has observed:
14 The principle of double effect recognizes that acts which have
both a good and a forseen bad effect are permissible provided that
the bad effect is unintended, unavoidable, and proportional to the
good effect. The origins of this doctrine are discussed in Chapter
Six
.
Michael Walzer provides a powerful argument for a fourth condition
which seems to have been now adopted by the U. S. in the employment
of its armed forces: viz., that actions must be taken to minimize the
bad effect even at the risk of one's own soldier's lives. See Just
and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 152-9.
15 Anscombe, War and Morality, p. 50.
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:
'
'
L
u
6 effect] is the curious notion that one's heart13 both morally and epistemologically in a privileged
status in the sense that the value of one's intentions
always outweighs that of the results of one's actions,
and that even given overwhelming external empirical
evidence, only one's intentions can really be known
certainly.
The principle of double effect, as formulated above,
would justify overriding the absolute prohibition against
killing for self-defense, defense of one's community,
preservation of liberty, and any number of other
proportionally good effects as long as the taking of life
remained an inadvertent side effect of one's good
intentions. Clearly this is not a pacifist position.
Another alternative for the pacifist who would
distinguish violence which incidently results in
deathwhom they kill from the intentional taking of life
is to call the former wrong but excusable (at least
insofar as the act of killing is concerned)
,
and call the
latter wrong and inexcusable
. Now, however, he must
delineate criteria for determining the conditions which
would make a wrong act excusable. Would, for example,
violence undertaken in self-defense or defense of others
be sufficient justification for excusing one for the
results of such violence? If so, then it is difficult to
Yehuda Melzer, Concepts of Just War (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff,
1975.), p. 133.
1 7 Paul Woodruff finds the distinction between excusable and
inexcusable wrongs useful in examining the issues of noncombatant
deaths in war. See "Justification or Excuse: Saving Soldiers at the
Expense of Civilians, " Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary
Vol
.
VIII (1982): pp. 159-76.
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see how this differs substantially from the principle of
double effect in that the basis for the excusal replaces
the good effect which "permits" the wrong (i.e. bad
effect) action.
Let's now examine two arguments which base their
opposition to war on an opposition to violence and
advocate pacifism as a moral doctrine.
Early Christianity and Pacifism
In the first few centuries following Christ's
crucifixion, up until the time of Constantine's
conversion to Christianity, many Christians refused
military service. Some scholars have speculated that
they did so primarily because of the requirement for
idolatry rather than on pacifist grounds. 18 The Roman
Army traditionally required that all higher ranks,
Centurion upward, sacrifice to the emperor; and even
though lower ranks did not have to actively participate,
they had to be present at the ceremony, swear allegiance
to the emperor, and wear a badge bearing the emperor's
effigy. At the beginning of the 4th Century, however,
the requirement for idolatry was extended to all ranks in
order to identify the Christians who were at the time
1
8
Elizabeth Anscombe defends this position in "War and Murder, " in
War and Morality, ed. by Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, California:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 48-9. See also Arthur F.
Holmes, "The Just War," in War: Four Christian Views, ed. by Robert
G. Clouse (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1981), pp. 117-135.
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being subjected to severe persecution. Those who refused
to perform the required idolatry were tortured and
executed. 19 in the well known case of the Forty Martyrs
(A.D. 316), Licinius, in attempting to rid his forces of
Christians, forced forty of them either to renounce
Christianity or to lie naked on a frozen lake all
night
.
20
Records of Christians in the military are frequently
cited as evidence that it was not pacifism, but the
expansion of the requirement for idolatry and increased
persecution, which caused many Christians to avoid
military service. While much of the historical evidence
most often cited is undoubtedly accurate, there is
another interpretation of the evidence which is more
consistent with all available information and which
convinces us that many early Christians were also
pacifists. Tertullian, writing in A.D. 199, prays
"...for security to the empire; for protection to the
imperial house; for brave armies..," but explicitly
prohibits Christians from wearing a sword irrespective of
the requirement for idolatry: 21
19 .Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations, pp. 30 &
45.
29 Ibid., pp. 45-6.
21 Tertullian, On Idolatry 19, trans. by S. Thelwall, in The Ante-
Nicene Fathers 3, reprinted in War and Christian Ethics, ed. by
Arthur F. Holmes (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1975),
pp. 43-4. The previous quotation from Tertullian is taken from
Apology found in the same source, p. 40. Tertullian' s work is not
always consistent on this topic. In one instance he argues that no
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But now inquiry is made about this point, whether themilitary may be admitted unto the faith, even the rankan file, or each inferior grade, to whom there is nonecessity for taking part in sacrifices or capitalpunishments One soul cannot serve two masters—God
and Caesar. And yet Moses carried a rod, and Aaron wore
a buckle, and John (Baptist) is girt with leather, andJoshua the son of Nun leads a line of march; and thePeople warred.... But how will a Christian man war, nay,how will he serve even in peace, without a sword, which
the Lord has taken away?... [the Lord] in disarming Peter,
unbelted every soldier. No dress is lawful among us, if
assigned to any unlawful action.
Another record from the period which expressedly
prohibits violence (and warfare)
,
but does not address
military service, is found in the following passage from
Lactantius, tutor to Constantine, written about A.D.
313. 22
. . .it is not therefore befitting that those who strive to
keep to the path of justice should be companions and
sharers in the public homicide. For when God forbids us
to kill. He not only prohibits us from open violence,
which is not even allowed by the public laws, but he
warns us against the commission of those things which are
esteemed lawful among men. Thus it will be neither
lawful for a just man to engage in warfare, since his
warfare is justice itself, not to accuse anyone of a
capital charge, because it makes no difference whether
you put a man to death by word, or rather by sword, since
it is the act of putting to death itself which is
Christian can engage in warfare (On Idolatry 19), while elsewhere he
seems to hold that a soldier who converts to Christianity may still
be a faithful Christian: "With Him [God] the faithful citizen is a
soldier, just as the faithful soldier is a citizen" ( The Chaplet
,
above source, p. 46).
Presumably he means that soldiers who convert to Christianity may
assist the emperor by prayer, but not with the use of arms.
Christians who are not already soldiers are prohibited from military
service
.
OO
, , , , ...Lactantius, De Divinis Institutionibus VI, 20, found in Eppstein,
The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations, pp. 38-9.
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t ere ought to be no exception at all; but that itis always unlawful to put to death a man, whom God willedto be a sacred animal.
One way to reconcile the issues of pacifism and
idolatry is to recognize that Christians could serve in
the army (perhaps on occupation duty, as part of a police
force, or simply as deterrents), without necessarily
committing violent acts. This seems to be implied by
Ongen (A.D. 245) who, in responding to charges by Celsus
that Christians were guilty of contempt issima inertia
,
or
most contemptible sloth, because they refused to join in
the defense of the state which maintained the communal
order, argues that "none fight better for the king than
we do . . . . we fight on his behalf, forming a special army-
-an army of piety—by offering our prayers to God." 23
And Marcus Aurelius, in crediting prayer by the great
numbers of Christian members of his Thundering Legion
with saving the entire unit from perishing from thirst in
A.D. 173 writes;
I called out of the ranks those whom we call Christians,
and, having questioned them, I perceived what a great
multitude of them there were and raged against them:
which indeed I should not have done, because I afterward
perceived their power. For they did not begin by the
contemplation of spears or arms or trumpets (which is
hateful to them because of the God which they keep in
2 3 Ongen, Contra Celsum, 8:73, reprinted in War and Christian
Ethics, p. 49.
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bUt by PrOStrati"9 themselves on
Presumably Aurelius "raged against them" because of
their unwillingness to fight.
Bainton argues for a similar explanation and
concludes that "ecclesiastical authors before Constantine
condemned Christian participation in warfare, though not
necessarily military service in time of peace." 25
We can conclude that while the expansion of the
requirement for idolatry to all ranks in the 4th Century
did keep Christians from military duty, their service
prior to this time was not inconsistent with their
pacifist beliefs. Let's now turn to an examination of
the basis for this early pacifism.
The prohibition against Christians engaging in
warfare was derived from certain passages from the New
Testament which seemed to expressly prohibit doing
violence to others. The most poignant of these passages
are quoted below: 26
How blest are the peacemakers; God shall call them his
sons. (Matthew 5:9)
You have learned that our forefathers were told, 'Do not
commit murder; and anyone who commits murder shall be
brought to judgment.' But what I tell you is this:
2
^ Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition, p. 34.
25 Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (New
York: Abingdon Press, 1960), p. 81.
26 All biblical quotations are taken from The New English Bible: New
Testament (London: Oxford University Press & Cambridge University
Press, 1961) .
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Anyone who nurses anger against his brother must bebrought to judgment
. If he abuses his brother he must
answer for it to the court; if he sneers at him he will
5
*
21 - 2
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' <Matthew
You have learned that they were told, 'An eye for an
eye, and a tooth for a tooth.' But what I tell you isthis: Do not set yourself against the man who wrongs you.
If someone slaps you on the right cheek, turn and offerhim your left. If a man wants to sue you for your shirt,
let him have your coat as well. if a man in authority
makes you go one mile, go with him two
You have learned that they were told, 'Love your
neighbor and hate your enemy.' But what I tell you is
this: Love your enemies and pray for your persecutors;...
And if you greet only your brothers, what is there
extraordinary about that? Even the heathen do as much.
You must therefore be all goodness, just as your heavenly
Father is all good. (Matthew 5:43-8)
They then came forward, seized Jesus, and held him fast.
At that moment one of those with Jesus reached for his
sword, drew it, and he struck at the High Priest's
servant and cut off his ear. But Jesus said to him, 'Put
up your sword. All who take the sword die by the sword.'
(Matthew 26:50-3)
Never pay back evil for evil. Let your aims be such as
sll men count honorable. If possible, so far as it lies
with you, live at peace with all men. My dear friends,
do not seek revenge, but leave a place for divine
ribut ion ; for there is a text which reads, 'Justice is
mine, says the Lord, I will repay.' But there is another
text: 'If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is
thirsty, give him a drink; by doing this you will heap
live coals on his head.' Do not let evil conquer you, but
use good to defeat evil. (Romans 12:17-21)
Of course, these passages can not be interpreted
simply as prohibitions against Christians doing violence
to others or to one another. If Christians have this
duty because what Christ said is true, then everyone must
have the same duty . 27
27 .... . , . .This point is raised by Jan Narveson "Pacifism: A Philosophical
Analysis," Vol. 75, pp. 259-271. Reprinted in War and Morality , ed.
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Part of the problem with using these passages as
the basis for pacifism is that while they are laden with
principles, they do not include any specific, objective
rules concerning the use of violence. in order to
interpret these passages as espousing pacifism, one must
distill certain values from them—e.g. submissiveness or
nonresistance— and argue that such values imply
passivity. But if we adopt this interpretation, then no
one should ever serve as a police officer, guard, or any
other position which might require force; and such an
extreme reading runs contrary to other passages in the
New Testament which recognize the legitimate authority of
the state as a keeper of the peace and enforcer of the
laws
.
In fact, many of the same or similar passages in the
New Testament can be interpreted in ways which seem to
justify violence in certain circumstances. For example,
one might argue that while the New Testament preaches
love and warns against hate, it nowhere prohibits
violence as a means of distributing justice; it is only
violence which is done in anger or with vengeance which
we are warned against. In fact, if we continue the above
by Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Co., 1970), p. 66. For a good discussion of Narveson's argument see
Yehuda Melzer, Concepts of Just War (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1975), p.
122
.
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quotation from Romans, we get a discussion of the
legitimate use of force in the name of justice:
EVSry person must submit to the supreme authoritiesThere is no authority but by act of God, and the existing
authorities are instituted by him; consequently anyone
w o rebels against authority is resisting a divinelnstituticn, and those who so resist have themselves tothank for the punishment they will receive. Forgovernment, a terror to crime, has no terrors for goodbehavior.
.
You wish to have no fear of the authorities?
Then continue to do right and you will have their
approval, for they are God's agents working for your
good. But if you do wrong, then you will have cause tofear then; it is not for nothing that they hold the power
of the sword, for they are God's agents of punishment,
for retribution on the offender. (Romans 13-14)
This passage undoubtedly permits violence as a means of
distributing justice and maintaining communal order.
A second problem for a pacifist interpretation is
that it requires that one accept the Old and New
Testaments as presenting different moral standards.
Without this discontinuity it is impossible to reconcile
pacifism with lex talionis (Exodus 21-24)
. If, however,
the violence of the Old Testament is understood as a
legitimate means of retributive justice rather than as a
form of revenge, the two texts are not incommensurate.
Elizabeth Anscombe defends just such an interpretation in
the following passage: 28
O O
§Elizabeth Anscombe, "War and Murder," in War and Morality, ed. by
Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Co., Inc., 1970), p. 48.
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characteristic of pacifism to denigrate the OldTestament and exalt the New: something quite contrary tothe teaching of the New Testament itself, which alwayslooks back to and leans upon the Old. How typical it isthat the words of Christ "You have heard it said, an eyefor an eye and a tooth for a tooth, but I say to you..."
are taken as a repudiation of the ethic of the OldTestament! People seldom look up the occurrence of this
p rase in the juridical code of the Old Testament whereit belongs, and is the admirable principle of law for thepunishment of certain crimes, such as procuring the
wrongful punishment of another by perjury. People often
enough now cite the phrase to justify private revenge; nodoubt this was often "heard said" when Christ spoke of
it. But no justification for this exists in the personal
ethic taught by the Old Testament. On the contrary. what
do we find? "Seek no revenge," (Leviticus xix, 18),
. . . .And "If your enemy is hungry, give him food, if
thirsty, give him drink" (Proverbs xxv, 21)
Anscombe goes on to add that the passages from the
New Testament often cited as dictating pacifism are
instead admonitions against wrongdoing and hatred, and do
not at all preclude the use of force as a legitimate
means for administering justice.
Another difficulty for grounding pacifism in
Christianity arises because of what is not said in the
New Testament. Despite the presence of Roman soldiers
throughout Palestine and numerous references to them in
the New Testament (they are baptized by John the Baptist
and provide Paul safe escort from Jerusalem to Caesarea)
,
nowhere do we find soldiering prohibited or even frowned
upon as a profession.
Ironically, the same text in which many have found
the tenets of pacifism has provided for others the basis
for the reprehensible, unconstrained violence of the
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Crusades. The pronouncement in Matthew, "You must not
think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have
not come to bring peace, but a sword" (10:34); and Luke,
"whoever has a purse had better take it with him, and his
pack too; and if he has no sword, let him sell his cloak
to buy one" (22:35-8); and also Christ's treatment of the
peddlers in the temple, all have been used as crusading
passages
.
29
Because of the ambiguity of the New Testament on the
issues of warfare, military service, and using violence
in the name of justice, many early Christians concluded
that Christ's nonresistance to the law meant a
nonresistance to lawlessness. As adherents to
Christianity grew, these beliefs regarding the laws of
the state threatened the very fabric of communal order.
The requirement to respond to this early pacifism forced
the church to develop the tradition of jus ad bellum
which we recognize today. By expressly permitting
Christian participation in just war, they hoped to keep
the new Holy Roman Empire under Constantine safe from
invading barbarians. Later we will examine how 4th and
5th Century Christian scholars reconciled the values
which characterized Jesus's life and gospel with the need
O Q
, ,y For a discussion on how the New Testament has been interpreted to
support both pacifism and crusades see Roland H. Bainton, Christian
Attitudes Toward War and Peace, chapter 4, "War and Peace in the New
Testament .
"
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to preserve peace and communal order by expanding and
codifying existing conventions. First, however, let's
examine another well-known argument for pacifism.
Mohandas Gandhi
Violence is an evil, Gandhi argues, and to respond
to violence with more violence merely compounds the evil
incurred; this holds regardless of the provocation. As
moral agents, human beings must always choose the
alternative which minimizes evil, even if that choice
results in personal hardship. As Gandhi puts it,
"Suffering is the law of human beings; war is the law of
the jungle ." 30
It is important to note that Gandhi's is not an
argument for appeasement but for a specific type of
resistance; and this resistance requires suffering.
There is, however, a crucial distinction between
suffering evil oneself and doing evil to others.
The doctrine of violence has reference only to the doing
°f injury by one to another. Suffering injury in one's
own person is, on the contrary, the essence of
nonviolence, and is the chosen substitute for violence to
others. It is not that I value life low that I can
countenance with joy thousands voluntarily losing their
lives for Satyagraha [soul or truth force], but because I
know that it results in the long run in the least loss of
life
.
3 ^
s o Mohandas K. Gandhi, "On Nonviolence," in Peace and War, p. 345.
31 Ibid., p. 348.
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If one were to understand this quotation as a purely
utilitarian objection to violence, then they might
respond that it is an argument for situational rather
than moral pacifism; but Gandhi's position is more
complex than this.
He believes both that it is dishonorable (and
cowardly) not to respond in some meaningful way to
injustice, and that the moral salvation of those
is more important than victory over the
aggressors. He concludes, therefore, that the only
acceptable response is to shock the consciences of the
aggressors through nonviolent suffering.
Individuals and nations who would practice nonviolence
must be prepared to sacrifice (nations to the last man)
their all except honor ... .Nonviolence is not a
resignation from all real fighting against wickedness.
On the contrary, the nonviolence of my conception is a
more active and real fight against wickedness than
retaliation, whose very nature is to increase
wickedness
.
32
Jan Narveson has objected to this position by
arguing that it is self-contradictory . 33 The very notion
that violence is inherently evil, he argues, means that
people have a right not to have violence done to them;
and the very notion of having a right means that one is
justified in preventing the deprivation of that right.
32 Ibid., pp. 346-7.
Jan Narveson, "Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis," pp. 63-77.
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a cou d that right to their own security, which peopleave possrhiy consist in, if not a right at least todefend themselves from whatever violence might be offeredthem?
...prevention of infractions of that right isprecisely what one has a right to when one has a right at
all. A right just is a status justifying preventive
action. To say that you have a right to X but that no
one has any justification whatever for preventing peoplefrom depriving you of it, is self-contradictory. If you
claim a right to X, then to describe some action as an
act of depriving you of X, is logically to imply that its
absence is one of the things that you have a right to. 34
Thus the pacifist cannot claim both that persons have
a right to freedom from attack, and also a duty to be
passive in the face of violent attack.
Gandhi might respond to this objection by denying
the notion of rights. The Hindu word which captures this
concept is ahimsa which means "action based on the
refusal to do harm ." 35 Under this approach, doing
violence is simply a wrong, and the only duty people have
is not to commit a wrong - 36 But in order for this to get
34 ibid., p. 72.
Compare Narveson's position to this argument from Emmanuel Kant:
"...if the use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom according
to universal laws (that is, is unjust), then the use of coercion to
counteract it, inasmuch as it is the prevention of a hindrance to
freedom, is consistent with freedom according to universal laws; in
other words, this use of coercion is just. It follows by the law of
contradiction that justice (a right) is united with the authorization
to use coercion against anyone who violates justice (or a right)
.
The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Introduction para. D, tr. by
John Ladd (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 36.
35 Gandhi writes: "Not to hurt any living thing is no doubt a part of
ahimsa. But it is its least expression. The principle of himsa is
hurt by every evil thought, by undue haste, by lying, by hatred, by
wishing ill to anyone." For a discussion of ahimsa see Joan V.
Bondurant, Conquest of Violence : The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 23-6.
36 Elizabeth Wolgast argues that the notion of individual rights is a
convention which has its origins in social atomism and is often
misused or simply inappropriate. She believes that justice could be
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US out of the dilemma— i.e. to make it truly pacifistic—
we must also add that all wrongs are incommensurate.
This means that one could not justify committing a
"lesser" wrong in order to prevent a "greater" one. And
of course, one must not give advantage to oneself over
others. For example, one could not strike or threaten a
would-be killer in order to save one's own life, or even
to prevent the murder of a member of one's family. And
in fact, this seems to be Gandhi's position:
A satyagrahi must never forget the distinction between
evil and the evil-doer. He must not harbor ill-will or
bitterness against the latter. He may not even employ
needlessly offensive language against the evil person,
however unrelieved his evil might be. 37
We see, then, that for Gandhi the prohibition
^*3^iust doing evil to another always takes priority over
any other obligation. 38 Moreover, he must reject the
better served by focusing on wrongs instead of rights. See The
Grammar of Justice (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), esp.
Chapter 2, "Wrong Rights."
37 Gandhi, "On Violence," p. 346.
O O
This is not quite true. In an oft quoted passage Gandhi writes:
"I do not believe that, where there is only choice between cowardice
and violence, I would advise violence. Thus when my son asked me
what he should have done had he been present when I was almost
fatally assaulted in 1908, whether he should have run away and seen
me killed or whether he should have used physical force which he
could and wanted to use, and defended me, I told him that it was his
duty to defend me even by using violence." Perhaps this can be made
consistent with Gandhi's non-violence if we understand that one's
first obligation is to preserve one's honor, and that there is a
hierarchy of actions which demean honor: cowardice, inaction,
violence to others, and so on.
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thesis that a lesser quantity of equivalent evils is
preferable to a greater quantity.
One problem with a view which does not recognize
degrees of wrongness between killing an innocent person
and using offensive language is that it doesn't seem to
be a very effective way to reduce human suffering.
Gandhi's argument that wrongs are only compounded by more
wrongs only works when one considers discrete scenarios.
Suppose that one were faced with an ongoing evil, like a
group of thieves (or rapists or cannibals or murderers)
who preyed repeatedly on a particular village. Even if
doing violence to one or all of them while they were
about their evil predations might increase the wrong done
at the time, it might also prevent future wrongs and
would thereby decrease the wrong done over the long term.
Surely some violence in the world is deterred by
considerations of resistance or reprisal.
But Gandhi's response to this objection is that it
focuses on the wrong consequences; even if an entire
village or nation is destroyed, the inhabitants will have
lost nothing of value because they will have maintained
their honor by not having engaged in violence themselves.
In a essay advising non-violent resistance to Hitler
Gandhi addresses this issue quite specifically.
Responding to the statement, "Hitler knows no pity. Your
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spiritual effort will avail nothing before him," Gandhi
writes
:
You may be right. History has not a record of a nationhaving adopted non-violent resistance. If Hitler is
unaffected by my suffering, it does not matter. For I
shall have lost nothing of worth. My honor is the only
thing worth preserving.
Understood this way, Gandhi's position finally seems
clear: One should always refrain from doing evil to
another; and because any violence directed against
another is evil, one should always refrain from doing
violence to another. (We will assume that by 'violence'
Gandhi means doing harm with harmful intent.)
Elizabeth Anscombe objects to Gandhi's assertion
that all violence is evil because such a belief "teaches
people to make no distinction between the shedding of
innocent blood and the shedding of any human blood. "40
But for Gandhi, all justice is a function of each
individual's own conscience. This means that all
conventional notions of justice are forsaken for the sake
of non-violence. The only means one has of administering
justice to is to shock the perpetrator of the injustice
by suffering oneself.
7 Q
Mohandas K. Gandhi, "If I Were a Czech," in The Gandhi Reader, ed.
by Homer A. Jack (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1956), p. 334
Anscombe, "War and Morality," p. 49.
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Many people believe this position to be based on an
inaccurate assessment of human nature. Some do not
believe, for example, that non-violent resistance by the
Jews would have had the desired effect on Hitler and his
ghouls, a possibility which Gandhi himself concedes; and
if Satyagraha doesn't bring about justice—or at least
put a stop to injustice—what could possibly be a motive
for adopting it?
A second problem for Gandhi stems from the crucial
distinction between causing suffering in others and
causing it in oneself. Satyagraha requires that agents
offer themselves willingly in the face of injustice in
order to "shock the consciences" of those who are
perpetrating the injustice. This however, seems to
somehow make the Satyagrahi participants in the violence
that is done to them. Suppose, for example, that an
oppressor places mines around a certain area or region to
constrain a group of people and keep them out of (or in)
that locale against their will. Satyagraha would require
that the oppressed continue to walk through the mined
area, detonating the mines and maiming or killing
themselves, until the consciences of the oppressors cause
them to remove the restraints. But contributing to one's
own demise in this fashion seems to make one responsible
in part for the violence done to them. If we accept the
premise that it is wrong to do violence to anyone, then
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that should include oneself; and if we modify it to say
that it is wrong to do violence to anyone except oneself,
then the very basis for the taboo against violence must
be called into question. For example, under what
justification should one do violence to oneself: justice?
honor? peace? If so, then why not to others for the sake
of these same values? Even if we accept the argument that
right action requires that one not give preference to
oneself over others, it is another matter entirely, and
contrary to our notion of justice, to require that one
give preference to others over oneself—especially when
we are innocent of any wrongdoing and those to which we
are asked to subjugate ourselves are our moral inferiors.
There is still another difficulty for Gandhi's
pacifism: Even if we accept the premise that we should
not defend ourselves against attack, it is much more
difficult to accept the prohibition against defending
others. (See footnote 38, above.) While I may accept my
own suffering as courageous and noble, it seems wrong and
unnatural for me to offer up my children's lives in the
face of wrongful predation when I am capable of
protecting them. I simply do not believe that permitting
a rapist to ravish my family will so shock his conscience
that he will desist. Gandhi's own argument that the only
thing we have of value is our honor requires that we risk
our own well-being-spiritual or physical—on behalf of
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the innocent when they are faced with dangers against
which they are helpless.
Conclusion
It is the tension between our longing for justice
and our ideal of not harming others which fuels the
pacifist and realist debates. Each party attempts to
relieve this tension by focusing on one of the moral
demands at the expense of the other. By adopting the
ideal of never causing harm to others, the pacifist
abrogates any responsibility for protecting innocents
from unjust predation. The realist, on the other hand,
crusades for justice as the paradigm end of human
intercourse without recognizing any restrictions on the
methods or collateral effects of his guest.
Both of these extremes can be found in Christian war
ethics: the pacifist rejects violence as a means of
administering justice--the crusader embraces it. There
is a third attitude toward which has been developed and
codified by Christian theologians and philosophers--the
idea of a just war. This is the topic of the next
section
.
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CHAPTER 4
JUST WAR IN ANTIQUITY
The modern concept of bellum justum was first
compiled, refined, and formalized by Christian
theologians and philosophers beginning with Saints
Ambrose and Augustine in the 5th Century. The tradition
of recognizing constraints on the conduct of war is,
however, much older. This section will begin with a
chapter outlining the early foundations of the just war
tradition from which the Christian philosophers derived
their ideas. In Chapter 5 we will discuss how this
tradition was adopted and formalized by Saints Ambrose
and Augustine. Chapter 6 will examine the secularization
of the just war tradition by the Scholastics based on
reason and natural law.
The policy of recognizing prescriptions concerning
the just conduct of war is not a product of "Christian
charity" or even Western Civilization, but is found in
some form across all cultures for which we have detailed
historical records. Fifth Century B. C. China recognized
rules which stipulated that no war should be begun
without just cause; that the enemy be notified of pending
attacks; that no injury be done to the wounded; and that
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the persons and property of innocents be respected. 1
Different territorial groups of the Aztec Empire fought
battles with fixed numbers of warriors at set times on
predetermined battlefields, which they called "wars of
flowers." 2 Laotse, a Chinese philosopher from the 6th
Century B.C. and founder of the Tao religion, writes: 3
...a good general effects his purpose and stops...
Effects his purpose and does not take pride in it.
Effects his purpose as a regrettable necessity.
Effects his purpose but does not love violence
.
Sun Tzu, a Fifth Century B.C. Chinese soldier and
philosopher, who has been highly influential in the
development of Chinese military doctrine, and who has had
(and continues to have) tremendous influence on U.S.
military doctrine, advises: 4
19. Treat the captives well, and care for them.
20. This is called 'winning the battle and becoming
stronger .
'
21. Hence what is essential in war is victory, not
prolonged operations. And therefore the general who
understands war is the Minister of the people's fate and
arbiter of the nation's destiny.
1
W. A. P. Martin, "Traces of International Law in Ancient China," in
International Review XIV (1883), pp. 63-77.
2 Geoffrey Parrinder, ed., World Religions: From Ancient History to
the Present (New York: Facts on File, 1971), p. 78.
3 The Book of Tao, printed in War and Peace, vol 5 of Classical
Selections on Great Issues (Washington D.C.: University Press of
America, 1982), p. 526.
4 The Art of War, Sun Tzu, Trans, with an introduction by Samuel B.
Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 76.
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The ancient Egyptians regarded humanitarian actions
in war important enough to be included among their
records of glorious actions, including, in one instance,
the rescue of enemy sailors whose ship had been sunk in
battle. 5 And in the Book of Manu, produced by the Hindu
civilization in India around the 4th Century B. C., we
find humanitarian rules for regulating land warfare which
are strikingly similar to many aspects of present day
international law regarding the conduct of war.®
90. When (the king) fights with his foes in battle, let
him not strike with weapons concealed (in wood)
,
nor with
(such as are) barbed, poisoned, or the points of which
are blazing with fire. 91. Let him not strike one who
(in flight) has climbed on an eminence, nor a eunuch, nor
one who joins the palms of his hands (in supplication)
,
not one who (flees) with flying hair, nor one who sits
down, nor one who says 'I am thine;' 92. Nor one who
sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat of mail, nor one
who is naked, nor one who is disarmed, nor one who looks
on without taking part in the fight, nor one who is
fighting with another (foe) ; 93. Nor owe whose weapons
are broken, nor one afflicted (with sorrow)
,
nor one who
has been grievously wounded, nor one who is in fear, nor
one who has turned to flight; (but in all cases let him)
remember the duty (of honorable warriors)
.
5 Samuel Birch, The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians, vol
III (New York: Scribner and Welford, 1878), p. 264. There is also a
record of a peace treaty between Ramses II and the Hittites which
specifies, among other things, mutual exchange of political fugitives
and emigrants with assurances of humane treatment to the same by both
sides. See James Henry Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt:
Historical Documents vol. 3 (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc.,
1962), pp. 163-72.
® The Law of War: A Documentary History, vol I, ed. by Leon Friedman
with a foreward by Telford Taylor (New York: Random House, 1972), p.
3.
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The Babylonian leader Sennacherib treated the Jews
according to principles of justice; concerning his
directives after the battle against Jerusalem in b.C.
690., we get the following account:
7
I assaulted Ekron and killed the officials and patricians who had
committed the crime and hung their bodies on poles surrounding the
city. The (common) citizens who were guilty of minor crimes, I
considered prisoners of war. The rest of them, those who were not
accused of crimes and misbehavior, I released.
In western culture the tradition of just war is no
less pronounced. Plato believes wars are necessary
evils, fought in order to gain peace;® because they are
often unavoidable, he outlines restrictions pertaining
not only to jus in bello, but also to jus ad beHum. In
the Republic, Socrates provides the following guidance
for soldier guardians of an ideal state. 9
They will not, being Greeks, ravage Greek territory nor
burn habitations, and they will not admit that in any
city all the population are enemies, men, women, and
children, but will say that only a few at any time are
their foes, those, namely, who are to blame for the
quarrel. And on all these considerations they will not
be willing to lay waste the soil, since the majority are
their friends, nor to destroy the houses, but will carry
the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty
to do justice by the pressure of the suffering of the
innocent
.
7 Ibid., p. 3.
® Laws, 1 (629c8-d9) in Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1961) .
9 Republic Book V 471a5-b5 in Collected Dialogues
.
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And later, in the Laws : 10
Any person making peace or war with any partiesindependently of the Commonwealth shall likewise incurthe pain of death. if a section of the state make peace
or war with any on its own account, the generals shallbring the authors of the measure before a court, and thepenalty for conviction shall be death.
In these passages Plato grants special status to
noncombatants and innocents and reserves decisions
regarding the initiation and cessation of hostilities to
"proper authority."
Aristotle, like Plato, regards war (or the threat of
inevitable and expresses concerns about
sufficient justifications for going to war: "no one
chooses to be at war or provokes war for the sake of
war .... [we] make war that we may live at peace.
.
" 11 He
is the first one to use the phrase "just war " 12 and in
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum he provides guidance concerning
both justifications for going to war and when to seek
peace : 13
The pretexts for making war on another state are as
follows: when we have been the victims of aggression, we
^ Laws, Book XII 955b9-c6, in Collected Dialogues.
11 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (1177b6) in The Complete Works of
Aristotle vol 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.
1861.
*2 Ibid., Politics 1256b25, p. 199.
13 Ibid., 1425al0-18 & 1425bll-16, pp. 2277-8. Some scholars
attribute this work to Anaximenes of Lampsacus, a contemporary of
Aristotle, but T. Case argues that it is a genuine work written
earlier than Aristotle's Rhetoric and that therefore it can't be by
Anaximenes. See W.D. Ross, Aristotle: A Complete Exposition of his
Works and Thought (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 22 & 293
(note 51)
.
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Xenophon's historical narratives point to Greek
concern for considerations of justice in both when and
how to wage war; 14 and the popular playwright, Euripides,
dramatizes the prohibition against harming prisoners of
war. 15 Another example from about the same period may be
found in the policies of Aristotle's student, Alexander
the Great. Concerning one of his battles against the
Persians for control of Greek cities (Battle of
Halicarnassus, 334 B.C.), we get the following account. 16
Although the defenders used cross-fire to good effect and
delivered another partly successful sally, it became
apparent that Alexander's siege engines would break a way
into the city.
. . .At the end of the day a company of
Macedonian veterans drove the Greeks and Persians back in
disorder and might have broken into the city if Alexander
had not sounded retreat in order to spare the civilian
population. Shaken by their heavy losses, the garrison-
Xenophon, Cyropaedia vii, 1, 41, trans. by J.S. Watson and Henry
Dale (London: Geprge Bell & Sons, 1891), p. 208; and Anabasis vii, 1,
29, in the same collection, p. 213.
15 Euripides, The Heracleidae (960-7), trans. by Ralph Gladstone in
The Complete Greek Tragedies, ed. by David Grene and Richard
Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 152.
16 Alexander the Great: King, Commander, and Statesman, N.G.L.
Hammond (New Jersey: Noyes Press, 1980) pp. 78 & 81.
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commanders decided to withdraw into the two citadels bythe harbor
...
*
Alexander broke into the city, ..and forbade any
reprisals against the civilians.
* * *
This was characteristic of him throughout his life; afterhis victory at the Hydaspes river he 'ordered the burial
of the dead, his own and the bravest of the enemy.'
Except for the Greek mercenaries he let the defeated gofree. He did not demand indemnities or impose
conscription, and when hillsmen came down to surrender he
sent them back to cultivate their own properties in
peace
.
Polybius records examples of injustice in the
conduct of war and constrasts such action with the
concerns for justice on the battlefied shown by both
Phillip and Alexander
.
17 And Julius Caesar chronicles his
beneficence toward defeated foes in his Civil Wars, and
in a letter to Cicero writes:
You are right to infer of me... that there is nothing
further from my nature than cruelty. Whilst I take great
pleasure from that fact, I am proud indeed that my action
wins your approval
. I am not moved because it is said
that those, whom I let go, have departed to wage war on
me again, for there is nothing I like better that I
should be true to myself and they to themselves. 18
Other cultures also developed constraints on how war
should be conducted. The ancient Hebrews had certain
17 .Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, vol. 1, Bk V, 9-11, trans.
from the text of Hultsch by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1974) pp. 367-9.
18 Caesar, quoted by Cicero in a letter to Atticus dated March 26,
B.C. 49 in Cicero: Letters to Atticus, vol. II, trans. by E.0.
Winstedt (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912), pp. 261-3.
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rules governing warfare, as the following passages from
Deuteronomy show. 19
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draw near to * citY to fight against it,e terms of peace to it. 11 And if its answer to youis peace and it opens to you, then all the people who arefound^n it shall do forced labor for you and shall serveyou. ut if it makes no peace with you, but makes war
against you, then you shall besiege it; 12 and when theLord your God gives it into your hand you shall put alli s ma es to the sword, but the women and the little
ones, the cattle, and everything else in the city, allits spoil, you shall take as booty for yourselves; 19
When you besiege a city for a long time, making war
against it in order to take it, you shall not destroy itstrees by wielding an axe against them; for you may eat of
them, but you shall not cut them down... 20 Only the
trees in the field which you know are not trees for food
you may destroy and cut down that you may build
siegeworks against the city that makes war with you,
until it falls.
Finally, there are even historical cases of limiting
the brutality of war through arms control. For example,
during the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1590, the
principle weapon carried by Japanese soldiers was the
musket, reputed to be the best in the world at the time.
In less than a century, however, firearms had virtually
disappeared from Japan because they were inconsistent
with the ethos of Japanese warriors. 2 ^
Although this sampling of unrelated examples
provides, in most cases, guidelines which are quite
removed from what we would consider appropriate, they
1
9
Holy Bible, Revised Standard Edition, Deuteronomy 20 (New York:
Thomas Nelson & Sons), p. 152.
20 Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985), pp. 56-
7 .
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nevertheless Identify explicit restraints on both jus ad
bellum and jus in bello which reach back to the beginning
of recorded history. Later we will attempt to understand
why commonly held notions of justice so often break down
in warfare. For now, however, let's examine in more
detail the work of a Roman philosopher whose ideas
directly influenced the development of our present
tradition of just war, Marcus Tullius Cicero.
The Just War Tradition in Ancient Rome
In De Republica 3, XXIII, written in the First
Century B. C., Cicero gives us the precursor of our
modern concept of jus ad bellum: 21
...a war is never undertaken by the ideal state, except
in defense of its honor or safety.
.
...Those wars which are unjust are undertaken without
provocation. For only a war waged for revenge or defense
can actually be just.
. .
.
...No war is considered just unless it has been
proclaimed and declared, and unless reparation has first
been demanded.
. .
.
Wars which are fought for revenge for wrongs done (we
might say retribution)
,
are to be included in wars fought
in defense of honor. Clearly here Cicero has in mind
wars fought on behalf of Rome's allies. Elsewhere in
the same section from which the above quotation was
taken, we find the following: "our people, by defending
2
1
Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Republics 3, XXIII, trans. by Clinton
Walker Keyes (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), pp. 211-13.
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their allies, have gained domination over the whole
world. ..."
Cicero also notes that war should be a last resort,
turned to only when discussion is unsuccessful. 22
Other necessary conditions for jus ad bellum are: 1)
war must be declared by proper authority; 2) the
antagonist must be notified of the declaration of war;
and 3) the antagonist must be afforded the opportunity to
make a peaceful settlement prior to the initiation of
hostilities
.
Concerning these last conditions, Rome had a
detailed procedure whereby whenever she had a grievance
against another city, ambassadors from the fetial college
under the direction of the pater patratus would go to the
offending city and demand rerum repititio
„ The
ambassadors then returned to Rome and waited thirty-three
days for a response. If they received none, the pater
patratus
,
accompanied by members of the fetial college
would again travel to the other nation and threaten war.
If the offending nation still refused, the pater patratus
would inform the Senate of their failure to make
reparations, and the Senate (the assembly after the 5th
Century B.C.) could decide to resort to force to carry
out its claims. Once the Senate voted for war. the
ambassadors were again sent to the hostile nation to
^ 2 Cicero, De Officiis
,
Bk. I, XI, p . 35.
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announce the declaration of war and symbolically throw a
javelin on enemy soil. The only time these elaborate
procedures were not followed was when the enemy was not
organized as a state, when Rome was already under attack,
or in the case of civil war
.
23
According to Roman law a war was just if it
conformed to these procedures. Thus Roman law provided a
means whereby Rome could "objectively” assess justice in
the international arena; war waged in accordance with
these conditions was formally just.
The Roman Empire was such a dominant force—morally
and militarily that in formulating her laws, she assumed
the role of an objective observer operating from behind a
veil of ignorance. In other words, the Roman Senate
adopted "just" laws, and imposed them on herself and
those nations with whom she interacted. In this sense
Rome is the "law giver" and these laws are jus gentium or
world law. Nevertheless, even though the Roman term 'jus
gentium' is usually rendered as 'international law ,
'
or
'law of nations,' it is worthwhile to note that
historically the term referred to laws declared by the
Roman Senate, not by any international organization. The
Roman Senate assumed the same "ideal observer" role which
is assumed by the representatives to modern international
23 Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), pp. 21-3.
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conversions at Geneva, Hague and the United Nations. Thus
Roman jus gentium meets the objections of those who
criticize modern international law because there is no
recognized common authority with the power of santions.
Roman rules governing how war should be fought were
also delineated. In De Officils, Cicero notes that
"there are certain duties that we owe even to those who
have wronged us... [and] there is a limit to retribution
and punishment.... "24 He emphasizes that only soldiers
sworn to duty with active military units may legally wage
war, and he adds: 25
Not only must we show consideration for those whom we
have conquered by force of arms, but we must also ensure
protection to those who lay down their arms and throw
themselves upon the mercy of our generals, even though
the battering ram has hammered at their walls.
It is possible, of course, to produce numerous
examples where such rules were ignored. This does not,
however, show that these rules were without effect,
anymore than a particular breach of private law by a
citizen proves that a particular domestic law is
inoperable. There are those who would argue that wars
and war crimes are a mark of the human condition, an
unfortunate but inevitable dimension of human behavior.
Perhaps this is true. But the mere statement that a
24 De Officiis, Bk
. I, XI, p. 35.
25 Ibid., p. 37.
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particular act constitutes a war crime, is sufficient to
show that one recognizes normative constraints on the
conduct of just war.
What this myriad of examples from different cultures
and periods shows is that concern for justice in war is a
human, rather than simply a Christian, characteristic.
Let's now turn our attention to the Christian theolo-
gians who compiled and formalized this pagan just war
tradition into the one which became the foundation of
international laws governing war.
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CHAPTER 5
DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUST WAR TRADITION
The just war doctrine which the early Christian
theologians codified and developed has been a cause of
consternation by those who argue that Christ's message
implies pacifism. Modern defenders of Christian pacifism
explain the development of early just war doctrine as a
compromise between the practical or worldly notion of
duty to society which was embodied in Roman traditions,
with the ideal or utopian notion of purity of the soul
which they found in the New Testament
. They believe that
pacifism is precisely what was compromised when
Christianity became the official religion of the state . 1
Johnson argues convincingly that the development of
the Christian just war tradition does not represent a
compromise between Christian and Roman values, but should
more accurately be described as a synthesis of these
values . 2 Analysis of the writings of the early Christian
scholars shows that all of them opposed war and violence
per se, and that the debate really centered on whether or
not Christians might seek the temporal goods represented
1 This view is espoused by all those who base their pacifistic
beliefs on the New Testament. For an example see Stanley Windass who
claims that early Christians "prostituted" themselves to secular
authority, Christianity Versus Violence (London: Sheed and Ward,
1964) .
2 James Turner Johnson, The Quest For Peace (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987), p. 45.
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by the state. 3 Those who defended pacifism held the
position that Christians must hold themselves aloof from
the affairs of this world in preparation for the next
one. Those who advocated the notion of just war, on the
other hand, held that in some cases the quest for
temporal goods might be a duty grounded in Christian
ideals
.
4
One example which illustrates this is Saint
Ambrose's dictum that wrong behavior consists not just in
harming another oneself, but also in the failure to
prevent another' s infliction of harm when one has the
ability. As he puts it: "He who does not keep harm off a
friend, if he can, is as much in fault as he who causes
it. 3 Even though this statement is taken verbatim from
Cicero (De Officiis, Bk I, VII, 23), it would hardly do
to call this a compromise of the values of the New
Testament, especially since Ambrose rejects self-defense.
Instead, it should be understood as a principle which
permits one to resolve conflicts in values: in this case
the the prohibition against the use of violence on one
hand with the responsibility to protect the innocent
based on the principle of brotherly love on the other. 6
3 Ibid., p. 52.
4 Ibid., p. 52-3.
5 St. Ambrose, Duties of the Clergy, Bk I, XXIV, 115, in The Nicene
and Post Nicene Fathers vol. X (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1969), p. 30.
6 Johnson, The Quest for Peace, p. 55. Perhaps the joining of Roman
and Christian ideas in the works of Ambrose and Augustine could be
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Johnson sums up the thrust of this development thus:
The achievement of just war theory was... to combine thegeneral opposition to violence and bloodshed with alimited justification of the use of violence by
Christians. This limited justification required that the
use of force be to protect a value that could not
otherwise be protected, and it justified military service
as an instrument for such protection of value. The
presumption against violence nonetheless remained, so
that the justification could never become absolute:
permission was always accompanied by limitation. 7
The central notion here is that the use of force requires
justification the presumption is always against
violence--but it may be permitted to protect other
values
.
One consequence of such thinking is that the Roman
legal notion of just war is gradually replaced with a
moral or religious notion where the forces of good combat
the forces of evil. Saint Augustine, especially, expands
the just causes for war by including those wars ordained
by God. Couple this with Pauline teaching that earthly
political authority is divinely sanctioned and it is a
short step to the Holy War or crusade. Likewise, the
belief that God directly intervenes in or even
orchestrates battles permits one to view warfare as a
kind of trial by combat between states with God tipping
the scales in favor of the righteous.
better termed an
compromise
.
7 Ibid., pp. 51-2
amalgamation rather then a synthesis or a
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On the other hand, the establishment of the church
as a unifying, political authority undermined the notion
that the will of the monarch was the source of justice.
If the sovereign could be called to the bar to answer for
his actions, then there must exist higher criteria by
which he might be judged. Such criteria would, of
course, apply to all monarchs
.
In a later section we will see how Christian just
war theory evolves into a secular set of legal dictums
similar to those of ancient Rome from whence they
originated but with considerably more detail. As we turn
to the writing of Saints Ambrose and Augustine, we will
attempt to distinguish the secular principles of justum
bellum, generally originating in Greek and Roman works,
from those which have theological origins.
Saint Ambrose
Prior to becoming the Bishop of Milan, Ambrose
occupied the position of Roman governor of northern
Italy, essentially a military post. He viewed the Roman
Empire as the warder of peace, the pax romana
,
and
preached that the ongoing assaults on the empire by
Germanic tribes were divinely inspired as retribution for
Roman paganism. His primary importance for our study
lies in his admonition to Christians that they not keep
themselves aloof from the affairs of the state in
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anticipation of an imminent fulfillment of the
eschatological promise— an argument which Augustine
develops further in The City of God .
Borrowing heavily from Cicero, Ambrose outlines the
duties which Christian citizens owe to their community.
These duties are derived from the Four Cardinal Virtues:
prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance
.
8 One must
manifest these virtues in his temporal life in order to
attain eternal life : 9
It is certain that virtue is the only and the highest
good; that it alone richly abounds in the fruit of a
blessed life; that a blessed life, by means of which
eternal life is won, does not depend on eternal or
corporal benefits, but on virtue only. A blessed life is
the fruit of the present, and eternal life is the hope of
the future.
Ambrose adds that "what is useful is the same as
what is virtuous" and that this may be "divided into what
is useful for the body, and what is useful unto
godliness ." 10 Christians have a duty to do that which is
useful or virtuous, both in terms of serving God and in
their daily activities. This emphasis on the duties
which Christians have in their temporal lives is at once
a rebuttal to those Romans who accused Christians of
8 St. Ambrose, Duties of the Clergy, Book I, XXXVI, 179, p. 20.
These are the same virtues which Cicero discusses in De Officiis,
Bk I, XV-XVII, and which have their origins in Plato, Laws 631 and
Republic 427e. Ambrose, like Plato, gives prudence (wisdom) and
justice special billing.
9 Ibid., Bk II, V, 18, p. 46.
10 Ibid., Bk II, VI & VII, pp. 47-8.
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inertia
, and an admonition to those Christians who held
themselves aloof from temporal affairs in anticipation of
the eschatological Armageddon.
The dominant virtue is justice, and the examples
which Ambrose uses to illustrate his message are
especially revealing concerning his thinking on just war
theory. in a discussion on how these virtues are
integrated and manifested in one's daily life, Ambrose
uses virtue in war as his example, and in so doing
provides us with his views on jus ad bellum : 11
It is clear, then, that these [cardinal] and the
remaining virtues are related to one another. For
courage, which in war preserves one's country from the
barbarians, or at home defends the weak or comrades from
robbers, is full of justice; and to know on what plan to
defend and to give help, how to make use of opportunities
of time and place, is the part of prudence and
moderation, and temperance itself cannot observe due
measure without prudence. To know a fit opportunity, and
to make return according to what is right, belongs to
justice
.
Likewise, his discussion of right conduct in war is
developed in a discussion of the duties which are part of
our temporal lives. Concerning duty to one's country he
writes : 12
We read, not only in the case of private individuals but
even on kings.... If anyone gains the people's favor by
Ibid., Bk
.
I, XXVII, 129, p. 22. This example is an interesting
choice by Ambrose because the Greek word for virtue, arete, was used
by Homer to refer specifically to military virtue, i.e., courage.
Plato and others use the term more broadly, of course.
12 Ibid., Bk II, VII, 30, p. 48.
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advice or service, by fulfilling the duties of hisints ry or offrce, or if he encounters danger for thesake of the whole nation, there is no doubt but that suchve will be shown him by the people that they all willput his safety and welfare before their own.
In an example found in the same chapter from which
the above quotation is taken, he discusses David (among
others), who accepts the role of king against his wishes
because it is his duty to do so. And in a remarkable
passage, Ambrose holds up David's actions in war as a
model of jus in Jbello
.
13
He had bound the people to himself freely in doing his
duty.
. .when he showed that he loved valor even in an
enemy. He had also thought that justice should be shown
to those who had borne arms against himself the same as
to his own men he admired Abner, the bravest champion
of the opposing side whilst he was their leader and was
yet waging war. Nor did he despise him when suing for
peace, but honored him by a banquet. When killed by
treachery, he mourned and wept for him. He followed him
and honored his obsequies, and evinced his good faith in
desiring vengeance for the murder; for he handed on that
duty to his son in the charge that he gave him, being
anxious rather that the death of an innocent man should
not be left avenged, than that any one should mourn for
his own.
This passage is especially significant because it
implies three principles which are key tenets in our
modern notion of jus in Jbello. The first is that
soldiers have a duty to the innocent even when it means
the risk of their own lives. In this case that duty is
manifested by David's willingness to risk his son's life
to bring justice to the wrongdoer. Second, Ambrose
13 Ibid., Bk. II, VII, 33, p. 49.
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clearly notes that even members of an enemy nation can be
included in those considered "innocent."
The third concept which this passage raises is the
notion of moral equality among soldiers. David accepts
Abner as a moral equal because of the way he fights in
the war independent of the rightness or wrongness of the
war itself
.
14 in addition to the above principles which
Ambrose introduces, he also borrows freely from Cicero's
ideas regarding jus in bello. Citing an example used by
Cicero, he notes that virtue does not lie in victory, and
that it is a shameful victory unless it is gained with
honor. "In truth," he adds, "it is a noble thing for a
man to refuse to gain the victory by foul acts ...." 15 He
also argues against excessive cruelty and admonishes
Emperor Theodosius for needless bloodshed at the siege of
Thessalonica
.
16
I urge, I beg, I exhort, I warn... that you who were an
example of unusual piety ... should not mourn that so many
have perished. ... I dare not offer the sacrifice if you
intend to be present. Is that which is not allowed after
14 The notion of moral equality among soldiers is discussed nicely by
Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 34-41. The principle states that
soldiers always believe that their cause is just and that therefore
they can't be held responsible for the war itself (jus ad bellum)
,
but only for their actions in how they fight the war (jus in bello) .
Walzer uses the case of Generals Eisenhower and von Armin in World
War II to illustrate the principle. We will return to this topic in
more detail in Chapter 8.
15 Ibid, Bk
.
Ill, XV, 91, p. 82. The case of Caius Fabricius is
discussed by Cicero in De Officiis, III, XXII.
^ Ibid., Letter LI "To Theodosius after the massacre at
Thessalonica, pp. 450-3.
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shedding the blood of one innocent person, allowed after
shedding the blood of so many?
Ambrose, like Cicero, champions the notion of
justice for the vanquished and distinguishes the innocent
from the guilty among the enemy. Unlike his ideas
concerning jus ad beHum, these jus in bello principles
do not appear in Augustine. They will, however, be
adopted by subsequent exponents of just war theory, and
will thereby find their way into canon law.
As we read Ambrose we should remember that nowhere
is his intention to provide a theory of when and how one
should wage war these principles he considers to be an
obvious by-product of living a virtuous life. His point
is to convince Christians that those who would attain the
kingdom of heaven must live a virtuous life in the
temporal world, and included in such a life is the duty
to promote and, when necessary, enforce justice. He
believed unequivocally that Christians had a duty to
support and defend the great leviathan that had quelled
the war of every man against every man and imposed order
on the sin-ridden combative world. By remaining aloof
from civil affairs one fails "to render unto Caesar"
those things which are due him; and one of these duties
is the requirement to contribute to the peace and justice
of one's community--even by the use of arms if necessary.
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One additional aspect of Ambrose's work which
warrants our attention, if only for its subsequent
importance in Augustine's just war thinking, is God's
role in deciding the outcome of wars. Old Testament
passages where God orders his chosen people to wage war
and then grants them victory were not lost on either
Ambrose or Augustine. in a treatise written at the
request of Gratian, Emperor of the West, who was
preparing to repel a Gothic invasion, Ambrose writes: 17
Go forth, sheltered, indeed, under the shield of faith,
and girt with the sword of the spirit; go forth to the
victory, promised of old time, and foretold in oracles
given by God.
. .
.
No military eagles, no flights of birds, here lead the
van of our army, but Thy Name, Lord Jesus, and Thy
worship. This is no land of unbelievers, but the land
whose custom it is to send forth confessors— Italy.
In the same work Ambrose blames earlier successes by
the Goths against the empire on Roman paganism. He
quotes the prophecy found in Ezekiel 39 that the people
of Israel will repulse an attack by the Gog, and
concludes: "That Gog is the Goth, whose coming forth we
have already seen, and over whom victory in days to come
is promised, according to the word of the Lord." 18 This
notion of divinely inspired wars constitutes a break with
Cicero's theory of just war and will comprise a key
element of Augustine's idea of jus ad beHum.
17 Ibid., On The Christian Faith, Bk II, XVI, 136 & 142, pp. 241-2.
18 Ibid., 138, p. 241.
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Saint Augustine
Saint Augustine is widely recognized as the father
of modern just war theory. « in this section we will
summarize his principles of justum bellum and also the
arguments he offers to support these principles. It is
worthwhile to remember that Augustine was a philosopher
before his conversion, and many of the ideas which he
espouses are taken directly from Plato and Cicero, while
others are derived from his interpretations of The
Gospel. In either case, he invariably attempts to support
his views--including those which have their origins in
Greek and Roman philosophy—with evidence from the Old
and New Testaments
.
The problem with defending Greek and
Roman just war principles with Christian premises is that
if the premises can be called into question, then the
conclusions themselves become suspect, even though they
may originally have been derived from secular premises.
The later jurists and philosophers of the middle ages
will use Augustine as their starting point, but will take
care to formulate their just war arguments so as to be
independent of revealed premises, as we will see in
Chapter Six.
A second consideration is that in defending Catholic
Orthodoxy against both the pagans and the many divisions
1 9 See, for example, John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law
of Nations (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1935), p. 65 and
Donald A. Wells, The War Myth (New York: Pegasus, 1967), pp. 32-3.
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within the church itself, Augustine develops his own
psychology and philosophy of history, and an
understanding of these is often crucial to understanding
how he arrives at certain aspects of his theory of just
war. While our purpose is to understand Augustine's
thinking on justum bellum, it will be necessary to
discuss, at least to some extent, both his philosophy of
history and his psychology in order to accomplish this.
We will divide our exposition into three broad
sections: Augustine's philosophy of history, his
political philosophy, and his views on men as moral
agents. Let's begin, however, with a brief background.
St. Augustine was born in A. D. 354 and converted to
Christianity in 386. During his lifetime (in A. D. 383),
Christianity was adopted as the official state religion
of the Roman Empire (although the emperors had all been
Christians since Constantine became a convert and issued
the Edict of Milan proclaiming toleration of Christians
in A. D. 312)
.
Augustine also lived through a period of
decline for the Roman Empire that included the sack of
Rome by Alaric the Visigoth in 411—an event which
shocked the Roman world. His own city. Hippo, in
northern Africa, felt the pressure of barbarian
expansion, and during the last two years of his life the
only thing that prevented his community from being
overrun was the Roman Army. In fact Hippo fell to the
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Vandals under Genseric in 431,
Augustine's death
.
20
the year following
In addition to these external secular threats to
Augustine's world, his lifetime was also a period of
great divisiveness within the church, with multiple sects
claiming orthodoxy and vying for leadership and
followers. Augustine himself was once a follower of the
Manichaeans (a dualistic religion whose founder, Mani,
claimed to be a prophet sent by Christ), although after
his conversion he worked hard to expose the heretical
nature of their beliefs; his De Libero Arbitrio is
largely directed toward this end . 21
One difficulty with extracting a single coherent
theory of justum bellum from Augustine stems from the
fact that much of his work, especially that relevant to
our topic, was written either: a) in response to
inquiries by Christians concerning their religion, b) in
an effort to stem the growing divisiveness in the church,
or c) to respond to attacks against the church by either
20 For a brief summary of key biographical information see
Augustine, St.," by R. A. Markus in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
vol. 1-2 (New York: MacMillian Publishing Co. & The Free Press,
1967), pp. 198-206. Markus includes an annotated bibliography at the
end of his essay.
O 1
The Manichaean heresy was an effort to account for sin in the
world by positing eternal forces of good (light) and evil (darkness)
.
The problem they posed for the Christians was how to account for evil
in a monotheistic religion; i.e., if we credit God with all the good
in the world, must we not also blame Him for all the evil? See
Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, vol. IV, "The Anti-Manichaean
Writings" pp. 3-365. The most important of these works for our study
is his "Reply to Fautus the Manichaean," pp. 155-345.
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the pagans or other religious sects. His thoughts on
justum beHum are nested in such works and there is no
single work where we can find even a majority of his
views on our topic. For example, his writing against the
British monk, Pelagius, is primarily a defense of
efficacious grace as a necessary condition of salvation.
The Pelagians denied the doctrine that mankind was
inescapably cursed through Adam's original sin, and
asserted instead a doctrine whereby salvation was wholly
dependent on a virtuous life attainable by everyone
through the judicious exercise of their free will . 22
Inherent in this position was the contention that
men should maintain their purity by remaining aloof from
all political affairs. In responding to this heresy
Augustine explains, among other things, that the soul has
the franchise on the normative worth of human actions.
Thus it is what one holds in one's heart--i.e. one's
intentions— rather than one's actions that are weighed by
God. This idea is crucial to Augustine's principle of
benevolent severity which he often uses as a
justification for violence.
22 ,The Pelagians cited Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio as evidence for
their position. Augustine's Retractations, where he elaborates on
the relationship between grace and free will, was a response to the
Pelagian position. For a more detailed discussion see B. B.
Warfield, "Introductory Essay on Augustin and the Pelagian
Controversy," in The Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, vol . V (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1956), pp. xiii-lxxi.
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In addition to defining Manichaeanism and
Pelagianism as heresies, Augustine excludes Donatism from
Christian orthodoxy. In his writing against the
Donatists he is largely concerned with condemning their
practice of granting a second Baptism; but he also seeks
to refute their contention that all political
institutions are diabolical. in defending political
institutions (such as the Roman Empire), he defends the
institutional use of force as a means of maintaining
peace and order.
The City of God is a response to accusations by the
pagans that the decline of Rome at the hands of the
barbarians was the divine retribution of Jove. It is
also meant to provide Christians with an explanation for
the barbarian successes against the (now) Christian
Empire--an explanation especially needed because of St.
Ambrose s admonishment that earlier barbarian successes
were due to the pagan nature of the Empire.
Considering the motivation for these works, along
with the fact that Augustine , s thoughts on various topics
were developed over the last 40 years of his life, it is
easy to understand why they do not lend themselves to
scrutiny as a tight, consistent philosophy on justum
bellum. With this in mind, let's turn to his work.
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Philosophy of History
We begin with the charge, levied by Rome's pagans,
that the sack of Rome by Alaric was divine retribution by
Jove for the Empire's adoption of Christianity. This
charge was not easily dismissed, even by the faithful,
for it was plausible to think that an event of such
catastrophic proportions must be the work of God. To
accept the idea that God would permit the earthly bastion
of Christianity to be raped by pagans was not consistent
with commonly held beliefs about the omniscient,
omnipotent, and omni-beneficent nature of the Christian
God. Many of the faithful, faced with explaining God's
actions, concluded that the demise of the Empire signaled
the onset of the eschatological promise. And indeed, the
eternal empire, the pax romana which had endured for a
millennium, seemed to be coming to an end.
Augustine responds to these issues with a philosophy
of history that he develops in The City of God . 23 He
begins by addressing the pagan charge that Christianity
was the cause of the Empire's demise. After researching
and chronicling all the calamities, spiritual and
physical, which he could say had ever befallen Greece or
Rome under paganism, Augustine admonishes:
23 For a cogent commentary on this work see The Political Aspects of
Augustine's ’City of God,' John Neville Figgis (Gloucester, Mass.:
Peter Smith, 1963)
.
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Augustine goes on to explain that man's suffering is
both a punishment and a remedy for sin. World history is
a process, culminating in the Last Judgment, whereby man
suffers as redemption for original sin (i.e. the sin of
man in Eden)
. Specific events in the epic of time, such
as wars, battles, or the fall of empires, are the means
whereby God at once punishes and absolves mankind for its
sins. Political turmoil, and indeed, all events in the
temporal world, must be understood as part of the divine
plan
.
Augustine argues that there are two cities on earth
which coexist and whose inhabitants commingle. The
ci vitas Dei came into being with the beginning of time
when God created the universe ; 25 the civitas terrena came
into being with the Fall of man and will cease to exist
when man's redemption is complete as signified by the
Last Judgment. The latter is limited to the temporal
world and its citizens are those who are without
efficacious grace: a society of the reprobate. The
24 Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, vol. II, Bk. Ill, 31 p. 63.
Augustine argues that the civitas Dei came into being when God
created the Angels which occurred simultaneously with the creation of
light. Ibid., Bk. XI, Chap. IX, p. 210.
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former consists of all the inhabitants of heaven plus
those very few elect persons on earth who have been
granted efficacious grace. Both earthly groups are
infected with the curse of original sin and are "slaves
to sin," but the members of civitas terrena are motivated
solely by self-love ( cupiditas
)
which manifests itself
as a lust for wealth, glory, and power, and is at the
root of the pain, suffering, and corruption of the human
condition. The former group (the elect) have been
granted efficacious grace and are motivated by unselfish
love of God ( caritas
)
which gives them the strength to
exercise their will in always choosing the lesser over
the greater evil
.
26 Because both groups coinhabit the
same firma terra and are equally infected with the curse
of original sin, each experiences the wars of the flesh
against the spirit and of man against man, although each
is affected differently by the experience.
For even in the likeness of the sufferings, there remains
an unlikeness in the sufferers; and though exposed to the
same anguish, virtue and vice are not the same thing...
the same violence of affliction proves, purges, clarifies
the good, but damns, ruins, exterminates the wicked.
For, stirred up with the same movement, mud exhales a
horrible stench, and ointment emits a fragrant odor . 27
A crucial aspect of Augustine's theory is that
neither the civitas terrena nor the civitas Dei is
26 Ibid., Bk. XIV, 28, pp. 282-3.
27 Ibid., Bk. I, 13, p. 6.
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equated with the Empire (or the church)
: both societies—
the elect and the reprobate—transcend political
boundaries. His point here is not to discredit the Roman
state, but simply to diminish the relevance of its rise
and fall, its successes and failures, as they relate to
Christianity and God's divine plan. In fact, it is only
through earthly suffering that mankind will attain
redemption. Wars are one means by which man receives
both retribution and absolution for his sins; and thus
even victories by the wicked have a purpose in the divine
plan
.
For even when we wage a just war, our adversaries mustbe sinning; and every victory, even though gained by
wicked men, is a result of the first judgment of God, who
humbles the vanquished either for the sake of removing or
of punishing their sins. 28
We see that this account of history at once responds
to the pagan charge that the sack of Rome was inspired by
Jove, as well as the Christian heresy that it was the
beginning of Armageddon. Augustine manages to reduce the
significance of all discrete earthly catastrophes by
explaining them as mileposts along the road to man's
redemption
.
Another key aspect of Augustine's philosophy of
history is its emphasis on a world society wherein the
citizens of Civitas Dei and civitas terrena share a
28 Ibid., Bk. XIX, 15, p. 411.
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common bond in that they all are descended from Adam and
they all share the curse of his sin. 29 Even the elect
have no cause for self-exaltation because their selection
is invariably arbitrary. The significance of Augustine's
notion of a world society of mankind which transcends
political and national boundaries cannot be overstated.
While the idea is not new (having its origins in the Book
of Genesis)
, Augustine is the first to state it
definitively, and to state it to an audience which itself
transcends national and political boundaries: Christians.
The significance of a world society lies in the
implication that judgments concerning justum bellum do
not apply simply to Christians (or Romans)
,
but to all of
mankind. Of course, this premise concerning the unity of
mankind can be supported just as well by secular
arguments based on either evolution or rationality, as
later commentators will point out.
Political Communities
How do states fit into Augustine's philosophy? The
classical Greek-Roman view was that the state is the
2 9
"God created only one single man, not, certainly, that he might be
a solitary, bereft of all society, but that by this means the unity
of society and the bond of concord might be more effectively
commended to him, men being bound together not only by similarity of
nature, but by family affection. And indeed, He did not even create
the woman that was to be given him as his wife, as He created the
man, but created her out of the man, that the whole human race might
derive from one man. Ibid., Bk
. XII, 21, p. 241. Augustine also
argues that Christians have an additional bond in that they all refer
to God as 'Father.'’
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highest form of human society; it made possible the
attainment of knowledge, justice, and happiness. The
most perfect state that the world had ever known was the
Roman Republic. The Christian view, on the other hand,
was that true (or perfect) knowledge, justice, or
happiness could be attained only through God. The
disparity between these two views gave rise to different
positions concerning the relationship that Christians
should recognize with their state. The belief which
Ambrose had sought to rebut—viz. that Christians ought
to hold themselves aloof from all political concerns-was
still very much alive and may have been rejuvenated by
Alaric's sack of Rome.
Augustine's views on the state are derived directly
from his beliefs concerning the way good and evil are
realized in the temporal world
.
30 Here Augustine is
greatly influenced by Plato's theory of Forms in that he
believes that evil is a corruption of the perfection of
something good: "For who can doubt that the whole of that
which is called evil is nothing else than corrupt ion ?
"
31
For an excellent discussion of Augustine's views on states see
Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine
,
esp. Chapter IV, "The State: The Return of Order upon Disorder" (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1963) . I am indebted to this work
for locating many of the references to warfare which are spread
throughout Augustine's corpus.
Nicene Fathers, vol
. IV, "Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, " 35,
p. 147.
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Everything which God creates is good (and perfect)
.
This is true of both man and, because it is an essential
aspect of man's nature, human society. But one aspect of
man's perfection is that he is not necessarily good-he
has free will. it is this free will which caused man to
turn from God (in an effort to aggrandize himself) and
which introduced evil into the world. Evil, on
Augustine's view, does not exist independently, but is
the corruption of that which is perfect— it is the
privation of good. Mortality, suffering, vice had no
place in human nature as it was created; it was man's
injudicious exercise of his free will which caused his
fall from grace and introduced imperfection (which we
perceive as evil) into the temporal world. The result is
that all mankind, and all created by mankind, is
contaminated with the malady of original sin and bears
the attribute of this imperfection. Political entities,
of course, fall into this category. The ideal state
(e.g. Plato's Republic)
,
where perfect peace, justice,
and knowledge obtain, is possible only in the City of
God; when compared to the eternal city, earthly kingdoms
are no better than "robber bands ." 32
But we must not assume that Augustine's pessimistic
assessment of political entities implies that they are
entirely evil. On the contrary, Augustine believes that
•52
Nicene Fathers, vol. II, The City of God, Bk IV, Chap. IV, p. 66.
117
mankind must live in communities, and he, following Plato
and Aristotle, builds his notion of a state on that of a
family. He argues that men are social creatures by
nature and that one who dwells outside a polls must be
either a beast or a god. For Augustine, as for the
Greeks and Romans, the family i s primitive and an
association of families is natural. And just as a family
is organized hierarchically, so must a state be so
organized for the sake of order. As he puts it,
"obedience to princes is a compact of all human
society. "33 m response to a charge by Petilianus the
Donatist that states are invidious, Augustine responds
that men have some duties which they share in virtue of
their humanness and others commensurate with their
natural abilities and social roles, and included in this
latter group is the duty to benefit mankind through their
rule
.
34
Accordingly, when we take into consideration the social
condition of the human race, we find that kings, in the
very fact that they are kings, have a service which they
can render to the Lord in a manner which is impossible
for any who have not the power of kings.
The primary purpose for which man organizes his
small family groups and communities into states is to
insure peace. In the civitas Dei there is no need for
33 Nicene Fathers, vol
. I, Confessions, Bk
. Ill, VIII, 15, p. 65.
4 Nicene Fathers, vol. IV, "The Letters of Petilian, The Donatist"
Bk. II, XCI I , 202 & 210, pp. 577 & 583.
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laws or a government because there is no need for
restraint or coercion. On earth, however, beginning with
the first fratricide, man, unable to govern himself, has
needed civil government and authority to maintain peace
and thereby seek whatever happiness can be attained in
this world.
The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an
earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-
ordered concord of civic obedience and rule, is the
combination of men's wills to attain the things which are
helpful to this life. 35
Included in the "things helpful to this life" are
temporal goods which are only attainable when there is
order and peace. The enjoyment of the pleasures which
such goods provide is not contrary to a Christian life.
This whole class of human arrangements, which are of
convenience for the necessary intercourse of life, the
Christian is not by any means to neglect, but on the
contrary, should pay a sufficient degree of attention to
them, and keep them in memory. 3 ^
Included in this "class of arrangements" by which
states contribute to the "necessary intercourse of life"
are such temporal goods as leisure, art, and material
possessions, and while Augustine advises his readers not
to shun such temporal goods and the pleasure they
provide, he warns that he is referring simply to the
35 City of God, Bk . XIX, 17, p. 412.
3 ^ Nicene Fathers, vol . II, "On Christian Doctrine," Bk . II, 25, 40,
pp . 548.
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enjoyment of discrete instances of pleasure rather than
avarice or lust for pleasure. it is one's lust for
possessions (and fame, glory, etc.) which is the real
evil, not the attainment of them. For consider: a
general, or king, or bishop could become famous and
wealthy as a coincidental result of magnanimous actions
done entirely for the welfare of others. In spite of
this, he might remain humble in his actions and generous
in his love. According to Augustine, it is what one
holds in one's heart (one's intentions) which determine
normative worth rather than consequences. It follows
that temporal acquisitions are not themselves to be
shunned.
Money will be thy means of pilgrimage, not the stimulant
of lust; something to use for necessity, not to joy over
as a means of delight.... Thou art passing on a journey
and this life is but a wayside inn. Use money as the
traveller at an inn uses table, cup, pitcher, and couch,
with the purpose not of remaining, but of leaving them
behind. J
The outward peace achieved in the civitas terrene
,
which not only permits man to live a commodious life, but
also enables him to aspire to righteousness, is, at
best, a fleeting, inconstant peace; while that attained
in the civitas Dei is a perfect, eternal peace. Mankind,
as a whole, moves through time toward redemption and
37 Nicene Fathers
,
vol. VII, "On the Gospel of St. John," Tractate
XL, 10, p. 229. See also Deane's discussion of this topic (note 29
above)
,
p. 44
.
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eternal peace. Thus Augustine at once argues that the
ideal of justice and peace are reserved for the civitas
Dei, but that justice and peace are still the proper
goods of the temporal world, and that these can only be
attained though man's organization into states-i.e. man
needs a leviathan to motivate and effect social harmony
and commodious living. "For peace is a good so great,
that even in this earthly and mortal life there is no
word we hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with
such zest, or find to be more thoroughly satisfying ." 38
Borrowing from Plato, Augustine assures us, "even robbers
take care to maintain peace with their comrades, that
they may with greater effect and greater safety invade
the peace of other men.
Nevertheless, while all men desire peace:
Whoever hopes for this so great good in this world, andm this earth, his wisdom is but folly.... for in the
very great mutability of human affairs such great
security is never given to any people, that it should notdread invasions hostile to this life. 40
Human society, like the men who comprise it, is
perfect by nature, but corrupt by convention. If society
were perfect, as it is in the civitas Dei, there would be
peace for all inhabitants for "...there will be perfect
o o
The City of God, Bk. XIX, Chap. 11, p. 407.
^
Ibid., Bk
. XIX, 12, p. 407. See Plato's Republic 351c.
40 Ibid., Bk, XVII, 13, p. 352.
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righteousness where there will be perfect peace. "«•
Earthly society is, however, corrupt; and consequently,
man must continually struggle, often violently, in order
to achieve peace which, when attained, is at best
imperfect and ephemeral. As a social being man's desire
for peace is natural (and therefore good), as a fallen
being his cupiditas makes achievement of peace
impossible. Nevertheless, all mankind desires peace.
Whoever gives even moderate attention to human affairs
and to our common nature, will recognize that there is no
man... who does not wish to have peace. For even they who
make war desire nothing but victory—desire that is to
say, to attain to peace with glory it is therefore
with the desire for peace that wars are waged For
even those who intentionally interrupt the peace in which
they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it
changed into a peace that suits them better. They do
not, therefore, wish to have no peace, but only one more
to their mind. ^
The idea of human society, as conceived by God, is
one where there is perfect peace and harmony among all
members; the instantiation of it on earth, however, is
plagued with conflict and violence. Still, man seeks
peace to the extent possible, and thereto organizes
himself into states and passes laws, and maintains
1 ance
,
all in an effort to deter or restrain the
inevitable effects of man's cupiditas. Without states,
there would be Hobbesian chaos. Hence Christ's
4
1
Nicene Fathers vol. VIII, "Expositions on the Book of Psalms,"
CXLVII, 22, p. 670.
42 Ibid., Bk. XIX, 12, p. 407.
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admonition to his followers to "render onto Caesar those
things which are Caesar's," and to the Roman soldiers to
"be content with your wages and do harm to no man."
...the natural order which seeks the peace of mankind,
ordains that the monarch should have the power of
undertaking war if he thinks it advisable, and that the
soldiers should perform their military duties in behalf
of the peace and safety of the community. 4 "^
Up to this point Augustine deviates little from the
classical views on state authority he inherits from
Cicero, although his explanation for them is entirely his
own. In his discussion of the just causes for war,
however, he modifies Cicero's definition of a just war
(one fought for safety or honor) to reflect his religious
beliefs concerning good and evil in the world, and he
adds to those wars which are to be considered just those
which are ordained by God . 44
Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge
injuries, when the nation or city against which warlike
action is to be directed has neglected either to punish
wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what
has been unjustly taken by it. Further, that kind of war
is undoubtedly just which God Himself ordains.
We noted previously that Augustine viewed war as a
means whereby God could both punish man for his sins
4
^ Nicene Fathers, vol. IV, "Reply to Fautus the Manichaean, " Bk.
XXII, 75, p. 301.
44 Augustine, Questiones in Heptateuchum, Bk . VI, 10a, quoted in
Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations, p. 74.
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and/or grant him absolution. The consequences of this
reasoning become apparent in the following passage : 45
War begun at God's command is certainly waged justly in
order to frighten or break down or subjugate human pride:it is not waged for human cupidity, it cannot be contrary
to the incorruptible God or His saints: who are alsopleased by the exercise of patience, the humbling of the
proud, the bearing of paternal discipline. Nor has
anyone power over soldiers except from the command or
permission of God.
This account of war as an instrument of God is a key
area where Augustine breaks dramatically with his Greek
and Roman predecessors. Whereas the Roman tradition held
that "no war is just unless it is entered upon after an
official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or
warning has been given and a formal declaration made ," 46
this could no longer be operative in Augustine' s notion
of righteous wars fought at the behest of God. Russell
provides an illuminating analysis of the consequences of
this innovation
.
47
[Augustine's] just war was thus total and unlimited in
its licit use of violence, for it not only avenged the
violation of existing legal rights but also avenged the
moral order injured by the sins of the guilty party
regardless of injuries done to the just party acting as a
defender of that order. As sins as well as crimes, seen
in the context of a broadened concept of justice whereby
45 Ibid., p. 301. I have used Eppstein's translation from The
Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations, p. 70, for this passage as
it is much clearer than the Stothert translation in the Nicene
Fathers edition.
46 Cicero, De Officiis, Bk. I, 36, p. 39.
47 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 19.
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not only illegal but immoral or sacrilegious acts werepunishable the
_ transgressions were both a crime againstthe law and a sin against righteousness.
Beginning with Augustine, war (as well as the
violence of the magistrate) became more than just a legal
remedy for injustice, it became a moral imperative-and
even more significant, it could be fought for the benefit
of the vanquished.
For the person from whom is taken away the freedom which
e abuses in doing wrong is vanquished with benefit tohimself; since nothing is more truly a misfortune thanthat good fortune of offenders, by which perniciousimpunity is maintained, and the evil disposition, like an
enemy within the man, is strengthened And in mercy,
if such a thing is possible, even wars might be waged by
the good, in order that, by bringing under the yoke the
umbridled lusts of men, those vices might be abolished
which ought, under a just government, to be either
extirpated or suppressed. 48
Eventually this view of righteous war would be
gradually replaced by an objective legal notion of justum
bellum, founded on the Roman tradition, but only after
many jihads were fought by Christians in the name of
righteousness
.
In summary, there is little new or profound in
Augustine's views on man's social nature and his duties
as a citizen; most of what he asserts can be found either
in Plato's Republic and Laws, Aristotle's Politics, or
48 Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, "Letters of St. Augustine," CXXXVIII, 14,
pp . 485-6.
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The
Cicero's De Officiis and De Re Public*.™
significance of his work lies in the synthesis achieved
between this classical philosophy and the Christian
religion. The premises which are central to Augustine's
argument can just as easily be stated sans theism: a) man
is by his very nature a social being; b) social groups
must have a some means of insuring order and keeping the
peace; c) social groups require a hierarchical structure,
etc. Clearly Augustine, like Plato, Aristotle, and
Cicero, places squarely on the shoulders of civil
government the responsibility to maintain order, effect
justice, and seek peace. What is different--and a
dramatic difference it is is the tint of good and evil
with which Augustine imbues all justice and injustice in
the world. His understanding of political institutions
as instruments of man's redemption in God's divine design
bestows on political actions a kind of indeterminate
"hallowness . " The moral law as determined by the church
became the law of the land. What had been restrained by
objective criteria under pagan rule, now became subject
to ideological zealotry and crusade.
4Q . . . . .We also find in Augustine an implication that their are "natural
rights" common to all peoples which cannot be "legislated away"; for
example, the right to common passage which the Amorites refused the
Israelites and which was justification for war.
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Man as a Moral Agent
We have explained man's concupiscence as a
consequence of original sin. if man is destined to sin
and suffer until his redemption is complete (as signified
by the Last Judgment)
,
then can he still be held
accountable (either to God or to his fellows) for his
sinning, given this inevitable predisposition to sin?
Moreover, given that God has foreknowledge of every
thought and act which man will consider or perform, how
can it be said that man has any free will at all? And if
man has no free will, how can he be culpable for his
misdeeds ? 50
Augustine responds to these questions by
distinguishing what is foreseen from what is necessary,
and concludes: "it is manifest that our wills by which we
live uprightly or wickedly are not under a necessity; for
we do many things which, if we were not willing, we
should certainly not do ." 51 It is our will, he argues,
which God foresees,
50 For a short summary of the key arguments and Augustine's response
to them see "A Treatise on Grace and Free Will," in Nicene Fathers,
vol. V, pp. 433-65.
51 The City of God, Bk V, 10, p. 92. I omit the more difficult
question of how man receives his "just dessert" for the prudent
exercise of his free will, except to add that although the great
majority (all those without efficacious grace) are inescapably
damned, the severity of their punishment is linked to the severity of
their sins. The Catholic Church will later soften this position
through the Doctrine of Purgatory. For the inception of the doctrine
of purgatory (later developed by Pope Gregory I) and a discussion of
the Biblical passages on which it is founded see City of God, Bk.
XXI, 13 & 24, pp. 463-4 & 470.
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[and] it is not the case that because God foreknew what
would be in the power of our wills, there is for that
reason nothing in the power of our wills For a mandoes not sin because God foreknew that he would sin.Nay, it cannot be doubted but that it is the man himself
who sins when he does sin, because God, whose
oreknowledge is infallible, foreknew not that fate, orfortune, or something else would sin, but that the manhimself would sin, whom if he will not, sins not. 52
And because no one knows whether or not they are
saved, or that they will persist in salvation until
death
,
53 they have no choice but to judiciously exercise
their free will in order to minimize their sinning. 5 ^
The crucial point here is not that man can
altogether avoid sinning, but that he can endeavor to
avoid (or minimize) sinning and herein is he judged by
God. Thus it is what what one wills or intends, rather
than one s actions themselves, which have normative
worth. And in fact, we find that Augustine's psychology
completely subordinates actions to intentions. This
focus on inward dispositions is Augustine's way of
reconciling the requirement for man to strive to maintain
52 Ibid., p. 93. I have made a minor change in the wording of the
second sentence for clarity.
Augustine provides a parallel argument for happiness: "Though God
knows what we shall will in the future, this does not imply that we
do not make use of our will. ... I say that when you will be happy,
you will be happy through your will and not against it. Because God
foreknows your future happiness, and because nothing can happen
otherwise than as He has foreknow, it does not follow that we must
suppose you will not be happy through your own will." De Libero
Arbitrio Bk III, 3.8 (Maryland: The Newman Press, 1955), p. 147.
53 City of God, Bk . XI, 12, p. 212.
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his purity for divine judgment with the pragmatic need to
live and effect justice in the sin-ridden, temporal
world. 55 in response to a letter from Marcellinus which
maintained that certain Christian principles were
incompatible with the rights and duties of citizens
—
namely: "Recompense to no man evil for evil," and
"Whosoever shall smite thee on one cheek, turn to him the
other also; and if any man take away thy coat, let him
have thy cloak also; and whosoever will compel thee to go
a mile with him, go with him twain"—Augustine
responds
:
56
• • - these precepts pertain rather to the inward,
disposition of the heart than to the actions which are
done in the sight of men, requiring us, in the inmost
heart, to cherish patience along with benevolence, but in
the outward action to do that which seems most likely to
benefit those whose good we ought to seek....
. . .and the benevolence which prevents the recompensing of
evil for evil must be always fully cherished in the
disposition. At the same time, many things must be done
in correcting with a certain benevolent severity...
Consider, for example, the parable of the Good
Samaritan (Luke 10) : suppose the Samaritan had happened
on the victim while the robbery and beating were in
54 They must also pray daily not to be led into temptation and for
forgiveness of trespasses. Nicene Fathers vol . V, "On Nature and
Grace," Chap. 80, p. 149.
55 Augustine wishes to bypass the distinction between objective guilt
and culpability; and if man's actions are viewed from the perspective
of an omniscient God, the distinction is meaningless.
5 ^ Nicene Fathers, vol. I, "Letters of St. Augustine," CXXXVIII, II,
9 & 13-4, pp. 483 & 485. The New Testament passages cited are from
Roman XII and Matthew V, respectively.
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progress
.
Wouldn't the principles of charity and
brotherly love mandate that one stop the evil deed, even
if it meant harming the perpetrators of the injustice?
Augustine would surely answer in the affirmative because
such action would be motivated by caritas. For
Augustine, Christ's statement: "Blessed are the
peacemakers," does not refer to a passive inactivity, but
to an active process. ~> 7
Moreover, for Augustine, the need for social order
is so great that its requirements often override other
important ethical or moral principles. He believes that
when the values one cherishes come into conflict, a good
citizen has no choice but to attempt to effect justice in
accordance with his abilities and duties. Often this
entails committing acts which might otherwise be deemed
evil, but which, in certain circumstances and depending
on the disposition of one's heart, might be morally
obligatory. This is nicely illustrated in the following
passage where he discusses a judge who must torture an
accused man in order to ascertain his guilt or
innocence
:
58
What shall I say of these judgments which men pronounce
on men, and which are necessary in communities, whatever
outward peace they enjoy? Melancholy and lamentable
judgments they are, since the judges are men who cannot
discern the consciousness of those at their bar, and are
S7 See Eppstem, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations, p. 91.
^ 8 City of God, Bk . XIX, 6, pp. 404-5.
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to tht?
freSuently compelled to put innocent witnesseshe torture to ascertain the truth.... And what is
and i
m
f°
r
t
ehTndUrable''a thlng ' indeed ' t0 be ^wailed,, at were possible, watered with fountains oftears-xs thls th^ when the judge putg th0 accused ^
at he may n0t unwittingly put an innocent
' ° deathf the result of this lamentable ignorance isthat this very person, whom he tortured that he might notcon emn him if innocent, is condemned to death bothortured and innocent.
...for [he might] declare that hehas committed the crime which in fact he has not And
consequently, he [the judge] has both tortured aninnocent man to discover his innocence, and has put himto death without discovering it. If such darkness
s rouds social life, will a wise judge take his seat onthe
_
bench or no? Beyond question he will. For human
society, which he thinks it a wickedness to abandon,
constrains him and compels him to this duty These
numerous and important evils he does not consider sins;for the wise pudge does these things, not with anyintention of doing harm, but because human society claimshim as a judge.
This is not an application of some type of
utilitarianism where certain lesser evils are obligatory
in order to maximize aggregate utility. In Augustine's
formulation the obligatory action (or rule) might result
in less utility than alternatives, as it does in the
above example of torturing an innocent person; but "it is
impossible for a man's acts to be evil, when his thoughts
are good ." 59
Thus does Augustine recognize that there are
exceptions "made by the divine authority to its own law,
"
including the prohibition against the taking of human
life, and that exceptions may either be derived from a
special commission granted for a limited time, or based
59
"Expositions of the Book of Psalms," XCLVIII, 2, p. 673 .
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on a just law which applies generally. 60 concerning
those exceptions which apply generally, Augustine cites
the magistrate who, like a father toward his son, must
behave with benevolent severity. 61
"whoever lives
according to God... ought to cherish toward evil men a
perfect hatred... [so that he] hates the vice and loves
the man." 62
Concerning those exceptions to divine law which are
based on a special commission, Augustine cites the
example of a soldier who is himself "but a sword in the
hand of him [the ruler] who uses it, [and] is not himself
responsible for the death he deals." 63 And not only does
the soldier carry out his orders with impunity, but he is
obligated to obey those orders. "The soldier who has
slain a man in obedience to the authority under which he
is lawfully commissioned, is not accused of murder by any
law of his state; nay, if he has not slain him, then he
is accused of treason." And in fact, instances of men
inflicting harm on others in the line of duty may even be
considered a form of charity because man as a social
animal is not disposed to harm his fellow human beings. 64
60 City of God, Bk. I, 21, p. 15.
61
"Letters of St. Augustine," CXXXVIII, II, 14, p. 485.
62 City of God
,
Bk. XIV, 6, p. 266.
63 City of God, Bk
. I, 21, p. 15
64*Hartigan argues that Augustine's analogy between soldier and
executioner fails because soldiers kill those who are not guilty.
Swift responds (citing Ramsey) that it is not an assumption about the
"individual, subjective, moral guilt of the opponent,
.
.
[but] his
objective or functional guilt... which results from his objective
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Moreover, Augustine makes it clear that this is true
even when the war itself is an unjust one.
an idoT^
lnf EmPer° r
'
an aP°state ' a wicked man,olater; Christian soldiers served an infidel
id^TV" // ^ Called uP°n them at any time to worshipdols, to offer incense, they preferred God to him- butwhenever he commanded them to deploy into line, to march
against this or that nation, they at once obeyed. Theydistinguished their everlasting from their temporal
master; yet they were, for the sake of their everlastingMaster, submissive to their temporal master.
Here Augustine restricts the responsibility for jus
ad bellum to the political arena, thereby setting the
stage for the modern tradition of limiting the soldier's
moral culpability to the battlefield itself.
While Augustine recognizes exceptions to the divine
law against taking another's life, he accepts Cicero's
arguments against private killing, and also Ambrose's
prohibition against killing in self-defense.
As to killing others in order to defend one's own life,
I do not approve of this, unless one happen to be a
participation in actions disruptive to peace and public order." See
Richard Shelly Hartigan, "Saint Augustine on War and Killing: The
Problem of the Innocent," in Journal of the History of Ideas 27
(1966), p. 203; Louis Swift, "Augustine on War and Killing: Another
View," in Harvard Theological Review 66 (1973), p. 376-7; and Paul
Ramsey, The Just War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp.
159-60.
In Chapter Ten I will argue that the notions of guilt and innocence
are not relevant to the issue of justifying the actions of
combatants
.
65
"Expositions On the Book of Psalms," CXXV, 7, pp. 602-3. For a
more detailed discussion of this point see Deane, pp. 143-50.
Elsewhere he argues that "good laws can be issued by a man who is
not good." De Libero Arbitrio, Bk I, 5.11, p. 45.
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soldier
... act ing in defense of others
commission lawfully given him.^^
according to the
Augustine can make this distinction between the
defense of others and self-defense because he, like
Ambrose, believes that the defense of others is a
charitable or altruistic act, while self-defense is a
selfish one. The former could be done with "love in
one's heart," while the latter would be motivated either
by hatred or by self-love. This prohibition against
self-defense will be reversed in the Thirteenth Century
by St. Thomas Aquinas who, otherwise, adopts Augustine's
work on justum bellum intact.
Conclusion
As we have noted, Augustine's principles of justum
bellum synthesize classical and Christian views. Where
the Greek and Roman tradition advocated equality for
citizens, Augustine sought to extend it to mankind.
Unfortunately, his blurring of the distinction between
good and evil on one hand and the legal and the unlawful
on the other led him to accept war and violence as
6 6
"Letters of St. Augustine, XLVII, 5, p. 293. This is a
modification to what he had written years earlier in De Libero
Arbltrio: Evodius
:
"It is a much lesser evil for the assassin than
for the man who defends his own life, to be killed. It is far more
dreadful that an innocent person should suffer violence than that the
assailant should be killed by the intended victim" (Bk I, 5.12, pp.
44-5)
. Augustine's final position in this section is unclear. He
responds to Evodius by distinguishing between earthly punishment
through temporal law and "secret" punishment by Divine Providence. I
believe that his conclusion here is that this is an example where man
must choose the lesser of two sins.
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legitimate means of attacking subjective assessments of
evil. Nevertheless, Augustine can rightly be called the
father of the modern just war tradition because it is his
synthesis which is picked up and developed by later
writers such as Gratian and Aquinas. While he supposes
that there may be divinely ordained wars, he retains the
Roman jus ad bellum principles; viz., there must be a
just cause, they must be declared and carried out by
proper authority, and the final objective must always be
peace. Moreover, he insists that soldiers should never
fight for fame or glory, or with a spirit of vengeance.
He admonishes soldiers and leaders always to keep faith
with the enemy and show mercy to the vanquished. He
shows that although the resort to force seems to require
the violation of certain important Christian principles,
that these principles are defeasible in special
circumstances based on either other more fundamental
principles or the particular will of God. And finally,
he establishes war as a purposeful, public act, with
prescribed moral limits, which, though itself abominable,
occasionally becomes necessary for the sake of peace and
justice
.
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CHAPTER 6
SECULARIZATION OF THE JUST WAR TRADITION
The process whereby Roman and Christian ideas
concerning just war evolved into international law is
complex and spans many centuries. Theologians,
canonists, and jurists, many of them now obscure, all
contributed to the transition. m this chapter we will
highlight some of the key mileposts in this process by
focusing on the original contributions of two influential
writers: Aquinas and Vitoria.
The period between the work of St. Augustine and
that of St. Thomas Aquinas saw a transition from the
stability of the magnificent Roman empire to the
continuous feudal conflicts of the Dark Ages. The
emergence of numerous, autonomous, political communities
with a shared unifying dimension--the Catholic Church--
motivated the development of more formal rules governing
warfare and gave birth to the Code of Chivalry
.
1
Ironically, the breakup of the Catholic Church into
various sects led to savage ideological wars, void of
A similar development occurred in Ancient China from about the 5th
Century B. C. to the death of Alexander (referred to by the Chinese
as the Age of chan-kuo
,
or warring states)
. The unifying dimension
recognized by the Chinese was the Emperor (among other things)
. See
W. A. P. Martin, "Traces of International Law in Ancient China," in
International Review XIV (1883), pp. 63-77
.
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rules (e.g. the abominable Thirty-years War), and gave
birth to Grotius' famous work on international law.
2
Likewise, the Spanish treatment of the Indians in
the Americas inspired a number of significant
contributions to the law of nations by writers such as
Vitoria, Valdez, and Suarez. In each case, it seems as
if moral judgments concerning the conduct of war were
formulated in response to actions which outraged the
public conscience. Perhaps it is the recognition of
wrongs which motivates the development of formal rules
designed to outlaw what man's sense of justice already
recognizes as manifestly improper. 3 Certainly the
changes in conduct of war and the technological
innovations which occurred during this period
necessitated parallel developments in the just war
tradition
.
As secular, central authority diminished with the
demise of the Roman Empire, localized conflicts
One historian describes Gustavus Adolphus, the King of Sweden and
champion of the Protestant cause in the Thirty years War, thus: "Hehad a smattering of ten languages, an interest in learning, and apassion for practical philosophy; he carried a volume of Grotius withhim everywhere." C. V. Wedgewood, The Thirty Years War (New York:
Methuen & Co., 1984), p. 271.
3 Every modern war seems to have stimulated innovation and refinement
of the laws of war. Henri Dunant's founding of the International Red
Cross in 1863, an event inspired by his memories of the Battle of
Solferino, is another interesting example, as is the League of
Nations initiative after World War I and the United Nations after
World War II. Perhaps it is the improvement in mass communication
techniques which has brought the public conscience into play and
served as the catalyst for these recent accelerated improvements in
the just war tradition.
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increased. An increasingly powerful Catholic church
sought to fill the void created by the decentralization
of secular power. About the year 600, St. Isidore, the
Archbishop of Seville, wrote an encyclopedic compilation
of past writings on just war which became a source
document for later scholars. 4 In 989 the church attempted
to restrict the conduct of the constant warfare through
the Peace of God. This edict sought to regulate the
participants in war by prohibiting actions against
certain classes of peoples such as clerics, monks,
peasants, women, pilgrims, merchants, and shepherds; it
also prohibited attacks on churches, cemeteries, farm
animals, and fruit trees. 5 While this had little
immediate effect (probably because it was not supported
by feudal law)
,
the ideas it contained concerning
innocents would be picked up by later writers, most
notably Grotius, and would thereby find their way into
4 ...His most significant work was the Etymologies
.
The fifth book
concerns the laws of war and the eighteenth addresses the various
kinds of war. For a brief summary of Isidore's contribution see
Ballis, The Legal Position of War (New York & London: Garland
Publishing, 1973), pp. 43-5; Hartigan, The Forgotten Victim (Chicago:
Precedent Publishing, 1982), pp. 37-8.
5 James Turner Johnson notes that the concern for the status of
noncombatants expressed in the Peace of God represents the only
significant development in just war thought from Augustine to the
12th Century when Gratian publishes his Decretum. See Just War and
the Restraint of War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981),
p. 131. For more on the Peace of God and the Truce of God, see
Johnson, The Quest for Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1987), pp. 75-91; Hartigan, The Forgotten Victim, Chapter VI, "The
'Peace of God' and Chivalry," pp. 65-77; Baintain, Christian
Attitudes Toward War and Peace (New York: Abington Press, 1960), pp.
110 - 1 .
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the jus in bello rules of international law. in 1027 the
Peace of God was supplemented with The Truce of God,
which restricted warfare to certain days of the week and
seasons of the year. 6 The event, however, which
contributed the most to reducing the countless private
wars which cursed the period was the Church's successful
redirection of the violence within Christendom against an
external foe through the Crusades. 7
From an historical perspective, the first pivotal
event in the development of the just war tradition
following Augustine occurred in 1148 when a Benedictine
monk, Gratian, published an exhaustive compilation of
canon law, which became the focal point for just war
debate: the Decretum . 8
The Decretum is important, not because of its
original content, but because of its topical organization
and detailed treatment of the central issues. Gratian
sought to reconcile the many divergent, even contrary,
6 Ibid. A third attempt at controlling the conduct of war was made
by the Second Lateran Council in 1139 when they prohibited crossbows,
bows and arrows, and siege weapons.
"~J For an example of an appeal to crusade see Eppstein, The Catholic
Tradition of the Law of Nations (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne
Ltd.
,
1935)
,
pp. 94
.
6 Gratian of Bologna's Concordia discordant ium canonum soon became
known as the Decretals of Gratian. For a detailed discussion of this
work and the commentators on it see Russell, The Just War in the
Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), esp.
Chapter 3, "The Just War in Gratian' s Decretum," pp. 55-85. Robert
L. Benson discusses the the Decretum and its effects on canon law,
but does not address the issue of war; The Bishop Elect (Princeton
University Press, 1968), esp. Chapter II, "Constitutional Background:
Gratian' s Decretum , " pp. 23-45.
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works on canon law, and in his discussions included
selections from historical documents, various civil laws,
and extensive ecclesiastical sources; hence the title:
Concordia discordantium canonum
.
Gratian, like Augustine, argues that "with the true
servants of God even wars are pacific as they are entered
upon not through cruelty or greed and have as their
object peace, the repression of the wicked and the
deliverance of the good ." 9 He devotes a separate chapter
( Pars Secunda, Causa XXIII) to war; and while the content
of this chapter does little more than reproduce most of
the texts of Augustine (the Roman influence is also
apparent through the texts of Isidore)
,
it is presented
in a manner which encourages study and invites
commentary. Up until the publication of the Decretum,
canon law was considered a branch of theology; but after
the circulation of Gratian' s work, it became an
independent discipline. In fact, the influence of this
work was so great that it inspired a new school of canon
lawyers called the Decretists, which in turn gave birth
to the Decretalists . 10 As one scholar of the period
Q
Decretum, Pars. II, causa xxii, Q. 1, in Eppstein, The Catholic
Tradition of the Law of Nations, p. 89.
I*9 Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, esp. Chapters 4 and 5,
"The Just War According to the Decretists" and "The Just War
According to the Decretalists," pp. 86-212. Russell uses 1190 as
the date dividing the two groups, but notes that "the distinction
between Decretists and Decretalists is not easy to draw, since after
1190 many canonists commented on both...."
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notes
:
"To Master Gratian we
concept of the just war
jurisprudence
.
m11
owe the introduction of the
into modern international
While many of the commentators on Gratian' s work made
important contributions to the just war tradition, the
pivotal breakthrough occurred during the intellectual
renaissance of the thirteenth century following the new
availability of the Aristotelian corpus in Europe.
Aristotle's emphasis on grounding arguments in principles
derived from induction (coupled with the sheer brilliance
of his analyses) influenced many to believe that revealed
moral and scientific truths, at least those concerning
the temporal world, could be deduced independently of the
Gospel. This is not to imply a questioning of the
veracity of that which is revealed through the
Testaments; it simply means that because the truths
written in the mind of the immutable God must necessarily
be manifested in His instantiation of the world,
induction from the state of the world can therefore
reflect glimpses of these truths.
Foremost among the Aristotelians of the period was
St. Thomas Aquinas, to whose work we now turn.
1
1
Ibid., p. 85. According to one source, the period between 1471
and 1500 produced at least thirty-nine different editions of the
Decretum.
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Saint Thomas Aquinas
Just as St. Augustine turned to Cicero and Plato for
inspiration, so did St. Thomas Aquinas turn primarily to
Aristotle and Augustine. His work on just urn helium is
significant for a number of reasons. First, he
summarizes the key elements of Augustine's work on just
war (available to him through Gratian 12 ) and reduces them
to abstract rules grounded in clearly stated principles.
Aquinas believed that man's reason was the sole arbiter
between right and wrong moral choices (and by extension,
just and unjust manmade laws
.) 13 The first principles
12 The evidence indicates that Aquinas used Gratian as his guide to
Augustine on war because he limits his commentary to just those
issues which Gratian addresses. Ryan notes that one of the passages
which Gratian incorrectly attributes to Augustine is used in the same
fashion by Aquinas. John K. Ryan, Modern War and Basic Ethics
(Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1897), p. 19. Eppstein reaches
the same conclusion in The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations,
p. 81.
13 Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Question 91, First Article,
(henceforth Q.91, A.l) "On the Various Types of Law,
,
in The
Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. by Dino Bigongiari (New
York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1957), p. 11.
Aquinas' classification of laws into eternal, natural, and manmade
is strikingly similar to the view of the Romans expressed in this
passage from Cicero: "... [supreme] Law is not a product of human
thought, nor is it any enactment of peoples, but something eternal
which rules the whole universe.... Law is the primal and ultimate
mind of God, whose reason directs all things either by compulsion or
restraint.... Therefore, just as the divine mind is the supreme law,
so, when reason is perfected in man, that also is law; and this
perfected reason exists in the mind of the wise man; but those rules
which, in varying forms and for the need of the moment, have been
formulated for the guidance of nations, bear the title of laws rather
by favor...." Cicero goes on to argue that these "laws of perfect
reason" (such as a prohibition against rape and a disposition to
jeopardize one's own safety for the community) are binding regardless
of any temporal laws which may or may not exist. See Laws, II. iv &
v, 8-13, in Cicero: De Re Publics, De Legibus (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1928), pp. 381 -5.
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Which give the impetus to rational (hence moral) choice
are accessible to all humans through perception of
natural inclinations. “ This is crucial because it
recognizes that all humans share identical natural
inclinations (we might say certain 'values'), even though
these universal inclinations often provide the basis for
different manmade laws for different peoples at different
times
.
15 That is, all mankind has access to the eternal
law (written in the mind of God) by discerning the
fundamental tendencies of nature ( natural laws); 1 * and by
reflecting on these tendencies, rational agents can
develop knowledge of the principles which comprise moral
law. These principles serve as the grounding for
different human laws
.
11 Aquinas himself explains the
significance of this thus : 18
It follows therefore that natural law in its first common
principles is the same among all men, both as to
validity and recognition (i.e. something is right for all
and is so by all recognized)
.
One of man's natural inclinations is to live in
society
.
19 This necessitates some form of government as
15
Ibid *' Q* 91
'
A
-
2
'
"Whether There Is in Us a Natural Law?" pp.12-4.
Ibid.
, Q . 95, A. 2, p 57-9: Human law is derived from the precepts
of natural law, though human laws are for different peoples at
<^i^^erent times; Q.97, A.l, p. 79: the process of perfecting temporal
laws is an ongoing one based on reason.
16
17
18
19
Ibid.
,
Q.93, A. 2, P- 32.
Ibid. Q. 94, A. 4, pp.. 49-50 & Q . 95, A. 2, pp. 58-9
Ibid. Q • 94
,
A. 4, P- 50.
Ibid. Q . 94, A. 2, P- 46.
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well as laws to effect justice and order. 20 In fact> thg
state is a natural condition and the end (telos) of all
states is the same: bring about justice and order.
Because this is the end of all states, the ruler's
authority does not extend to decisions concerning this
end, but only to the means whereby this end might be
realized. Human laws are the rational ordinances
enacted and promulgated by the states (and their rulers)
for the common good: i.e. the preservation of order and
maintenance of justice. These laws might necessitate the
destruction of life, limb, and property, and the
deprivation of liberty whenever such action is necessary
in order to uphold justice or maintain order. 21 That
which is murder or theft for a private person, may become
a praiseworthy act when performed by someone vested with
public power. 22 And of course, actions taken to address
injustices which are external to the state may also be
required. 23 Because the raison d'etre of political
rulers is to promote the common welfare, they of course
have the duty to defend the community from attack. 24
The common good of the state cannot flourish unless its citizens
be virtuous" (Ibid., Q.92, 2d Art., p. 26); and therefore "...the
proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue"
(Ibid.
,
A. 1, p. 25)
.
Summa Theologies II-I, Q.65, A. 2; Q.66, A. 8; Q.67, A. 4.22 Ibid., Q.65, A. 2 & Q.67, A. 4.
23 Summa Theologies II-II, Q.66, A. 8, p. 140.
4
"Aquinas wrote to the Duchess of Brabant that since princes were
instituted by God to further the common good, they therefore had the
duty to defend it" quoting Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages,
pp. 261-2.
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This brings us to Aquinas' second major contribution
to the just war tradition: his comprehensive statement
concerning jus ad bellum. Before we address this,
however, it is worthwhile to note that the position we
have been attributing to Aquinas rests entirely on
secular premises. As Russell observes, "Aquinas' use of
Aristotle prevented him from attempts to transform the
churches' spiritual superiority into the legal supremacy
advocated by canonists such as Host iensis .
"
25 And in
Aquinas' own words, "the theologian considers a sin
principally as an offense against God, whereas the moral
philosopher considers is as being contrary to reason.
None of Aquinas' three conditions for a just war are
new, but he is the first to place all three of them
together as independently necessary and jointly
. Moreover, he elaborates on them and supports
them with sound, and often original, argumentation. In
the section of his Summa Theologica where he specifically
addresses war, he stipulates that for a war to be just it
must be declared by the authority of a head of a state
(proper authority)
,
for a proportionally good reason
Aquinas also stipulates that because wars are fought on behalf of
the common good, rulers may not resort to war when the cost of
fighting exceeds the good for which it is being fought.
25 Russell, p. 289.
Summa Theologica I-II, Q.97, A. 6, quoted in Thomas Aquinas,
Frederick Copleston (London: Search Press, 1976), p. 199.
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(just cause), and with a morally good aim (right
intention )
,
27
The requirement that wars be declared has its
origins in Roman law and the fetial college. Although
Aquinas does not mention a specific time between the
declaration and the commencement of hostilities (recall
that Roman law stipulated thirty-three days)
,
the very
act of declaration invites the second party to the
pending hostilities to offer redress in lieu of war
.
This is crucial because it establishes the principle that
for a war to be just, the aggrieving nation must have
refused to render satisfaction. Thus war becomes a means
of sanction for some injury received in those cases where
there is no alternative means of seeking redress. This
point is developed in greater detail by subsequent
writers such as Suarez
.
28
Concerning the requirement that wars only be
declared by proper authority, Aquinas argues that if one
Summa Theologica II-II, Q. 40, A.l, pp. 106-109. All of the
quotations concerning justification for war which follow are from the
First Article of Question 40, except as noted.
Suarez writes: "I hold that a war may also be justified on the
ground that he who has inflicted an injury should be justly punished,
if he refuses to give just satisfaction for that injury, without
resort to war. This conclusion is commonly accepted.
.. [provided] we
assume that the opposing party is not ready to make restitution, or
to give satisfaction; for if he were so disposed, the warlike
aggression would become unjust...." The Three Theological Virtues:
On Charity, Disputation XIII, Section 4 & 5 in Selections From Three
Works of Francisco Suarez, S.J., vol. 2, trans. G.L. Williams, A.
Brown, and J. Waldron, in Classics of International Law, vol. 2, ed.
J. B. Scott (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1944), p. 817-8.
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can seek redress of his rights from some higher
authority, then one is not justified in resorting to
violence. States, however, have no common authority to
which they may appeal for arbitration, and "just as it is
lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in
defending the common weal against internal
disturbances,
. . so too it is their business to have
recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal
against external enemies." And quoting Augustine (Contra
Faustum, 22.75), he adds: "The natural order conducive to
peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and
counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the
supreme authority."
Concerning the requirement for just cause, Aquinas
provides three examples which he takes directly from
Augustine ( Questiones in Heptatuechum, 10) : "A just war
is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when
a nation or state has to be punished for refusing to make
amends for wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to
restore what it has seized unjustly." While he doesn't
specifically state that war must only be used as a last
resort in this section, he does specify elsewhere that a
cause cannot be considered just unless the grieved has
first tendered the opportunity for a peaceful settlement
and been refused. 29
29 Ibid., I-II, Q. 105, A . 1 , p. 104.
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Although Aquinas doesn't directly address defensive
wars (presumably he considers their justification
obvious)
, he does discuss self-defense in the chapter
following his discussion of war. Here he makes it clear
that a defensive act can become aggression if one uses
more violence than is necessary in repelling an attack. 30
We will return to the issue of self-defense momentarily
in our discussion of double effect.
Finally, Aquinas again follows Augustine in his
stipulation that wars may not be undertaken without
rightful intentions, such as the advancement of good, the
securing of peace, the punishment of evildoers, or the
avoidance of evil. The examples he gives of wrongful
intentions are also taken directly from Augustine ( Contra
Faustum, 22.74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the
cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless
spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such
like things. ..." And he adds that even if a war is
declared by legitimate authority for a just cause, it can
be rendered unjust through a wicked intention.
Aquinas concludes his discussion of offensive wars by
again invoking the words of Augustine (Epistle ad
Boniface 189) : "We do not seek peace in order to be at
war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be
peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish
30 Ibid., Q.41, A . 1 , pp. 113-4.
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those whom you war against, and bring them to the
prosperity of peace."
Aquinas also addresses the right of subjects to rebel
against an unjust sovereign. While he adopts the
Augustinian doctrine that sedition is wrong because it is
opposed to a special kind of good, namely, "the unity and
peace of the people," he also breaks sharply with
Augustine with the following caveat:
A tyrannical government is not just, because it isdirected, not to the common good, but to the private good
of the
.
ruler, as the Philosopher states. Consequently
there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this
kind, unless the tyrant's rule be disturbed soinordinately, that his subjects suffer greater harm from
the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's
government
.
Notice that he is careful to stipulate that the harm
done by the means employed in effecting justice must not
exceed the harm which is done by the injustice one seeks
to correct.
The final dimension of Aquinas' philosophy which we
will explore is his doctrine of double effect. Recall
3
1
Ibid., Q. 42, A. 2, p. 117. The passage from Aristotle to which
Aquinas refers in this quotation states that "governments which have
a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with
strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those
which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and
perverted forms ..." (Politics, Bk 3, chap. 6, 1279al6-7, from The
Complete Works of Aristotle vol. 2, ed. by Jonathan Barnes
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 2030.
The seed in Augustine which permits Aquinas to make this break is, I
believe, Augustine's statement that "A law which is not just does not
seem to me to be a law." De Libero Arbitrio Bk I, 5.11, tr. Dorn Mark
Pontifex (Maryland: The Newman Press, 1955), p. 44.
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that both Ambrose and Augustine had prohibited self-
defense because it is motivated by cupiditas, while
defense of others is motivated by brotherly love (a form
of caritas). Aquinas' predisposition to natural law and
his Aristotelian background would not let him accept this
position, and his doctrine of double effect is his retort
to the prohibition against self-defense
.
32 This doctrine
states that acts which have both a good and a bad effect
are permissible provided that the bad effect is an
unintended side effect, that it is proportional to the
objectively good effect, and that there is no alternative
way of achieving the good effect. Thus one can kill an
attacker in self-defense provided that he does not intend
(will) the attacker's death (either as an end or as a
means), but simply endeavors to defend his own life, and
the death of the attacker is "outside the intention" or
per accidens
.
While his doctrine of double effect is developed to
justify self-defense, and even though he does not himself
32
I believe that the doctrine of double effect was inspired by the
following passage from Bk
. 5, Chap. 10 of Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics
:
"Thus there are three types of injury that occur in
communities and associations: (1) injuries committed in ignorance are
mistakes, when the person affected, the act, the instrument, or
result were not what the agent supposed they were. He thought he was
not hitting anyone, or not with that particular missile, or not that
particular person, or not for this purpose, but a result was obtained
which he had not intended.... (2) When the injury inflicted happens
contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a mishap; (3) when it
happens not contrary to reasonable expectation, but without malice,
it is a mistake ..." (1135b) . Aristotle does not release those who
make "mistakes" from culpability, however.
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extend it to acts of war, it has had such a profound
effect on just war thinking and international law, as
well as numerous other areas of our lives, that it is
worthwhile to reproduce Aquinas' own words here : 33
nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only oneof which is intended, while the other is beside theintention. Now moral acts take their species according
o what is intended, and not according to what is besidethe intention, since this is accidental Accordingly,the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is thesaving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the
aggressor. Therefore, this act, since one's intention isto save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that itis natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as
ar as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a goodintention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out
of proportion to the end.
Notice that the innate disposition to remain "in
being" in not sufficient (one could perhaps acquiesce or
flee) ; Aquinas must also condone the foreseen harm which
will occur to another as a direct result of one's defense
of self. His solution (ironically) is to use Augustine's
own distinction between intended consequences (which have
normative worth) and incidental consequences (which are
morally neutral) to provide this justification. The
crucial step which permits him to make this innovation is
an acceptance that unintended ("bad") consequences can be
foreseen without undermining the permissiblity of
intended (good) consequences.
33 Ibid., Q. 64, A. 7. For a more detailed analysis see Joseph T.
Mangan, "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect" in
Theological Studies 10 (March 1949): 40-61.
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The application of double effect to the conduct of
war has been the topic of much debate and consternation,
and we shall return to it. For now, however, let's turn
to the writer who first extended Aquinas' double effect
to include collateral damage on the battlefield: Vitoria.
Francisco de Vitoria
Vitoria studied philosophy at the College Saint
-
Jacques in Paris where he edited a commentary on the
Secunda Secundae of Aquinas' Summa Theologica written by
one of his teachers. After receiving his doctorate he
returned to his native Spain and won the "Chair of
Prime," the most important chair of theology, at the
University of Salamanca, a position he held until his
death in 1546. His most famous works, and the ones with
which we are concerned, De Indis and De Jure Belli
,
were
published for the first time from the lecture notes of
two of his students ten years after his death. 34
Although together they total less than 60 pages, these
works contain innovative insights concerning both jus ad
bellum and jus in bello .
34 .For more detail on Vitoria' s life see the Introductory Essay by
Ernest Nys in De Indis Et De Ivre Belli Reflectiones, ed. by James
Brown Scott (Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1917), pp.
9-100. All quotations from Vitoria are taken from this edition.
The information in my introductory paragraph is taken from Nys'
essay. For a summary of his views on jus ad bellum see Ballis, The
Legal Position of War, pp. 77-90; for a summary of his contributions
to jus in bello see Hartigan, The Forgotten Victim, pp. 81-91.
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The catalyst for his lectures on international law
was the treatment of the native American Indians by the
Spanish Conquistadors. In his De Indus he undertakes to
ascertain whether or not the many ongoing massacres and
Plunderings by the Spanish in the New World were being
done rightly or wrongly. The question is a serious one
because the Indians were not subject to Spanish civil law
and, as heretics, were not subject to Christian law.
Vitoria examines no less than six arguments which
purport to justify seizing possession of the Indians'
land and property (e.g. the Indians were heretical,
guilty of mortal sin, unsound of mind, not rightful
owners to begin with, etc.), and shows each of them to be
groundless Concerning the subjugation of the Indians,
he is equally thorough in his analysis, and refutes
arguments to the effect that they should be subjugated
either for their own good (i.e. Aristotle's contention
that war could justly be waged against those whose nature
dictates that they should be governed. Politics 1256b22-
5) , or in order to "compel them to come in" to the
Christian faith, or because of "a special grant from
God," among others. 36
He concludes that "the aborigines undoubtedly had
true dominion over public and private matters, just like
35
36
De Indis, Section I, para. 4-23, pp. 120-127.
Ibid., II, pp. 130-148.
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Christians Moreover, he insists that Spain had no
right to wage war against the Indians, that neither the
Emperor nor the Pope could authorize such a war, 38 and
that even if the Indians themselves attacked the
Spanish out of fear, the Spanish might defend themselves,
but only so far as possible with the least damage to the
natives, the war being a purely defensive one." 39
Vitoria's final position is that an obligation to
observe certain minimum standards of conduct obtains
between all peoples at all times and that even in a
defensive war, nations have a duty to hold their own
soldiers accountable for these minimum standards of
behavior (even against aliens)
. These standards include,
for example, that no looting or burning shall be
permitted without express orders from the prince or
general in command— irrespective of the absence of any
positive laws to the same. 40
Vitoria's position is pivotal because it recognizes
an international society of independent states, each with
reciprocal obligations and prohibitions on their conduct
vis-a-vis one another. His refutation of various Spanish
justifications for seizing the Indians' territory and
37 Ibid., II, 16, p. 149.
38 Ibid., Concerning the Emperor: II, 1, 2. pp. 131-5; concerning the
Pope: II, 6, p. 137. Note that Charles V was both the Emperor and
the King of Spain when this was written.
39 Ibid., Ill, 6, p. 155.
40 Ibid., De Jure Belli
,
I, 53, p. 185.
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property establishes what is now recognized as a state's
right to territorial integrity. His rebuttal to Spanish
arguments justifying domination of the Indian peoples
establishes what we now call a nation's right to
political sovereignty. These two states' rights,
articulated in response to the Spanish abuse of American
aborigines, are central to our modern international law.
In his De Jure Belli, Vitoria addresses the problem
of war more directly and specifies restrictions on both
jus as bellum and jus in hello. He is the first to
insist on an objective analysis of the justifications for
going to war, and in so doing, revokes the Monarch's
monopoly on decisions regarding the resort to arms. It
is not enough, he argues, for a prince to believe he has
a just cause, it must also, as Aristotle asserts, come up
to the standard of a wise man's judgment.
It is essential for a just war that an exceedingly
careful examination be made of the justice and causes of
the war and that the reasons of those who on grounds of
equity oppose it be listened to.... For truth and justice
in moral questions are hard of attainment and so any
careless treatment of them easily leads to error, an
error which will be inexcusable.
. . . all who are admitted on summons or voluntarily to the
public council or the prince's council ought, and are
bound, to examine into the cause of an unjust war.
[For they] can avert the war, if they lend their wisdom
and their weight to an examination into its causes.
Therefore they are bound so to do.... Again, a king is
not by himself capable of examining into the causes of a
war and the possibility of a mistake on his part is not
unlikely and such a mistake would bring great evil and
ruin to multitudes. Therefore war ought not to be made
on the sole judgment of the king, nor, indeed on the
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judgment of a few, but on that of many,
upright men. 41
and they wise and
Of course, what is missing is a list of objective
criteria for what constitutes just cause; but this is not
Vitoria's concern here: he has previously repeated
Augustine's (and Aquinas' and Cicero's) examples of just
causes. Here he is concerned that extreme care be taken
to ensure that cases under consideration do indeed
warrant a resort to arms—that the legitimate authority
is not guilty of "vincible and deliberate error" in
declaring a cause just— and also that "greater evils do
not arise out of the war than the war would avert ." 43 in
this sense, justice is "objectively" satisfied by method
(as it was in the Roman tradition)
,
rather than by
content; if the method is followed correctly, then the
cause is as just as we can attain to as imperfect
beings . 44
4
^
Ibid., 21 & 24, pp. 173-4.
Ibid., 1, 18 & 19. He also enumerates many examples of unjust
causes
.
43 Ibid., 20, p. 173 & 37, p. 179.
Of course there are bound to be mistakes just as there are in the
enforcement of municipal law. Recall Augustine's discussion of the
judge who tortures and condemns to death an innocent person: he is
himself blameless because he has followed due process. To take the
analogy one step further, suppose that an innocent person is "justly"
convicted by due process in accordance with the laws of his state.
Should that person attempt to avoid his punishment? Is he guilty of
an additional crime if he attempts escape? The Socratic argument
seems to be that justice is linked to objectivity of process, even
though he personally is an example of the deficiency of the same.
The parallel case is the citizen who is called to fight in what he
believes to be an unjust war. The distinction between legal and
moral rules will be addressed in a later chapter.
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Vitoria's contribution to the tradition of jus in
belle is likewise significant because of his commitment
deliberate slaughter of innocents is never
itself," for it is "forbidden by natural
'innocent' Vitoria means all who did not
directly take part in the fighting. This is a distinct
break with Augustine who saw war in terms of a moral
struggle between the forces of good and evil, where the
enemy represents the embodiment of evil. Vitoria begins
his arguments regarding the inviolability of innocents
with a quotation from Exodus 23: "The innocent and the
righteous slay them not;" he continues
:
4 ^
The basis of a war is a wrong done. But a wrong is not
done by an innocent person. Therefore war may not be
employed against him. Thirdly, it is not lawful within a
State to punish the innocent for the wrongdoing of the
9uilty. Therefore this is not lawful among enemies.
Fourthly, were this not so, a war would be just on both
sides,.. a thing which, as has been shown, is impossible.
And the consequence is manifest, because it is certain
that innocent folk may defend themselves against any who
try to kill them.
Vitoria goes on to enumerate specifically those who
are to be included in the class of innocents, and names
women, children, farmers, foreign travelers, clerics and
religious persons, and the rest of the peaceable
population
. He also stipulates that even among the
Saracens and other nonbelievers the innocent shall not be
that "the
lawful in
law " 45
45 Ibid., 13, p. 171 & 35, p. 178.
46 Ibid., 35, p. 178.
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harmed because "A prince has no greater authority over
foreigners than his own subjects. But he may not draw
his sword against his own subjects unless they have done
some wrong. Therefore, not against foreign citizens ." 47
But Vitoria realizes that absolute injunction
against harming civilians is unattainable; he must temper
the ideal of not harming any innocents with the reality
of combat if he is to be credible. This leads him to
develop another crucial innovation: the application of
St. Thomas' doctrine of double effect to collateral
damage in war. He writes : 48
Sometimes it is right, in virtue of collateral
circumstances, to slay the innocent, even knowingly, as
when a fortress of city is stormed in a just war,
although it is known that there are a number of innocent
people in it and although cannons and other engines of
war cannot be discharged
... without destroying innocent
together with the guilty. The proof is that war could
not otherwise be waged against even the guilty and thejustice of belligerents would be balked.
In the paragraph following the above quotation he
caut ions--most prophet ically--against possible abuses of
the principle he has just espoused.
Great attention must be paid.
. .to see that greater evils
do not arise out of the war than the war would
avert.... In sum, it is never right to slay the guiltless
,
even as an indirect and unintended result, except when
there is no other means of carrying on the operations of
a just war. (my italics)
47 Ibid., 13, p. 170-1.
48 Ibid., 37, p. 179.
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He Concludes with a quotation from Matthew 13 to
let the tares grow, lest while ye gather up the tares ye
root up also the wheat with them."
Thus Vitoria at once develops the most powerful case
to date for granting special status to innocents, and
also provides the first statement of military necessity
as a justification for setting aside this protection. 49
Double effect is his way of resolving the tension between
the deontological dictum that individual rights are
sacrosanct, and the teleological argument that public
rights sometimes outweigh individual ones.
This leads us to another dimension of Vitoria's
exposition of justum bellum which, like his application
of double effect as a justification for collateral
damage, continues to be a source of consternation even
today: the question of whether or not a war can be just
on both sides. Recall that in a previously quoted
passage Vitoria uses the premise that a war cannot be
just on both sides as manifest in order to prove (by a
reductio ad absurdum) that even among the enemy,
innocents must not be slain. Elsewhere, however, he
49.Vitoria adds military necessity as a necessary condition for his
application of the doctrine of double effect to war. At certain
times in history military necessity will be considered a sufficient
condition for setting aside considerations of jus in bello. We
return to this issue and examine it in considerable detail in Chapter
Ten
.
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makes a further distinction concerning justice and
injustice in war which clouds the issue somewhat
.
50
Assuming a demonstrable ignorance either of fact or ofaw, it may be that on the side where true justice is thewar rs Dust of itself, while on the other side the war isDust in the sense of being excused from sin by reason ofgood faith, because invincible ignorance is a complete6XCUS6
o
Vitoria's objective here is to distinguish between
guilt and culpability. The innuendo that a war may be
just on both sides is, however, picked up by subsequent
writers and has been a magnet for criticism of just war
theory since. Arthur Nussbaum, for example, writes : 51
...the traditional doctrine of just war is essentially
religious; where its religious spirit evaporates, only a
shallow and stale residue remains. Certainly, the issue
of just war deserves discussion in any course or textbook
on international law, but only as a matter of analysis
and historical information
. . . . The just-war-on-both-sides
problem is illustrative. It is there that insoluble
troubles befell the writers who tried to elaborate the
just war concept in a legal or semi-legal way.
And in his specific discussion of Vitoria's treatment of
this topic, Nussbaum notes: "His objective was laudable,
Ibid., 32, p. 177. See also De Indis, III, 6, pp. 155, where he
states that "there is no inconsistency, indeed, in holding the war to
be a just war on both sides, seeing that on one side there is right
and on the other there is invincible ignorance."
51
"Just War—A Legal Concept?" in Michigan Law Review 42 (1943)
: p.
478 .
The argument that International law is not genuine law is not new.
In the early 17th Century Grotius introduces the reason for his On
the Law of War and Peace thus: "Such a work is all the more necessary
because in our day, as in former times, there is no lack of men who
view this branch of law [international law] with contempt as having
no reality outside of an empty name." Prolegomena 3, p. 9
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indeed, but one can hardly agree with the obliteration of
the difference between the objective criterion of justice
and the subjective criterion of good faith ." 52
But Nussbaum' s criticism is, it seems to me, tenuous
at best. Surely we understand Vitoria's intention in
grouping together guiltless and blameless—he is
concerned with reparations and punishments after the war-
-even if we don't agree with his method. Victoria's
objective here is not to develop a system of
international law, but to provide guidance to his monarch
(and his monarch's subjects) on the proper moral choices
concerning war. This is even more apparent when we
consider that the topic is broached in conjunction with a
discussion on whether or not a subject's beliefs
concerning the justice or injustice of a war affect his
obligation to serve in it. Vitoria concludes that "if a
subject is convinced of the injustice of a war, he ought
not to serve in it, even on the command of his prince ." 53
The common thread in Vitoria' s reasoning is the
Augustinian notion of good intentions; i.e. that
ultimately, each person, sovereign or citizen, can do no
more than what he believes to be right. (He adds that
each must vigorously seek the truth to the best of his
ability
.
52 Ibid., p. 460.
53 Ibid., 22, p. 173.
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Moreover, he also employs the distinction between
Objective justice and culpability when he notes that "a
war may be just and lawful in itself and yet owing to
collateral circumstance may be unlawful ." 54 This is
because wars are political acts waged for the common
good. Therefore, when the costs of waging the war are
excessive, even though there exists a just cause, "it is
indubitable that the prince is bound rather to give up
his own rights and abstain from war. "55 It follows that a
prince could begin a war believing it to be just (i.e.
with good intentions), and subsequently discover it to be
unjust, based on either new information or costs to his
nation, or whatever. In such cases the war would be
objectively unjust, but the monarch who initiated the war
would be "excused" as Vitoria puts it, because he acted
in good faith.
In all cases, Vitoria is concerned with providing
practical instructions to his readers, be they citizens
or heads of state, on how they should act in particular
situations, and he quite rightly bases his alternatives
on subjective beliefs rather than objective facts. Of
course he, along with the rest of us, would like these to
be the same. In cases where the ideal is not realized,
however, Vitoria addresses the subsequent question of
54 Ibid., 33, p. 178.
55 Ibid.
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Thus he
moral and legal culpability after the fact,
addresses his remarks to those contemplating war, to
those engaged in war, and to those who are victorious in
war. This is evident in his own summary of his work
which he provides us at the conclusion in three canons
which correspond to three time periods : 56
First Canon : Assuming that a prince has authority to make
war, he should first of all not go seeking occasions and
causes of war, but should, if possible, live in peaceW1
_
a 1 men
'
• •
• [and] only under compulsion and
reluctantly should he come to the necessity of war.
Second Canon: When war for a just cause has broken out,it must not be waged so as to ruin the people against
whom it is directed, but only so as to obtain one's
rights and the defense of one's country and in order thatfrom that war peace and security may in time result.
Third Canon: when victory has been won and the war is
over, the victory should be utilized with moderation and
Christian humility, and.
. . so far as possible should
involve the offending state in the least degree of
calamity and misfortune, the offending individuals being
chastised within lawful limits;., [for] it is thoroughly
unjust that ' Quidquid delirant reges, plectantur Achivi.'
(For every folly their kings commit the punishment should
fall upon the Greeks.)
Here Vitoria makes explicit the practical nature of
his enterprise. This can be brought into even sharper
relief when contrasted with the way a subsequent Spanish
writer and student of Vitoria's work, Francisco Suarez,
accomplishes the same results by specifying that:
...three periods must be distinguished with respect to
every war: its inception; its prosecution, before victory
56 Ibid., 60, p. 187.
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IS gained; and the period after victory. The threec assies of persons already mentioned must also bedistinguished, namely: the sovereign prince, theintermediate group of leaders [military officers] and thesoldiers of the rank and file.^
By specifying different rules for each group and
each time period, Suarez alleviates the difficulty caused
by linking post war justice to pre-war decision making.
Of course the link is still there, but the mechanism for
dealing with it is in distinguishing discrete time
periods rather than by a blurring of the objective notion
of jus ad helium which jurists demand
.
58
Finally, we must keep in mind that when Vitoria
discusses national prerogative, his purpose, like
Ambrose's, Augustine's, and Aquinas' before him, is to
determine the normative status of alternatives. A
sovereign could not be called before the bar except by
God, and then only after his death. There could be no
legal judgment on a sovereign's actions. Vitoria's
enterprise was to provide guidance which would assist a
ruler in choosing the moral alternative. His work had
legal connotations only insofar as it motivated rulers to
decree laws restricting the behavior of their own
citizens vis-a-vis foreigners. Criticizing Vitoria for
57 Francisco Suarez, The Three Theological Virtues
,
Disputation
XIII, Section VII, p. 836. Suarez also notes that the possibility of
a war being just on both sides is absurd.
58 Suarez also addresses the practical issue of deciding when to
resort to arms and concludes that rulers must follow the "more
probable" truth. Ibid., p. 836.
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inefficacy of his theory of international law is
moot
.
Nussbaum's criticism stems from the jurist's
insatiable quest for objectivity; and indeed, the purpose
of law (at least a sufficient purpose) is to make
objective commonly recognized morality. (Hence the idea
that legislators declare rather than "make" laws.) But
laws always require interpretation, both in terms of
application to particular situations and degree of
culpability, because principles of justice, like moral
principles, cannot be stated in terms of a general rule
which can be applied mechanically to empirical data
.
59
In the next chapter we will return to the topic of
international law in more detail.
Vitoria mentions a specific example in which armed
force can be directed against innocents that warrants our
consideration because of its relevance to today's world:
reprisals. He argues that nations have a duty "to
vindicate the right against the wrongdoing of their
subjects, " and that "the neglect and breach of this duty
grants the prince of the injured party the right to
5 9 This may be the point which Aristotle is making in his
introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics I, 2, when he notes that one
should "look for precision in each class of things just so far as the
subject matter admits.... [in moral philosophy] the end aimed at is
not knowledge but action" (1094b 12-1095al0)
. The Complete Works of
Aristotle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 1730.
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recoup himself even from innocent folk. "60 The problem
with this attempt at justifying
-evil for evil- between
states iS; of course, that it makes a mockery out of the
the very notion of justice that underlies the resort to
force in the first place, because the evil is not
returned against the guilty, but against the innocent.
Walzer has recently attempted to salvage reprisals
that are conducted in lieu of war by stipulating that: a)
they parallel the initial wrong in the kind of target
selected; b) they be proportional in their effects; and
c)
-they be carried out so as to avoid civilian
deaths Reprisals of this type are, for Walzer, "a
first resort," undertaken in lieu of war after all
attempts at diplomatic or peaceful redress fail. 62
Reprisals represent a problematic appendage to just war
theory because they are premeditated acts of violence
Ibid., 41, p 181. I am limiting this discussion to reprisals
conducted in lieu of war, rather than reprisals conducted as
retribution for war crimes, as this is Vitoria's context. We will
return to the latter subject in a later discussion.
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Chap. 13, "Reprisals," pp207-22. FF '
62 A recent example of a reprisal conducted in lieu of war that
meets Walzer' s criteria (and which many consider to be justified) is
the U.S. raid on Tripoli in April 1986. The Libyan government,
specifically the head of state, had directed and carried out
terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens in Germany, and had planned
and ordered additional attacks. The evidence was irrefutable. The
U. S. responded with an air attack on Libya's command headquarters
where the orders originated, as well as two military installations.
The guidance to U. S. pilots included a requirement that they
visually identify their targets prior to dropping ordinance in order
to minimize the possibility of innocent deaths even though this meant
a substantially increased risk for the pilots because it exposed them
to hostile anti-aircraft fire.
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between states which violate the principles of jus ad
beHum. A seCond type of reprisal, those conducted
durxng wartime, are even more contentious. We'll save
our discussion of them until Chapter Ten.
Vitoria'S work inspired subsequent Spanish writers
such as Suarez, who transcribes Vitoria's ideas into the
language of jurists and elaborates on the distinction
between combatants and innocents; and Vasquez, who
envisions a society of free states with reciprocal
rights, regulated by a law of nations and independent of
either imperial or ecclesiastical authority. The next
writer we will examine in detail, however, will be a
Dutchman, widely regarded as the father of international
law, Hugo Grotius.
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CHAPTER 7
HUGO GROTIUS: FATHER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The writers we have examined so far have all
advocated certain just war principles as moral
imperatives. The next contributor we will examine, Hugo
Grotius, attempts to transform this tradition of just war
as a matter of moral principle into positive
international law. in Chapter Seven we will seek an
understanding of Grotius' theory of jurisprudence and
international law. A second objective is to identify the
principles that underlie the laws of war which he
proposes and see if they are still valid in light of new
political and technological realities. While much of
what he advocates is either outdated (such as a
prohibition against using poison spears)
,
not relevant to
our enterprise (such as his rules governing ambassadors)
,
or simply contentious (such as his careful division of
prohibitions into natural and customary)
,
the principles
on which he bases his arguments are still cogent and
worthy of our attention. This will be our focus.
Grotius' ideas are not uncontroversial
. Many
jurists, like Nussbaum in the last chapter for example,
argue that international law could more appropriately be
called international morality; where there is no common
authority, they argue, and hence no power to enforce
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violations, there is no positive law. in Chapter Eight
we will examine the difficulties that criticisms such as
Nussbaum' s raise for Grotius' argument and explore ways
in which he might have responded to them. We will save
our critical assessment of the content of the laws of war
for Chapters Nine and Ten.
Huig de Groot was born in Holland in 1583. He
graduated from the University of Leiden at 14 years of
age, and received the degree of Doctor of Law from the
University of Orleans two years later. in 1609 he
published his first work on international law, a treatise
in defense of freedom of the seas (Mare Liberum) which
was actually a chapter in a larger unpublished work
titled Commentary on the Law of Prize. His most
important work, De Jure Belli ac Pads, was conceived
while he was in prison on political charges and was
written from 1623-1625, after his escape to France. 1
Rightly regarded as the father of international law,
Grotius' extensive influence and many contributions to
the science of jurisprudence defy summarization here. We
can, however, explain why the rules concerning the
conduct of war which he formulated, articulated, and
systemized were so suited to the needs of his world, as
1 The Law of War and Peace, Hugo Grotius, tr. by Francis W. Kelsey
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1962) . The biographical
information is taken from the introduction by James Brown Scott, pp.
ix-xliii. All quotations from Grotius are taken from this source.
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well as how they are relevant to our world today. 2 We
should note that one of the keys to the success of his
work on international law is the fact that he developed
it as part of a larger theory of jurisprudence. Thus
while international law forms the most important part of
his work, he also addresses such topics as the basis for
political and legal obligations and constitutional law.
We will organize our analysis of Grotius' work under
three headings: 1) the relationship between morality and
law in Grotius
' theory of jurisprudence; 2) his theory of
international law; and 3) his laws of war. Let's begin,
however, with some general observations concerning the
background against which the work was conceived.
During the Middle Ages the international order of
Europe was based primarily on the ecclesiastical
authority of the Catholic Church. with the church as the
dominant central authority for matters political as well
as spiritual international legal questions were seen as
subjective moral determinations in the Augustinian
tradition, rather than objective empirical ones as they
had been in the Roman tradition. The conditions which
2 Richard Falk states that important insights into world problems can
be realized through a careful study of historical periods that faced
analogous problems. The period most relevant to our present
situation, he argues, is "the seventeenth-century transition to the
modern state system." See "A New Paradigm for International Legal
Studies: Prospects and Proposals," in International Law: A
Contemporary Perspective ed. by Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil,
and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), p.
653.
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created the need for Grotius' work were changes in the
existing social, economic, and religious conditions
caused by 1) the replacement of feudal systems with
national states, 2) the increase in world trade and
colonialism, and 3) the fragmentation of the Christian
church. Without a powerful ecclesiastical authority to
mediate and arbitrate interests between increasingly
powerful states, many with worldwide expansionist and
trade interests, force became a common medium of
political intercourse. 3 National animosities which had
been held in check for centuries by a unity of religion
(e.g. that between France and Spain) found expression on
the battlefield. The Thirty Years War which dominated
the period was especially abominable because it was a
righteous, religious war wherein the only acceptable
outcomes were either the conversion or the annihilation
of the opposing side. Even in those cases where the
Roman Church might have exercised its influence in urging
moderation of violence, it did not do so. On the
contrary. Church leaders often seemed determined to
destroy forever the heresy of the Reformation through the
annihilation of its adherents. This was a war fought on
3 ,In his discussion of the period leading up to and including the
Thirty Years War Falk notes that "The political realities of medieval
times were complicated and dominated by the character of highly
localized power arrangements. In this regard, notions of papal
supremacy and spiritual unity were rhetorical more often than
behavioral, and should not, in any event, be accepted uncritically."
Ibid., p. 693, n. 30.
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wars of the
behalf of God and, like the Israelites in the
Old Testament
, its soldiers were not constrained by
rules whatsoever
.
4 m Grotius' own words, it was
conduct of this war which motivated him to write The
of War and Peace.
^
any
the
Law
have had many and weighty reasons for undertaking towrrte upon this subject. Throughout the Christian 1I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such
tha^men
barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed
an rf n° armS f°r 3li9ht Causes ' or no «ll, and that when arms have once been taken up there isno longer any respect for law, divine or human; it is asIf, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy hadopenly let loose for the committing of all crimes.
Grotius
' objective was to supplant the impotent and
corrupt ecclesiastical authority with an external,
objective, secular authority which the competing
political interests (i.e. national states) would accept--
viz. a corpus of international laws. In a famous passage
One commentator describes the period this way: "War to
extermination thus became the only means of obtaining peace. This
was the strictly logical basis of the decree of the Holy Inquisition,
which Philip II solemnly approved, condemning to death the entirepopulation of the Netherlands Plunder and pillage were supportedby reference to the divinely approved 'spoiling of the Egyptians' by
the Israelites. The right to massacre unresisting enemies was based
upon the command of the Almighty to the Jews in the twentieth chapter
of Deuteronomy. The indiscriminate slaughter of whole populations
was. justified by a reference to the divine command to slaughter
nations round about Israel. Torture and mutilation of enemies was
sanctioned by the conduct of Samuel against Agag, of King David
against the Philistines, of the men of Judah against Adoni-bezek.
Even the slaughter of babes in arms was supported by a passage from
the Psalms 'Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little
ones against the stones.'..." Andrew Dickson White, Seven Great
Statesmen (New York: The Century Co., 1912), pp. 84 & 85.
^ T^e Law of War and Peace, Prolegomena 28, p. 20.
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he establishes with finality that the domain for his
enterprise is all of humankind regardless of religious or
national affiliation: "What we have been saying (that
natural laws are binding on all mankind] would have a
degree of validity even... if there is no God, or that the
affairs of men are of no concern to Him."® Let's now
turn to his work.
Law and Moral Principles
The central theme of The Laws of War and Peace is
that the relations between states are always governed by
laws and moral principles just as are relations between
individuals. This assertion is pivotal because if true,
it restricts both the authority of the church and that of
independent states (and their monarchs)
. Such
limitations on secular and church authority are necessary
if international laws are to have any force. But in
order for his argument to work, Grotius must first show
that the universal moral principles which are operative
in interpersonal relations are at the foundation of
municipal laws. Only then can he stand any chance of
convincing us that analogous rules apply (or should
^ Ibid., Prolegomena 10, p. 13.
Grotiiis is careful to add that he is only referring to the minimum
standards for acceptable behavior; he notes that there are additional
revealed constraints on Christians. This is a brilliant tact because
it effectively limits ecclesiastical criticism to content rather than
process (i.e. the parameters of the theory rather than the theory
itself)
.
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apply) in the society of states. Grotius tackles the
first issue by grounding municipal law in a law of nature
which is, as he puts it, "unchangeable-even in the sense
that it cannot be changed by God."'' Our discussion of
international law must build, therefore, on the
foundations which Grotius lays in his theory of natural
law. Let's start by identifying the different types of
law which Grotius recognizes and examining how they are
related to one another.
Grotius divides all laws into two broad types:
natural law and volitional law. Of the former he says:
The law of nature is a dictate of right reason whichpoints out that an act, according as it is or is not in
conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of
moral baseness or moral necessity...,®
and later:
In discussing the law of nature, the question is this,
whether an act can be performed without injustice; and
injustice is understood to be that which is utterly
repugnant to a rational and social nature .
^
When Grotius uses the term 'natural law' he is
referring to phenomena in the realm of interpersonal
relationships the same way a scientist explains
phenomenon concerning inanimate bodies in terms of laws
7 Ibid., Bk
. I, chap. 1, X, p. 40. Grotius' law of nature is derived
from that of Aquinas.
8 Ibid., p. 38.
9 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. 2, I, p. 52.
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of physics. 10 He argues that there is something in man's
nature as a rational, social being which is manifested in
human interaction as behavioral patterns. when
objectively apprehended, these can be expressed as
abstract universal or natural laws. Such laws are as
universal and timeless for human beings as are the laws
of nature which explain and predict interaction of
inanimate substances. These universal laws are the first
principles from which man's reason deduces moral truths.
Volitional laws, on the other hand, may be set aside
under certain circumstances, such as in wartime; or may
be changed to reflect the particular needs of a people or
the times. Volitional laws may be either human or
divine. 11 in either case, they ought never to be contrary
to the laws of nature; and in fact, volitional laws which
decree anything contrary to the laws of nature are
invalid. 12 Human volitional laws can be modified by
consent and reflect the times, customs, and necessities
of those who consent to them. Volitional laws are best
understood as an ever-changing, evolving expedient to
"Just as God cannot cause two times two should not make four, so
He cannot cause that which is intrinsically evil be not evil." Ibid.,
Bk
. I, chap. 1, X, p. 40; and elsewhere: "the fundamental principles
of the law of nature are as manifest and clear as those things we
perceive through the senses," Prolegomena, 39, p. 23.
Grotius further divides divine law into "universal divine law and
divine law peculiar to a single people." Ibid., Bk
. I, chap. 1, XV,
p. 45-50. In this sense, divine laws are those given by God to either
all mankind or one people.
12 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. 16, XXVI, p. 425.
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commodious living. Natural laws, which often provide the
principles or foundation upon which volitional laws are
conceived, cannot be set aside with the "tide of men's
fortunes." For example, different laws are operative in
times of war than are in peacetime, even though the same
natural principles provide the foundations for each
.
13
Volitional human laws are of three types. The first
are those that concern domestic relationships, such as
those between a father and his children or a master and
his employees. The remaining types Grotius calls
municipal laws' and 'laws of nations .' 14 Both of these
are based on consent, either explicit, or implicit, and
can be either written or simply customary. We will
return to each type of law in more detail in the course
of our exegesis.
The fundamental tenet of Grotius' s conception of
natural law is that man is a social creature--i
. e . civil
society must have existed in the state of nature (even if
states did not) because it proceeds from "essential
traits implanted in man" by God . 15 These traits include
1
3
Ibid., Prolegomena, 25-6, pp. 18-9.
14 For a discussion of the types of volitional law see Bk
. I, chap.
1, XI I I -XV, pp. 44-5; & Prolegomena 41, p. 24.
15 Ibid., Prolegomena 12, p. 14. Much of Grotius' position on
natural law is taken from Aquinas and Aristotle. "[5] Yet it is
natural for man, more than for any other animal, to be a social and
political animal, to live in a group. [6] This is clearly a
necessity of man's nature.... [8] If, then, it is natural for man to
live in the society of many, it is necessary that there exist among
men some means by which the group may be governed. ..." Thomas
Aquinas, On Kingship, Bk I, chap. I, in The Political Ideas of St.
l
i
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the disposition to sympathize with others, a disposition
to fulfill promises, the ability to know and act in
accordance with general principles, the ability to use
language, and a proclivity to inflict penalties on men in
accordance with their deserts. 16 it is not self-
preservation but life in society that forms the
fundamental basis for natural law. 17 While self-
preservation is an instinctive disposition, it is not the
most fundamental value as evidenced by man's (and other
social creatures') willingness to encounter great
personal risk to protect their families and their
communities. This concept is crucial because from it
Grotius concludes that neither persons nor states have an
absolute right to self-defense.
The type of society which is natural to man is not
one of loose anarchic associations, but consists of
ordered communities where men may live in concord with
Thomas Aquinas, ed. by Dino Bigongiari (New York: Hafner Publishing
Co., 1957), pp. 175-6.
16 Ibid., Prolegomena 7-8, p. 12-13.
1 7 it *Man is, to be sure, an animal, but an animal of a superior
kind,
. . . among the traits characteristic of man is an impelling
desire for society, that is, for the social life—not of any and
every sort, but peaceful, and organized according to the measure of
his intelligence, with those who are of his own kind;
. . . Stated as a
universal truth, therefore, the assertion that every animal is
impelled by nature to seek only its own good cannot be conceded."
Prolegomena 6, p. 11. Contrast this view with that of Hobbes who
argues that it is self-interest and self-preservation which are the
fundamentals values that motivate men to form social groups; and to
that of Cicero who argues that divine laws are laws of perfect reason
and examples of the same are the prohibition against rape and the
duty to sacrifice one's self for one's community.
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an
their fellows. Furthermore, society is not simply
expedient, for man's very nature would "lead him into the
mutual relations of society [even] if he had no lack of
anything .
"
18
Because it is in man's nature that he live in
society, "it is a rule of the law of nature to abide by
pacts" so that members may oblige themselves to one
another. The disposition to live in society and abide
by pacts is the source of municipal law which is thereby
grounded in the consent of those whom it affects.
Grotius summarizes the part of the relationship between
natural law and municipal law thus : 20
For the very nature of man, which even if we had no lack
of anything would lead us into the mutual relations of
society, is the mother of the law of nature. But the
mother of municipal law is that obligation which arises
from mutual consent; and since this obligation derives
its force from the law of nature, nature may be
considered, so to say, the great-grandmother of municipal
law
.
Grotius adds that while expediency is not the motive
behind municipal laws, they are reinforced by it in that
expediency provides the "opportunity" for civil
government and municipal laws which help cultivate the
social life. Thus man's rational nature compels him to
1 O
Ibid., Prolegomena 16, p. 15.
-*- 0 Ibid., Prolegomena 15, p. 14.
20 Ibid., Prolegomena 16, p. 15.
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adopt municipal
welfare
.
laws which are an expedient to increased
Natural laws either obligate, prohibit, or, by
forfeit, permit. Most volitional laws concern affairs
which are neither obligatory nor prohibited under natural
law; that is, they are permitted. Such laws are,
however, binding because men have given their consent to
them, either explicitly or implicitly, and this
constitutes having entered a pact with others who are
subject to these laws and, of course, "abiding by pacts
is a rule of nature ." 21 This formulation successfully
grounds obedience to volitional law in moral principles
without claiming that the content of particular municipal
laws, such as those concerning swimming or fishing, have
inherent moral significance. Perhaps an example will be
helpful here.
Grotius notes that all persons have a natural right
to those goods necessary for survival. Natural law does
2
1
Much of what Grotius states is best understood in the context of
the Thirty Years War. For example, the Papacy assumed the authority
to void any promises or treaties at will. Grotius responds by
arguing that volitional laws, human and divine, are a variety of
promises which are binding even on God. As Grotius puts it:
"According to civil law also a person can be said to be bound by his
own act, either in this sense, that an obligation results not from
the law of nature also but from the municipal law, or from both
together, or in the sense that the obligation gives a right to action
in a court of law. Therefore we say that a true and proper
obligation arises from a promise and contract of a king, which he has
entered into with his subjects, and that this obligation confers a
right upon his subjects;., and this holds even between God and man."
Bk. II, chap. 14, VI, p. 384.
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not prohibit ownership of additional goods, and
volitional law extends the right of ownership to these.
ownership, such as now obtains, was introduced by
the will of man; but, once introduced, the law of nature
points out that it is wrong for me, against your will, to
take away that which is subject to your ownership. "22 of
course, the law of nature which states that everyone has
the right to that which is necessary for survival can
never be invalidated by volitional law. 23 Thus ownership
of necessities is guaranteed by natural law, while
ownership of additional goods is permitted by natural law
(in that it is not forbidden) and legislated by
volitional law; and of course, volitional law is itself
grounded in natural law through the innate human
disposition to fulfill promises.
The significance of this to our enterprise is that
it means that no one—not even a sovereign power— is
outside of either natural or volitional laws. Moreover,
treaties entered into by sovereigns constitute instances
of volitional laws and cannot be abrogated without the
consent of all parties. As Grotius puts it: 34
...speaking of the observance of the law of nature and of
divine law, or of the law of nations; observance of these
is binding upon all kings, even though they have made no
promise.... Nevertheless, it must be admitted that when
2 Ibid., Bk. I, chap. 1, X, p. 39
3 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. 2, VI, p. 193.
4 Ibid., Bk I, chap 3, XVI, p. 121.
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such a promise is made, the sovereign
limited... the reason that... a truelegal right upon the promisee.
power is in a way
promise confers a
This leads us to an apparent difficulty for Grotius:
man's obligation to obey unjust laws-specifically, to
serve in an unjust war. There are two traditional
perspectives here for Grotius to work with. First, there
is the Augustinian view which places the greatest
emphasis on domestic peace and order. Augustine's
position is derived from Paul's letter to the Romans
(Chapter 13) which states, "Let every person be subject
to the governing authorities.... he who resists the
authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who
resist will incur judgment." Augustine interprets this
to mean that man must obey even unjust laws for the sake
of order:
...the people of Christ, whatever be their condition
—
whether they by kings, princes, judges, soldiers, or
provincials, rich or poor, bond or free, male or female,
-
-are enjoined to endure this earthly republic, wicked and
dissolute as it is.... 2 ^
The second perspective is the one defended by St.
Thomas who argues that one's individual conscience must
always be the final arbitrator of moral choices. The
Augustine, The City of God, Bk II, Chap. XIX, p. 34. Augustine
includes a citizen's obligation to serve in unjust wars in his
position. The only time a citizen can disobey his civil authority is
when what he is enjoined to do contradicts a command of God; i.e. the
only unjust laws are those which are contrary to God's will. Thus
his oft quoted statement: "unjust laws are not laws at all." See the
previous discussion of this issue in Chapter 5.
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difference between the two positions can be isolated in
each author's divergent perception of man's nature.
Augustine's view is that man is naturally disposed to
sin; hence the very purpose of political authority is to
impose an imperfect peace on stained beings. Aquinas, on
the other hand, sees in man's rational and social nature
a disposition to beneficence: "The first precept of
[natural] law [is] that good is to be done and ensued
,
and evil is to be avoided." 26 The purpose of civil
authority is to foster "the unity and peace of the
people, " and when a duly constituted authority fails to
accomplish this, it may be deposed. 27 "Man is bound to
obey secular princes insofar as this is required by the
order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority is
not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust,
his subjects are not bound to obey him. ... "28 Aquinas is
not questioning the divine authority of civil government,
but he locates it in the office rather than the
individual who fills the office.
The contradictory premises at the origin of these
views are: a) Augustine's position that revelation is the
source of moral truth; and b) Aquinas' contention that
2 6 Aquinas, Summa Theologia I-II, Q. 94, A. 2, in The Political
Ideas, p. 45.
27 See Chapter 6, esp. pp. 116 & 121.
2 ® Aquinas, Summa Theologia 11-11, Q. 104, A. 6, p. 172.
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moral truths are accessible through reason. 29 We see
that in the former case the last word concerning right
and wrong conduct comes "from the top"-i.e. from God
through either papal authority or the state—while in the
latter view it is discovered by man through reason. Thus
while Augustine generally equates morality with legality,
Aquinas sees moral truths as the foundation of positive
laws. Grotius' position on this topic initially seems
to favor the Augustinian perspective, but closer analysis
shows it to actually meld a compromise between the two
positions, as we shall see.
Grotius certainly denies to citizens the right to
resist a tyrannical ruler and includes among his list of
unjust wars those waged by an oppressed people to gain
freedom. This seems paradoxical when contrasted with
the progressive character of his work as a whole; enough
so, in fact, that one classic writer on international law
2 9 Aquinas holds that there are two types of reason, speculative and
practical, and, as he puts it, "the precepts of natural law are to
practical reason what the first principles of demonstrations are to
speculative reason." Practical reason, then, deduces moral truths
from the principles of natural law. Ibid., I-II, Q. 94, A. 2, p. 44.
Again, Aristotle's influence is noticeable. In the Nicomachean
Ethics V, 9 & 10, Aristotle notes that municipal laws are only just
incidentally (1137al2) ; and that when justice and law conflict (due
to law's inevitable lack of total universality), it must give way tojustice (1137b20-32)
.
Grotius writes: "Liberty, whether of individuals or of
states ... cannot give the right to war." What Grotius means here is
that the lack of liberty by itself cannot justify war because it may
have been entered into by lawful means. This is because although "by
nature no one is a slave," men must have the right to enter slavery
if they choose, otherwise they are not truly free. The Law of War
and Peace
,
Bk. II, Chap. 22, XI, p. 551.
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attributes this apparent inconsistency to the needs of
the times in which Grotius wrote
.
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considerations of this order must have weighed heavilywith one in whose work the desire for peace was thedominant motive and ever-recurring theme.
This commentator goes on to note that "behind the
facade of general disapproval of the right of resistance
there lay qualifications so comprehensive as to render
the major proposition almost theoretical ." 33 And indeed,
Grotius adds that there is a right of resistance in those
cases where a ruler either transgresses against the laws
of the state, abandons his responsibility or authority,
undertakes to place the state in subjugation, oversteps
the authority granted him by the people, shows himself
the enemy of the people, or when the right to resist has
been reserved by the people in the constitutional
document
.
34 Certainly these caveats seem to render
impotent the earlier prohibition against rebellion. Why
then is Grotius at such pains to emphasize that even
32 H. Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Movement," in International Law: A
Contemporary Perspective, p. 26.
33 Ibid., p. 27.
34 The Law of War and Peace, Bk. I, Chap. 4, VIII-XI & XIV, pp. 156-
9.
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unjust laws must be obeyed, and that a bad rule is better
than no rule at all ? 35
There is, I believe, a better explanation for
Grot ius
'
position here than simply that "it was required
by the times," and understanding his rationale on this
topic provides us with a worthwhile insight into his
enterprise as a whole. Recall that although Grotius
takes his notion of natural law from Aquinas, he applies
it in a manner which gives it relevance between nations
as well as between individuals. While Aquinas argues
that all just human laws are derived from natural law,
his first precept of natural law—do good and avoid evil-
-has little usefulness in terms of formulating specific
rules of behavior, and simply doesn't make any sense at
all when applied to abstract political entities.
Grotius' solution is to argue that man's natural
disposition to keep promises is at the root of volitional
laws which are a form of consentual agreement between
individuals, and that the same reasoning may be used to
understand international obligations which, although they
obtain between states, are made by individudls
. Because
he has grounded positive law in the natural law precept
that rational beings should keep promises, he must be
very careful concerning the conditions whereby he
justifies overriding this obligation. He can't permit
35 Ibid., iv, p. 142.
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disobedience to municipal law based on subjective
assessments by individuals, because exceptions which are
operative between individuals in domestic society will
have parallel applications in the international society
of states. in fact, Aquinas' advocacy of individual
conscience as the final arbitrator of right and wrong
action would make international obligations a farce. If
Grotius is going to be successful in establishing legal
constraints on sovereign nations based on their implicit
consent as evidenced by customary practices, he cannot
allow the camel to get his nose under the tent" by
permitting states the wherewithal to revoke their consent
at will. The only justifications for reneging on
promises must be conflicts with other natural law
obligations. Thus by insisting that individuals are
always bound by municipal laws based on their consent and
the universal obligation to keep pacts (except when such
laws conflict with natural law)
,
he has prepared the way
to stipulate a like requirement for states . 36
This is a marvelous "compromise" by Grotius because
he successfully grounds positive law in morality as
Aquinas advocates, without completely subordinating it to
3 6
"Whatever the king does in acts belonging to his kingly office
should be considered in the same way as if the state did them.
. . .
After an oath has been taken he [the king] cannot render it void,
because here also separate persons are required. ... to swear so that
you would be bound only if you should yourself be willing is
altogether ridiculous, and contrary to the nature of an oath." Ibid.,
Bk, II, Chap. 14, I & III, pp. 381-2.
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individual conscience. Still, he is able to leave the
door open for civil disobedience based on the
incompatibility of municipal laws with the principles of
natural law— an outcome which legal systems based
entirely on consent are unable to achieve
.
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to our system of government under law. To rest upon orhide behind the claim that if one's conscience speaks to the
contrary, justification exists for ignoring laws or decrees is but to
say that the rule of law is not to be the governing yardstick of our
society's conduct." Leon Jaworski, "The United States Faces Today aSerious Threat to Her Continued Existence as a Free People," in Law
and Morality
,
ed. by Robert M. Baird and Stuart Rosenbaum (New York-
Prometheus Books, 1988), p. 87.
If, on the other hand, positive law is an imperfect formalization
of moral principles, then one should always obey one's conscience
when it conflicts with the law. This seems to imply that civil
disobedience wouldn't be disobedience at all.
A recent attempt at compromise between the two positions is
developed by John Rawls who proposes that laws be based on those
ideal "principles of justice which free and rational men would agree
to in an original position of equal liberty." He goes on, however,
to allow for civil disobedience by noting that the laws which arise
from these principles will be imperfect because "we cannot frame a
procedure which guarantees that only just and effective legislation
is enacted." This seems problematic because if his is a theoretical
solution which postulates ideal principles, then why not postulate
ideal laws? i.e. those laws which free and rational men would agree
to under a "veil of ignorance." And if it is a practical solution,
then why shouldn't one object to the principles as well as to the
laws to include the ones concerning the form that disobedience
should take? "The Obligation to Obey the Law," Ibid., pp. 125-39.
Elsewhere Rawls argues that civil disobedience represents a
declaration that "the principles of social cooperation among free and
equal men are not being respected." This implies an appeal to moral
principle above those which "free and rational men would agree to..."
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The last point we need to address -in «Uui6 i our prosont
discussion of law and morality concerns sanctions
Grotius argues that the law of nature is a real law which
sanction in force because according to natural
law "every man has the right to punish wrongdoers . "38 m
municipalities the offices of preventing and punishing
wrongdoers are specialized and each individual's right to
undertake such action is restricted by volitional laws. 39
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Compare Grotius' conception of the origins of municipal law to thefollowing extracts from John Locke, written a century later- "Theexecution on the law of nature is [in the state of nature, put i«oevery man s hands, whereby every one has a right to punish thetransgressors of that law P
a. h^
VSr
.
y offense ' that can be committed in the state of nature may int e state of nature be also punished equally, as it may in acommonwealth: for though it would be beside my present purpose toenter here unto the particulars of the law of nature, or its Lireo punrshment, yet it is certain there is such a law, and that too asntelligible and plain to a rational creature,
. . as the positive lawsof commonwealths;., for so truly are a great part of the municipallaws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded
on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated andinterpreted.
...
The inconveniences [caused] by the irregular and uncertain exercise
of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of other,
makes them.
. .willing to give up every one his single power ofpunishing, to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it
amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorizedby them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in the we have the
original right of both the legislative and executive power, as well
as of the governments and societies themselves." Two Treatises of
188
In places where there is no constituted authority "the
old natural liberty remains, especially in places where
there are no courts, as, for example, on the sea ." 40
Will such an explanation also serve for international
law? As international law is presently understood it will
not because the analogy between individuals and states
fails in practice when we attempt to consider states as
moral agents, as we shall see in a moment. Nevertheless
there are, I believe, mechanisms whereby this difficulty
might be addressed. with this in mind, let's turn our
discussion to international law.
The Law of Nations
Besides the problem of sanctions, two additional
difficulties confronted Grotius in developing a system of
international law which merit our attention. The first
is the problem of where to get a core body of laws upon
which to build a corpus juris. Grotius addresses this by
proposing that there presently exist implicit laws which
are observed in relationships between different nations
just as there are implicit laws which are observed in
domestic society as a matter of custom. These may be
considered as jus inter gentes or laws between nations.
Government (New American Library: New York, 1963), Book II, Sections
7, 12, & 127, pp. 312, 315, & 397.
40 Ibid., p. 474.
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Grotius argues that one can determine the operative
laws of nations through the analysis of past and present
customs. Hence his work is a plethora of quotations from
"philosophers, historians, poets, and orators ." 42
When many at different times, and in different places,
affirm the same thing as certain, that ought to be
referred to a universal cause; and this cause, in thelines of inquiry which we are following, must be either a
correct conclusion drawn from the principles of nature,
or common consent. The former points to the law of
nature; the latter, to the law of nations. 43
Only a prodigy such as Grotius could be familiar
with the incredible volume of records from past
civilizations which he filters for moral practices and
refines into principles. Certainly making the
civilizations of Ancient Greece and Rome the wellsprings
for the precedents which he distills into the laws of
peace and war lent considerable credence to them and
facilitated their acceptance by national leaders who were
themselves steeped in classical traditions.
The second problem which confronted Grotius is the
difficulty with anchoring laws between nations in a law
41 Ibid., Bk. I, chap., 1, XIV, p. 44.
43 Ibid., Prolegomena, 46, p. 26.
43 Ibid., Prolegomena, 40
, pp. 23-4.
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Grot ius
of nature which concerns moral agents
recognizes that the proper domain for natural law is
individual relationships within a society, but he also
recognizes a society of nations wherein each member
nation consents to laws for the benefit of all. So the
law of nations, as he conceives it, is based almost
entirely on consent (pacta sunt sevanda)
, rather than on
natural law. Just as man's reason dictates that certain
principles must be followed for the maintenance of
domestic society, so the the authority of reason dictates
that the existence of a society of independent states be
regulated by certain principles. In this way the laws of
nations are similar to municipal laws in that they come
into being through consent.
Just as the laws of each state have in view the
advantage of that state, so by mutual consent it has
become possible that certain laws should originate as
between all states, or in a great many states; and it is
apparent that the laws thus originating had in view the
advantage, not of particular states, but of the great
society of states. And this is what is called the law of
nations
. . .
.
^
Thus Grotius is able to legitimize his enterprise by
using a timeless, international consensuality as his
precedence. The difficulty, however, is the lack of a
moral foundation in a legal system which seems to be
based on expediency—even if there is a consensus as to
^ Ibid., Prolegomena 17, p. 15.
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the rules of expediency. In other words, consensus can
mean agreeing on the rule to be adopted, without
necessarily agreeing on the reason for that rule— and in
moral philosophy, the reason is everything. Rules
grounded entirely in expediency will be followed only as
long as it is expedient.
Recall that Grotius' account of domestic society
stipulated that not only were some municipal laws derived
from the law of nature, but that all were affected by it
because of man's natural obligation to keep promises.
Unfortunately, using the moral obligations inherent in
interpersonal relationships as the basis for assuming
that such obligations obtain in international
relationships is fraught with difficulties because of the
fundamental disimilarities between the subjects of law
involved in each case: i.e. moral agents on one hand and
abstract entities on the other. The issue of whether
abstract entites can incur moral as well as legal
obligations vis-a-vis human beings or other abstract
entities is highly controversial even today, and was
simply a non-starter in Grotius' pre-corporate world.
^
But if one rejects natural law's application to the
international community, then international law is
45 It is interesting that Grotius' early legal experience was gained
representing Dutch shipping interests in foreign courts. His first
work on international law was written to address issues in
international shipping and commerce.
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deprived of moral force. A system of laws grounded only
in consent (sans moral force) and recognizing no common
constituting authority or force of sanction is likely to
have little effect. Under such a formulation the only
basis for any sovereign state conforming to a law would
be because it is in its own interests to do so. And
then, of course, there would be no need for law in the
first place. Moreover, if international law is based
solely on consent, then nations can withhold their
consent or repudiate it whenever conditions change ( rebus
sic stantibus) because there is no common authority to
mandate compliance. In order to give international law
coercive force, one must link it to moral principles the
same way Grotius does municipal law by grounding it in
human nature.
Grotius accomplishes this by arguing that the same
natural laws which govern man's relationships with his
fellows also apply to relationships between states. This
is not a domestic analogy argument where the state is
considered as an individual "writ large." Grotius regards
the state as an expedient formed so that group functions
may be delegated to individuals who act on the group'
s
behalf . 46 The nature of relations between states is
determined by the moral principles which concern
46 - • . .His entire enterprise is a denial of the Machiavellian view,
popular in his day, that in international politics nothing is unjust
which is expedient. See Prolegomena 3, p. 9.
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relations between individuals because persons conduct
national affairs. And because it is always moral agents
who make decisions and initiate actions on behalf of the
constituents of a state (who are themselves moral
agents)
, such actions must be governed by the natural
laws inherent in man's nature as a rational, social
being. Persons do not cease to be responsible moral
agents because they act in an official capacity as agents
of a state. Nor do the principles of natural law cease
to apply When one "interacts" with an abstract entity
representing an association of persons. This means that
even though abstract entities are the subjects of
international law, the responsibility for compliance, as
well as the culpability for infractions, always rests
with individuals
.
47 This completes the link back to his
Grotius' formulation was virtually ignored until after World War
II, but has since become more acceptable. As one expert oninternational law writes: "When I take up the Nuremberg cases in my
class in International Law, I find it quite difficult to convey to
the students how radical those proceedings appeared to be in 1947.
At that time, the contention that there should be individual
accountability under international law seemed to constitute an
unfounded and dangerous precedent." Anthony D' Amato, International
Law: Process and Prospect (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational
Publishers, 1987), p. 149.
The following quotation from the Justice Jackson's opening remarks
at the Nuremberg trials makes this point with finality: "The
principle of personal liability is a necessary as well as logical one
if international law is to render real help to the maintenance of
peace. An international law which operates only on states can be
enforced only by war because the most practicable method of coercing
a state is warfare.... Of course, the idea that a state any more than
a corporation, commits crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always are
committed only by persons. While it is quite proper to employ the
fiction of responsibility of a state or corporation for the purpose
of imposing a collective liability, it is quite intolerable to let
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earlier insistence that the laws of nature are binding on
all persons—monarch or Pope included.
A final point: this application of the principles of
natural law to international law doesn't imply that
municipal and international laws are similar in content.
We should keep in mind that in most cases volitional
laws—municipal and international—are expedients; their
moral force is derived from the obligation to keep
promises, not something inherently normative in the laws
themselves
.
In the next chapter we will return to the issue of
sanctions and other difficulties for international law;
for now, however, let's examine the just war principles
which Grotius proposes.
The Laws of War
Grotius' effort at establishing a concise corpus of
international law for the conduct of war represents the
culmination of a thousand years of gradually reducing
moral principles to objective criteria. Grotius realized
that a completely objective standard of justice for the
such a legalism become the basis of personal immunity. The
[Nurember] Charter recognizes that one who has committed criminal
acts may not take refuge in superior order nor in the doctrine that
his crimes were acts of states. Trial of The Major War Criminals
before The International Military Tribunal vol. 2, "Transcript of 21
Nov. 1945" (Nuremberg, Germany, 1947). p. 150. See also "The
International Tribunal at Nuremberg," in War and Morality, ed. by
Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Co., 1970), pp. 107-8.
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conduct of human affairs is impossible, that even the
most objective criteria must be subjectively applied.
Hence his work includes not only a system of specific
laws, but a discussion of the principles behind them
(their intentions) and guidance concerning their
application. Because there existed no legislative body
to formally "declare” his system of international
jurisprudence as positive law, Grotius had to depend on
reason and custom as the authority behind his laws, and
private conscience and public condemnation as his
sanctions. We will return to the efficacy of these
foundations in more detail in our discussion of modern
international law (Chapter Eight)
.
Grotius' laws of war must be examined from two
distinct and independent perspectives. His primary
objective is to prevent war; failing to prevent it, he
seeks to minimize its brutality. The specific
proscriptions of these two dimensions of the theory of
just war are disproportionately represented in modern
international legal documents, although the principles
upon which they are based are evident. Let's begin with
his conditions for jus ad beHum.
Grotius' abhorrence of war is a recurring theme in
his work. In the dedication of The Laws of War and Peace
to Louis XIII of France he writes: 4 ®
4 8 The Law of War and Peace, Dedication, pp. 4-5.
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, through your initiativepeace may come again.... [my italics]
While Grotius' objective is to avoid war, he is not
a pacifist: "For both extremes [pacifism and realism] a
remedy must be found, that men may not believe either
that nothing is allowable, or that everything is .” 49
Recognizing that national perspectives can never be
truly objective, he lays out a detailed set of criteria
for nations to use to evaluate situations that might
warrant the use of force. These criteria constitute his
concept of jus ad helium and must be met in order for a
war to be formally just.
Modern just war theory recognizes eight conditions
which must all be met for a nation to be justified in
resorting to arms. Grotius discusses seven of them, but
accepts only six. Since all seven which he does address
h^ve their origins in works which we have discussed in
previous chapters, our summary of them here will be
brief. We'll examine the one modern addition to the list
last
.
49 Ibid.
,
Prolegomena, 29, p. 20 .
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The first condition requires that the only
acceptable cause for resorting to force must be an injury
received. It is clear from the examples of just causes
which Grotius gives us that he regards as just only those
wars fought on behalf of certain rights. 50 The exaraples
he uses are defense of self or property, or infliction of
punishment
.
51 Punishment is only considered just when it
aims at some good because "reason forbids a man to do
anything whereby another may be harmed, unless this
action has some good end in view." 52 Clearly, then, he
classifies as just only those wars which are waged either
m self-defense or to inflict punishment after an injury
as been received. This effectively forbids wars of
anticipation or security:
The issue of whether or not the term 'rights' is the best way to
speak of moral prescriptions and prohibitions is the topic of much
recent debate. We can, I believe, avoid this issue by simply
accepting this as an expedient way to organize and refer to certain
moral rules that are themselves much less controversial. Thus we can
accept a principle such as 'one should not intentionally harm
innocent persons' without using the term rights, even though a rights
theorist would argue that such a prohibition is based on some
individual right. As long as we recognize that we need not use the
convention of "rights talk" it doesn't seem reasonable to avoid it in
those cases where it is useful.
Ibid., Bk
. II, Chap. 1, XVI, p. 184. These are for a public war.
Elsewhere he also makes provision for humanitarian intervention: In
those cases where a ruler "inflicts upon his subjects such treatment
as no one is warranted in inflicting, the exercise of the right
vested in human society is not precluded." Bk
. II, Chap. 25, VII, 2,
PP • 584. See also Bk . II, Chap. XX, IX, 1 where he discusses wars of
punishment waged for "the good of mankind in general."
^ Ibid., Bk
. II, Chap. 20, V, p. 468. This good end may be for
either the good of the person who does the wrong, or of the persons
against whose interest the wrong was committed, or of other persons
in general."
198
.. fear With respect to a neighboring power is not au lcient cause. For in order that self-defense may beawful it must be necessary; and it is not necessary
ess we are certain, not only regarding the power ofur neighbor, but also regarding his intention; thedegree of certainty required is that which is accepted in
And elsewhere: "that the possibility of being attacked
confers the right to attack is abhorrent to every
principle of equity ." 54 The principle here is that war is
a legal remedy albeit an extraordinary one—that is
undertaken only after a serious injustice has been
committed and ordinary procedures of resolution have
failed.
Grot ius ' discussion of unjust and doubtful causes is
as telling as his list of just ones. In the chapter
where he discusses 'advantage' as an example of an unjust
cause, (the shortest sub-chapter in the text, reproduced
here in its entirety) he exclaims:
VI. Advantage does not confer the same right as necessity. 55
He adds that if there is any doubt as to whether or not a
cause is just, one must refrain from war: "...in
consequence of war a great many sufferings usually fall
53 Ibid., Chap. 22, V, 1, p. 549.
54 Ibid., Chap. 1, XVII, p. 184.
55 Ibid., Chap. 22, VI, p. 549.
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upon even innocent persons. Therefore in the midst of
divergent opinions we must lean towards peace ." 56
The expression 'just cause' is misleading because
the term seems to imply a sufficient justification, it is
important to keep in mind that a just cause is not itself
an adequate reason for the resort to arms. Given that a
nation has received an injury which is considered a just
cause of war, the remaining jus ad helium criteria must
also be met.
The second criteria is that the good toward which
the war aims is proportional to the evil which the war
will cause. There are two aspects of this condition
which merit attention. The first demands a utilitarian
calculation of the consequences that will result from
resorting to arms. In this regard, Grotius makes the
enlightened statement (two centuries before Bentham and
that "kings who measure up to the rule of wisdom
take account not only of the nation which has been
committed to them, but of the whole human race
. And
elsewhere he notes that if there is any doubt concerning
the balance of good over evil that will result from the
war, it must not be undertaken. 5 ®
Ibid., Chap. 23, VI, p. 560. He notes that refraining from war
may, on occasion, be a mistake, but engaging in war unjustly is
always a crime.
Ibid., Prolegomena, 24, p. 18.
5 ® Ibid., Chap. 23, II, 2, p. 558. He notes, however, that "This
course cannot be pursued where one really must do one of two things,
and yet it is in doubt whether either of them is right. In that case
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The second aspect of this condition is that prior to
resorting to arms there must be a specific political end
toward which the war is directed. From this we realize
that any fighting which exceeds the political purpose for
which the war is being waged is likely to be unjust.
The king who undertakes a war for trivial reasons, or toexact unnecessary penalties, is responsible to his
subjects for making good the losses which arisetherefrom. For
. he perpetrates a crime, if not againstthe foe, yet against his own people, by involving them in
so serious an evil on such grounds.
In the same vein it is manifest that wars of
annihilation, "even against the wicked" are always
unjust, and that wars should be fought "only so far that
crimes may be remedied and corrected .
"
6 ^
Next, there must be a reasonable chance of success.
Grotius rejects the "better dead than red" principle on
the grounds that "life is of greater value than
liberty ." 61 This does not constitute a rejection of
fighting for freedom, but a rejection of futile or
suicidal resistance.
The fourth condition is that wars must be publicly
declared. The purpose here is twofold. Declaration of
war provides the offending party the opportunity to offer
he will be allowed to choose that which appears to him to be less
wrong.... In a comparison of evils, the lesser evil takes the place of
the good."
S Q
Ibid., Chap. 24, VII, p. 575.
60 Ibid., Bk. Ill, Chap. 11, VIII, p. 734.
61 Ibid., Bk. II, VI, p. 573-4.
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redress in lieu of violence. 62 Second, because war is a
public act it must not be engaged in secretly or
deceitfully, but must be conducted in a manner that
establishes "with certainty that war is not being waged
by private initiative but by the will of each of the two
peoples or their [lawful] heads. "63 In other words
_
it
opens to public debate the judgment of whether or not the
injury received warrants resort to arms. 64
Critics have argued that this requirement is no
longer reasonable because the time it takes to initiate
an attack today has been reduced ridiculously from the
time it took to raise an army and march to enemy
territory in Grotius' age. 65 Realistically, they argue,
it would be foolish for a nation to declare its intention
to go to war in a manner which affords the opposing
nation the opportunity for a preemptive attack.
62 Grotius divides declarations of war into conditional and absolute.
The latter is for those instances where demands are not relevant,
e.g. when a nation must defend itself from an ongoing attack by
another. In either case, the war still must be declared because it
is a public act. See Bk III, Chap. 3, VII & XI, pp. 635-6 & 639.
Ibid. Of course governments which routinely do not inform their
constituents of public policy will fail to meet this condition.
Grotius cites the Roman practice of the senate debating whether or
not to undertake war after the Fetiale College had ruled that the war
could be justly undertaken.
65 This is an often heard argument from both pacifists and realists.
The former accept the principle and conclude that no war can be just.
The latter reject the principle and conclude that the jus ad helium
is a nonsensical notion. See for example, Thomas Shannon, What Are
They Saying About Peace and War? (New York: Paulist Press, 1983), p.
118
.
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This "why should I obey the law or do what I
recognize to be morally right when others don't?"
objection isn't very convincing. As Grotius notes in
responding to a similar objection : 66
reaardina
nSiderati
r
^ enter int ° ^liberationsg g war, I admit, but only on grounds ofxpedrency, not of justice.... But that the possibilitybeing attacked confers the right to attack isabhorrent to every principle of equity. Human lifeexists under such conditions that complete security isnever guaranteed to us. Y
Moreover, it is not at all clear that a declaration
of war provides a significant advantage to the offending
nation. Even when we consider nuclear missiles which are
the most instantaneous and decisive means of initiating
war, the present state of the world is such that those
nations which would be most affected by a preemptive
attack (instead of a retaliatory one), maintain a
constant vigilance against the same
.
67 It is debatable
Ibid
. ,
Bk II, Chap. 1, XVII, p. 184.
The nations whose combat power is potentially the most vulnerable
to a surprise attack are those nations who depend heavily on nuclear
weapons. The early warning mechanisms of NATO Alliance and WARSAW
Pact, coupled with the Triad organization of nuclear forces (missile,
submarine, and airplane)
,
render a decisive surprise attack
practically impossible. This is the logical basis for the doctrine
of mutually assured destruction (MAD)
. if a population adopts the
MAD doctrine in advance of attack, then the condition that war must
be a public act is met in principle. (The larger issue of political
decisionmaking and minority rights in national policy decisions such
as MAD, while relevent, are beyond the scope of this analysis.)
Finally, although I have focused my discussion on nuclear war, these
considerations apply to conventional war as well. Nations which are
on adversarial terms maintain constant vigilance so that a successful
surprise attack is equally unlikely.
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whether there is a significant strategic advantage to be
gained by initiating an attack without warning instead of
declaring an intention to attack unless demands are met.
Of course, if a nation's political goals include the
complete subjugation of another nation, then
considerations of declaration are moot. A crook doesn't
care whether the bank is open or not, and he certainly is
not going to announce his intention.
Finally, a public declaration of war conveys to the
population of the offending nation a unity of purpose in
the population of the declaring nation. It announces to
their counterparts that 'an injustice has been committed
and we are prepared to resort to arms to correct it.'
This must certainly provide a great incentive to "settle
out of court." The fact that it is a public declaration
distinguishes it from a kind of political blackmail which
is by its very nature secretive.
A fifth jus ad bellum criteria is that only a
legitimate authority may declare war
.
68 Grotius is
careful to specify that this does not include "public
officials not having sovereign power, " but only the duly
constituted ruler who speaks with the authority of the
populace and who does not have recourse to a higher
authority for arbitration.
]68 Ibid., Bk. I, Chap. 3, V, pp. 98-100.
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Finally, Grotius specifies that war must always be a
last resort, undertaken only when all the above
conditions have been met, and no other means achieves
satisfactory resolution. He proposes that attempts be
made to obviate war by conference
,
69 by arbitration
,
70 by
lot
,
71 or by single combat - 72 He considers war so heinous
an evil that in order to avoid it "an innocent citizen
may be delivered into the hands of the enemy, in order to
prevent the ruin otherwise threatening the state ." 73 He
concludes that "a cause for engaging in war which either
may not be passed over, or ought not to be, is
exceptional .
”
74
The traditional jus ad bellum condition which
Grotius omits is the Augustinian stipulation that war
only be undertaken with right intention. Grotius argues
that while the aforementioned conditions must be
subjectively assessed, they are objective in the sense
that they apply to relationships between states.
Intentions, on the other hand, refer to the internal
states of individual agents. Thus, they can not change
the justice or injustice of the war itself. In his
words
:
69 Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. 23, VII, p. 560.
70 Ibid., 7, p. 561.
71 Ibid., 9, p. 563
72 Ibid., 10, pp. 563-4.
73 Ibid., Chap. 25, III, p. 579.
74 Ibid., Chap. 24, VII, p. 575.
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With these words [on intentions] you may ricrhtlvassociate the passage of Augustine: 'The eager desire tom ] ure, the cruelty of vengeance, the unappeased and
7?' the Savagery ° f Thett ofruling, and whatever else there is akin, these are thet mgs which are justly censured in warfare '
However, when a justifiable cause is not wanting, whilethese things do indeed convict of wrong the party thatmakes war, yet they do not render "he war itselfproperly speaking, unlawful. Hence no restitution is duea result of a war undertaken under such conditions. 75
We can see that if a war is formally and materially
just, the intentions of the ruler (s) cannot invalidate
this judgment.
The last condition that is often included as a
necessary prerequisite for a war to be considered just,
but that is not found in Grotius, is that it must be
fought justly. 76 Earlier I mentioned that the two
components of just war theory, jus ad helium and jus in
hello, were separate and distinct. I believe this
interpretation is appropriate for two reasons. First,
jus ad helium concerns relationships between states; just
and unjust conduct on the battlefield concerns the
actions of individuals. As Grotius notes, war describes
7
^
Ibid., Chap. 22, XVII, 2, p. 556.
Actually, there is a passage in Grotius which can be interpreted
as presenting this as a necessary condition: "In order that wars may
be justified, they must be carried on with not less scrupulousness
than judicial processes are wont to be." Prolegomena 25, p. 18. The
context of this passage indicates that it is should be interpreted as
a demand for recognition of the principles of jus in bello rather
than as an additional condition for jus ad bellum. For a defense of
just conduct in war as a jus ad bellum requirement see William V.
Obrien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1981), p. 35.
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a condition which can exist between states; ^ ^ ^ #
description of action. Second, soidiers can never be
responsible for the crime of war, qua soldiers. Resort
to war is always a political decision, not a military
one. As Grotius puts it:
It does not fall within the province of the general in
conseqLceT'of
^ ZlTtZ h^ CaUSeS ° r the
understoorto^ T^l”^ ^^Tlover, thTmust "berstood apply only to the conduct of the war. 77
Walzer captures this distinction nicely when he
notes that it doesn't matter whether soldiers fight
because of a legal obligation (conscription) or out of
patriotic duty, theirs is never the crime of aggression
because they always believe that their cause is just . 78
In Vitoria s language, soldiers are always infected with
"invincible ignorance"--and who could wish it otherwise?
Standing armies are recruited, trained, and maintained to
defend the community in times of danger. It would be a
traitorous abrogation of public trust to swear an oath of
preparedness to perform certain duties on demand in
return for "meals and support by the state, " and then,
after accepting the benefits of the agreement, to refuse
On the Law of War and Peace
,
Bk. Ill, Chap. 22, VII, p. 848.
Recall that Plato advocated that such actions by military officers
be punishable by death.
7 p Just and Unjust Wars, pp . 28ff.
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to fulfill the duties stipulated when called upon to do
SO. No citizen could logically wish it so . 79
Political leaders, on the other hand, are
responsible for engaging in political intercourse with
other nations on behalf of their respective citizens.
The most extreme form that this intercourse can take is
the resort to arms.
This does not, however, imply that soldiers qua
soldiers have no responsibility under the just war
tradition, merely that they have no jus ad bellum
responsibilities. The responsibility for the conduct of
the war is, as Grotius notes, always a military one. in
fact, all soldiers are always morally and legally
responsible for their actions regardless of whether or
not they are based on superior orders
.
80 In other words.
There rs one argument to the effect that military forces also have
responsibility for assessing the justness of wars that goes somethinglike this: The use of force to achieve political objectives is always
wrong, but the threat of force is permissible. Thus it ispermissible to recruit, equip, and train a standing military as adeterrent, but morally wrong for the members of this military
organization to use violence even if ordered. Of course, in order tobe effective as a deterrent, the intention to use force must appear
credible. This, however, requires a discontinuity between the
publically declared intention and the actual intention. Thus a
citizen who held this view would also have to will that the
government lie to her. And there are other problems with usurping
decision-making authority from the citizenry who favor retaliation
and believe it to be the actual intention. This argument is most
often discussed in terms of strategic nuclear weapons.
Of course, this argument does not apply to citizens who are
subject to conscription because as citizens they do have a political
or jus ad bellum responsibility. One might argue that citizen-
soldiers also have political responsibilities, but, in fact, these
are limited by law (at least in this country)
. The underlying
principle is that the use of military force is a means of political
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orders
soldiers must disobey unlawful regarding the
conduct of war even if they are given by an elected
official. A good example of this in practice is Rommel's
decision to burn Hitler's written order that all allied
soldiers found behind German lines be killed
.
81
In summary, because political leaders are
responsible for the crime of war (jus ad bellum
)
and
military persons are responsible for crimes in war (jus
in bello)
'
lt: doesn't seem useful to make actions in war
a condition for determining the justification of the war
itself. Of course, at certain high levels—e.g. the
Commander in Chief in the United States or the Secretary
of Defense—one person may wear both political and
military responsibilities. But this doesn't undermine
the conceptual distinction between the two roles even
though they may be located in the same individual.
The two natural law principles between which this
justum bellum dualism attempts to adjudicate are: a) the
prohibition against intentionally harming innocents; and
b) the positive duty to protect oneself and other
innocents from harm. Because soldiers can employ deadly
force under the mistaken belief that they are defending
intercourse between states, and that only elected (i.e. legitimate)
°^^lclals can make political decisions. Hence the civilian control
of the military in the U. S.
81 A "bad" example is the United States Air Forces' illegal bombing
during the U.S.- Vietnam War under the orders of Air Force General
Lavelle
. Some consider the use of atomic bombs on Japan as also a
violation of jus in bello.
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their nation, these two principies can come into
conflict. we can certainly imagine a nation's soldiers
fighting an unjust war that they believe to be just; and
we can imagine them behaving either justly or unjustly in
terms of their actions in such a war. Moreover, we can
imagine a just war where some soldiers fight in
accordance with the jus in bello rules and others do not.
And of course, the fact that some soldiers violate the
rules of war does not invalidate the justification for
the resort to arms in the first place anymore than an
elected official's misuse of her office invalidates the
democratic processes whereby she was elected. If, for
example, it could be determined that the Allied bombing
of Germany during World War II was a violation of the
laws of war because it resulted in the intentional and
unnecessary deaths of innocent civilians, this would not
by itself negate Great Britain's and France's right to
defend themselves against German aggression.
And finally, in response to the argument that the
attempt to protect innocents through war always directly
results in the death of other innocents and, hence, is
immoral, Grotius responds that in cases where all
alternatives violate either the same natural law, or
natural laws of equal import, one must choose the
alternative that minimizes the amount of evil that will
210
occur
.
In such cases, as he puts it, the lesser evil
assumes the character of the good.
An interesting and often overlooked aspect of these
traditional jus ad bellum criteria is that some of them
apply intra-nationaily as well as internationally. For
example, if a state goes to war in violation of a
condition such as legitimate authority, public
declaration, proportionality, or reasonable chance of
Victory, it is primarily the citizens of that nation who
have been wronged and have the right of redress from
their own leaders, as Grotius points out in a previously
cited passage (p. 200, above)
. If, however, a nation
resorts to arms without a just cause or without pursuing
alternate means of resolution, it is primarily the people
of the opposing nation which have the right of redress
against the political decision makers who violated the
jus ad bellum principles. Obviously these theoretical
distinctions will not often be maintained in practice and
most examples show both parties wronged. It is
especially important to keep in mind that Grotius saw the
Law of War and Peace as a handbook for individual rulers
to use in conducting their international affairs. In
that sense it is a system of national laws proscribing
the conduct of international relations.
Appropriately, the United Nations Charter references
to jus ad bellum are limited to those aspects of jus ad
211
beHum which we identifi
between states rather titan
people. Article 2,
settle their disputes by
that international
-e as-
set endangered
. (4y All
international relations fro." * ' e-
against the territo 1' - - 1
-n netween
states that ’
peaceful "ear',
and security.
a goverrent a no its
(3) All Members stall
e.“ r.c- - - - - i
t or use of force
;egrity
independence of any state..." 52 Article
nothing "shall impair the
— — an arreci attacn — ~
-• —1
1
ons Art ic 1g s 32 — <--«-<— / < _ - -
— Or settling cisoutes sio^*- c -
together, these articles cou' r
consistent with those ascects
which should appropriately
inherent right of ^
— - n. - - •— -
^ r — V b- C-*
internet 10 : . • c b- ~law—namely, ]ust
Grotius makes it clear that wars ~us~ be - - - -
1
-
--
w i t It not less scrupulousness than _ud‘c- T r^oces-e- s.*--.
82 Charter of the United Nations: Commentary ar.d Doc rrer.zs
,
e: - v
Leland H. Goodrich ar.d Edvard Hasbro Boston: World Pea ~~ --- --
1949), pp. 101-2.
83 Cbid., p. 297 Much it< r.a 3 cee -pi_o ueoatir.r
-_oe er.d
owo eruicles. Under the - i oenarrow" interpretations cf these
interpretation Art. 31 nrevides one ezaaple nf vtsr
- * —— ecif -..ter tr.6 narrow interpretation i* trovides
example . For a cogent, discussion of the arguments tr. noth sites see
fehuda Me 1 ze r , Concepts of Just War (Leyder.: A.W. Sijohoff, 19 _ 5,,
pp. 17-56. For a
Judgment (Boulder, Sar. Francisco, £
co. 63-71.
eloquent suonary see Sheldon M. Cohen, Ar*s and
London: Westviev Press, 1359
,
nwont to be. *84 He insists that even in war normal
municipal laws are set aside, certain other laws "which
are of perpetual validity and suited to all times" must
be obeyed. 5 These laws constitute his theory of jus i
bello
.
Grotius' restrictions on the conduct of war address
the traditional topics: a) who can be lawfully attacked;
b) what means can be used to attack them; and c) the
treatment of prisoners. Because of the extensive
political and technological differences between Grotius'
day and our own, it is more useful to focus on the
principles which are manifested in his constraints on
war, rather than the rules themselves. For example, his
discussion of accepting prisoners of war as slaves rather
than killing them is not relevant because the institution
of slavery is defunct. But his reasons behind the
prohibition against harming prisoners still apply. in
fact, I believe that we may subsume all of Grotius' rules
under a single principle (although Grotius does not
himself attempt to do this): viz., the prohibition
against intentionally harming other human beings may be
set aside only insofar as both parties are in the role of
combatants of opposing belligerent nations. We'll return
to this momentarily. Grotius is careful to point out
84 The Laws of War and Peace, Prolegomena, 25, p. 18.
85 Ibid, p. 19.
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that the questions of jus ad bellum are not relevant to
JUS in bello proscriptions. 86 That means (as we
concluded in Chapter 2)
, that one may not set aside the
rules of war on behalf of a just cause. Let's turn now
to Grotius' concept of who may rightfully be attacked in
war and how one may attack them.
As one commentator notes, the recognition of the
innocent as a special class with certain rights comes to
fruition (finally) in Grotius' The Laws of War and
Peace. 81 Grotius' argument is that war is a condition
between states and that it is only "by a sort of fiction
[that] the enemy may be conceived as forming a single
body," and that "nature does not sanction retaliation
except against those who have done wrong."®® Concerning
those who must be granted immunity from attack, Grotius
writes
:
One must take care, so far as is possible, to prevent the
death of innocent persons, even by accident. ...except
for reasons that are weighty and will affect the safety
of many, no action should be attempted whereby innocent
persons may be threatened with destruction. 89
86 Ibid., Bk. Ill, Chap. 4, III & IV, pp. 643-4.
81 Shelly Hartigan, The Forgotten Victim: A History of the Civilian
(Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1982), Chap. VII, "The
Emergence of the Civilian," pp. 93-102.
88 Laws of War and Peace. Bk . Ill, Chap. 11, XVI, 2, pp . 741.
89 Ibid., Bk. Ill, Chap. 11, VIII, pp . 733-4.
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He includes in the class of innocents 9 ® women,
children, old men, merchants, farmers, prisoners of war,
and holders of religious office. 9 > He even notes that in
a siege, a corridor must be left open for those who wish
to escape Still, Grotius acknowledges that some harm
may befall innocents, and he adopts Vitoria's adaptation
of Aquinas' double effect with "precautions." On one
hand he recognizes that certain actions may "follow
indirectly and beyond the purpose of the doer;" for
example: "we may bombard a ship full of pirates, or a
house full of brigands, even if there are within the same
ship or house a few infants, women, or other innocent
persons who are thereby endangered .” 93 On the other hand,
he immediately adds:
...what accords with a strict interpretation of right is
not always, or in all respects, permitted.
. . . Wherefore
we must also beware of what happens, and what we foresee
may happen, beyond our purpose, unless the good which our
action has in view is much greater than the evil which is
feared, or, unless the good and the evil balance, the
hope of the good is much greater than the fear of the
evil. The decision in such matter must be left to a
Pruc^nt judgment, but in such a way that when in doubt we
should favor that course.
. .which has regard for the
interest of another rather than our own.
9 0
I use the terms 'innocent' and 'noncombatant' interchangeably even
though the innocent-guilty distinction is sometimes used to refer to
one's status as determined by behavior, while the combatant-
noncombatant one refers to status as determined by the role they
fill. Grotius does not recognize a distinction.
Ibid., IX-XII, pp. 734-9. Women have immunity unless they are
employed as soldiers
.
92 Ibid., XIV, p. 739-40.
93 Ibid., Chap. 1, IV, p. 601.
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Many find this consequent ialist justification for
overriding the sanctity of innocents troubling. m
another context (reprisals) Grotius stipulates that
actions must not result in either intentional or
foreseeable deaths of innocents. 94 Probably the best
resolution of this tension between granting absolute
protection for innocents and completely subordinating
their safety to military objectives has been suggested by
Michael Walzer
. Walzer modifies the standard wartime
formulation of double effect so that not only must the
bad effect be unintended, proportional, inadvertent, and
not a direct means to the good effect, but that actions
must be taken to minimize the foreseeable bad effects
even if it means accepting an increased risk to
combatants. 95 in other words, the condition of
proportionality refers to the upper limit of the possible
acceptable bad effect; it does not absolve the agent of
the duty to minimze the undesirable effect. This
strikes me as a practical resolution which consistently
recommends intuitively sound choices. It certainly
prohibits direct attacks on a civilian population as a
means of destroying a nation's will to fight.
For example, arguments which purport to justify the
United States' bombing of Hiroshima and Nagisaki take the
94
95
Ibid., Chap. 2, VI, p. 628 & Chap. 4, XII, 650.
Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 153-5.
216
position that fewer American lives were lost because of
the bombing than would have been lost had the United
States invaded Under Walzer's formulation the most
crucial statistic would be which of the alternatives
would result in the greatest loss of innocent lives.
Soldiers are, after all, in the business of risking their
lives. one can never justify killing or putting
innocents at risk in lieu of doing the same to
combatants. Of course, even this formulation does not
entirely reduce the risk to innocents. As Grotius says
above, the decision as to how much risk must be left to a
prudent judgment." A good rule of thumb might be that
enemy civilian (innocents) should be subjected to no
greater risk than that to which one is willing to subject
one's own innocent population. We will return to this
and other issues concerning the rules of war in the next
section
.
The last class of innocents Grotius identifies is
prisoners of war. He stipulates that all who wish to
surrender must be allowed to do so, and that no prisoner,
regardless of whether she surrenders willingly or is
captured, may either be killed or severely punished.
Only those who are personally guilty of crimes may be
The issue of whether or not the U.S. was justified in demanding
unconditional surrender is outside of this discussion. The
disjunction of either bomb or invade only makes sense if one assumes
that unconditional surrender is the only acceptable outcome--which
is, of course, questionable.
217
punished 91 and an "obstinate devotion to one's party-
does not deserve punishment
.
99 in fact, he specifies that
prisoners must be released if one is unable to adequately
protect or guard them."
We can now see how each of these jus in hello rules
may be subsumed under the principle cited earlier: the
prohibition against killing other human beings is set
aside when they are engaged in the war effort as
combatants. This principle is grounded in the universal
natural prohibition against intentionally harming
innocent persons on one hand, and the universal natural
right each person has to defend himself and his community
on the other. Because the prohibition against
intentionally harming innocents is the more fundamental
of the two, the natural right of self-defense is limited
(only) by this principle.
Because a nation's soldiers act on behalf of that
nation in carrying out policies requiring the use of
force, they may be defended against. Upon capture or
surrender, however, a soldier's status as a combatant is
terminated and he reverts back to his former category as
an innocent. Hence, prisoners of war acquire the same
right to protection from harm that is afforded other
innocents (the commonly used term is "benevolent
97 Laws of War and Peace, Bk
. Ill, Chap. 20, L, 1, p. 826.
98 Ibid., XIV-XVI, pp. 739-42.
99 Ibid., XIII, 2, p. 739.
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quarantine"). of course, they are responsible for any
crimes that they may have committed as combatants, as
well as any that they might commit as noncombatants. For
example, should a civilian or a prisoner kill a soldier
from a belligerent nation without specific provocation,
this would constitute an act of murder. Even a prisoner
who kills a guard during an escape attempt is guilty of
murder because his status as a combatant is terminated
upon surrender or capture. Thus both the authority to
kill and the vulnerability to being killed are afforded
to combatants only.100 This change status ^
combatant to noncombatant can occur either because of
surrender, or capture, as we have seen, or because of
injury. Thus when a soldier becomes incapacitated due to
injury to the extent that he is no longer able to
participate in the war effort, his status as a combatant
is terminated.
Weapons that cannot be employed in ways which
discriminate between combatants and innocents are
prohibited, as are those that continue to cause damage
subsequent to the termination of persons's status as a
legitimate target. Hence the oft repeated prohibition
100 Recall from our discussion in Chapter 4 that this mirrors the
principle behind the Roman law which stipulated that a soldier was
permitted to fight only for the specific campaign for which he had
received authorization from the state; and that soldiers that fought
in additional campaigns would be guilty of murder. See Cicero, De
Officiis, Bk
. I, XI, tr. by Walter Miller (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1913) p. 35.
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or cause
against weapons that are either indiscriminate
"unnecessary" pain and suffering. Unnecessary pain and
suffering is that which continues to incapacitate or
prevent recovery after one's status as a combatant is
terminated. For example, the prohibition against using
spears with barbed tips is based on the realization that
once a combatant has received an incapacitating spear
thrust, he has been rendered ineffective in that role
which permitted his killing or being killed. while a
barbed spear tip would not have any measurable effect on
this, it would aggravate the injury so as to increase
suffering and adversely affect recovery— and these are
results which occur after the status of combatant has
been terminated. The same reasoning applies to poison
weapons
.
101 Hence all weapons of this type are prohibited
by the laws of war. Other examples include recent
prohibitions against the use of ammunition containing
non-detectable fragments (such as glass)
,
or that which
could contaminate wounds
.
102 Of course, this also explains
the legal requirement that enemy wounded be given medical
treatment
.
Laws of War and Peace, Chap, 4, XVI, p. 652-3
101
202 „ . ' r'' *' t' • V'j*- •
"The United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects" (1980), in
Constraints on the Waging of War (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1987), p. 147-57,
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Indiscrimate weapons are objectionable because they
cannot be employed in ways which discriminate between
innocents and combatants. Hence Grotius' prohibition on
poisoning drinking water "in order that the dangers of
war might not be too widely extended, "103 and modern
prohibitions on biological weapons or on placing mines in
populated areas. In each case, the operative principle
is Walter's modification of double effect with the
additional stipulation that innocents among the enemy
population must not be intentionally placed in any
greater jeopardy than that in which a nation could
reasonably place its own innocent citizens in order to
achieve a political or military objective.
It remains now for us to move from a list of
examples of combatants and noncombatants to a conceptual
theory which can be applied to determine into which of
the two classes certain other categories of persons fall.
From what we've discussed already we can distinguish
between soldiers, prisoners, and civilians; but what
about civilians who are not entirely "innocent" because
they contribute to the war effort through their civilian
occupation? Grotius addresses this issue in a discussion
of the status of third party nations which are not
directly engaged in the fighting, but are indirectly
involved through their trade with one of the
103 Laws of War and Peace
,
Chap, 4, XVI, p. 652-3.
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belligerents. In order to determine their status, he
distinguishes between three kinds of products:
"...some
things, such as weapons, which are useful in war; other
things which are of no use in war;
. . and others which are
of use both in time of war and at other times ." 104 This
classification for nations according to the products they
supply to those at war forms the basis for modern
classification of whom among the civilian population can
be regarded as combatants even though they are not
members of the armed forces. Only those associated with
the first class of goods can be considered combatants;
i
*
e *
, those who produce goods which are used by soldiers
in their role as soldiers (e. g. weapons, bombs, military
uniforms, etc.) are combatants; those who produce goods
which are used by soldiers, but not qua soldiers (e.g.
food, fuel, metals and other products used by all human
beings), are noncombatants and therefore immune from
attack
.
Grotius emphasizes that the distinction between
combatants and innocents applies to all peoples
regardless of moral or religious virtue, or
intelligence
.
105
Some might object to the contention that combatants
should show the same degree of care for innocents among
104
105
Ibid., Bk. Ill, Chap. 1, IV, 2, p. 602
Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. 22, X, p. 550.
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the enemy population as should be shown for members of
one's own civilian population. This is especially
troubling in light of the jus ad bellum contention that
war be publicly declared. This condition, if met, might
be interpreted to imply that all moral agents among the
enemy population share some responsibility for the war.
If so, then shouldn't they also share in the suffering
that results from it?
This argument brings us back to the distinction
between the objective justice of an act and the
culpability of the agent who performs said act that
troubled Vitoria. The fact is that the citizens of both
sides are often convinced that their nation is fighting
for a just cause--they are possessed of "invincible
ignorance, " as far as the objective justice of the war is
concerned. In such cases the solution must be reason
rather than punishment because punishment will not change
the content of one's beliefs. Moreover, even if it is
true that some of the citizens are culpable for the crime
of war, certainly not all of them are; and attacks
against civilians will always be indiscriminate in terms
of those which are guilty and those which are not. In
fact, attacks against innocent populations may themselves
constitute sufficient grounds for war; and in such cases,
the status of a war begun justly, or unjustly, could
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change based on the disproportionate actions of one of
the belligerents.
Conclusion
Grotius' contributions are many. He argues for at
least some restrictions on the autonomy of states and the
authority of monarchs. Kings are bound by the same moral
considerations as private citizens and political actions
(specifically war) cannot be justified simply by "reason
of state." He frees morality from the stifling grip of
ecclesiastical judicature by asserting that there are
natural laws which are binding on all men at all times,
and which "cannot be changed even by God ." 106 He argues
convincingly that although "reason condemns force which
disrupts the harmony of society and violates the just
order, force is allowed in order to protect rights and
maintain order ." 107 He attempts to make the conditions
which justify a resort to arms so strict as to all but
eliminate wars except in some cases of self-defense, and
he develops the first systematic set of rules for the
protection of innocents and prisoners. The principle
which underlies his rules of jus in bello— i.e. the
prohibition against harming other persons can
intentionally be overridden only insofar as they are
employed as combatants of a belligerent nation— still
106 Ibid., Bk. I, Chap. 1, X, p. 40.
1 07 .
Ibid., Bk 1, Chap 2, I, p. 33.
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bello and is
applies to modern concepts of jus in
manifested in existing international law.
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CHAPTER 8
PROBLEMS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
The just war tradition which Grotius researched and
articulated so carefully in his great corpus juris on
international law began to be formally declared as
positive law in the 19th Century. m 1862 President
Lincoln directed that a code of rules be developed for
the conduct of the Civil War. As a result, General
Orders 100, known after its principal author as Lieber's
Code, was adopted in 1863 and became the first instance
of a nation adopting a formal code of law to regulate its
Army's conduct toward enemy soldiers since Ancient Rome.
Lieber's Code also specified rules for the protection of
innocents as well as the treatment of prisoners. About
the same time, Henry Dunant and a group of Genevese
citizens founded the International Committee of the Red
Cross; and in 1864, in Geneva, an international
conference adopted the "Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded Armies in the Field." 1
Subsequent conventions which addressed treatment of
prisoners and the protection of civilians, as well as
further stipulations concerning the treatment of sick and
wounded and the status of medical persons and facilities,
were held at Geneva in 1929 and 1949.
1 Frits Kalshoven, Constraints of the Waging of War (The Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp. 8-9.
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In 1868
adopted a
bullets
.
a group of nations met in St. Petersburg and
declaration against the use of explosive
The reasoning behind this declaration is
significant
.
The only legitimate object which states should endeavorto accomplish during war is to weaken the militaryof the enemy; for this purpose, it is sufficient to
exceeded by
9r
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° f men/ thiS °bject would
employment of arms which uselesslyaggravate the suffering of disabled men, or render thill
thereforeT^
1310 '' ^ e",ploy,nent ° f such arms would,erefore be contrary to the laws of humanity. 2
This was important because unlike Lieber's Code
which was an internal document, this was an international
agreement regulating the conduct of war and clearly
acknowledging the principle that unnecessary harm is
contrary to the "laws of humanity." Both of these
documents were incorporated into the international peace
conferences held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. 3 These
agreements, to which almost every nation of the civilized
world is a signatory, comprise much—but not all— of what
"Declaration of St. Petersburg," in The Law of War: A DocumentaryHistory, vol I, ed. by Leon Friedman (New York: Random House), p.
3 The primary purpose for The Hague peace conferences was to
establish procedures for settling international disputes through
arbitration rather than violence. No international agreement couldbe reached on this topic, however, until the Kellog-Briand Pact of
1929 (officially titled the Treaty of Paris and signed by 42
nations)
. This agreement renounced war as an alternative in
international relations and stated that "the settlement or solution
of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin
they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except
by pacific means." In The Law of War: A Documentary History, vol I
468-9.
227
law
.
is considered international
Plays a significant role
Preamble to the Fourth Hague
Customary law still
in bellum legale
, as the
Convention of 1907 states:
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"9 Parties deem iS orient to
principles of the law of nations, as they result from r£usages established among civilised peoples, from the lawjumanity, and the dictates of public conscience.
4
This principle Is reenforced in the Geneva
Convention of 1949 which does more than simply echo the
1907 agreement; it also adds that the denunciation of or
withdrawal from this convention...
...shall in no way impair the obligations which thear les to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfill bvvirtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usages established among civilizedpeopies,
.
from the laws of humanity and the dictates ofthe public conscience.
Thus international law has some of the
characteristics of English common law ( jus gentium) in
that it is grounded in custom and precedence as well as
formal rules, much the way Grotius had argued.
Given this great tradition of bellum justum dating
back for millennia, and this tradition of bellum legale
recognized at an international level for over a century,
4 ibid., p. 309.
5 Ibid., p. 543.
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we must inquire into the reasons why mankind's attempts
to control both the initiation and the conduct of war
have met with only limited success. Can it be, as Donald
Wells argues, that "We have limited commitment to the
laws of war precisely because of the military
unwillingness to accept restrictions"?® Or is it some
more fundamental problem with the very notion of
regulating the conduct of sovereign nations, as Schillp
argues
:
tr^
elati
,
0nS
w
a”0n9 nati°ns Uith each other today can,ruth, only be characterized as anarchical Thismerely another way of saying that the relations
nations with each other are not subject to law. 7
in
is
of
The first criticism of the laws of war is an
objection to the content of the law: specifica iiy. to
such caveats to the humanitarian principles of jus in
bello as military necessity or the soldier's obligation
to obey superior orders. We will save our discussion of
these topics until Chapters 9 and 10. The second
criticism aims at the very idea of calling a rule a law
in the absence of a common power to legislate formally
Donald A. Wells, War Crimes and the Laws of War (Lanham, Maryland
and London: University Press of America, 1984), p. 110.
Paul Arthur Schillp, "International Sovereignty and International
Anarchy," in The Critique of War, ed. by Robert Ginsberg (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1969), p. 152. Schillp goes on to argue that
the United Nations is a "world debating society" and the World Court
at The Hague has only an advisory capacity. In sum, that "The very
concept of 'International Law' is, therefore, in today's world
situation, either a self-contradictory or else an ironically humorous
one" (p. 153) .
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
l
i
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and enforce compliance. This is t-h^ +- •s he topic we will
examine in this chapter.
Understanding International Law
Grotius' advocacy of universal, natural laws and
customs which impose legal as well as moral obligations
on. states continues to be highly controversial.
Criticism of this view has its roots in a philosophy of
law called Positivism, which was in vogue in the 19th
Century and is still accepted in various forms by many
today. 8 Proponents of legal positivism argue that
lurisprudence and ethics are unrelated disciplines and
that it is simply a contingent fact that they share a
common language of obligations and prohibitions. And
indeed, the relationship between moral and legal rules
often seems rather arbitrary. For example, there are (or
have been) laws which are clearly immoral, such as those
hich regulate slavery, apartheid, impressment, and
certain religious observances and prohibitions. Likewise
there are laws which are amoral, such as those which
mandate the use of seat belts, stipulate concrete vaults
for burial, or require that a goat be sacrificed instead
of two sheep. in certain cases, however, laws do
formalize moral rules such as those which prohibit rape,
« The classic exponent of the positivist position is John Austin, The
rovince of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. by H.L.A. Hart (London-Weidenfelfd and Nicolson, 1954 )
.
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mur er, or selling alcohol on Sundays. And finally,
there are recognized moral rules which are not regulated
by law, such as tipping a waiter for good service, not
cutting in line at the supermarket, and certain instances
of keeping promises or telling the truth
.
9
The Positivist avoids this confusion by excluding
from the science of law all matters of an a priori or
metaphysical nature, such as moral obligations
.
10 Under
his account, normative questions concerning which rules
of conduct should be declared as de jure laws are
distinct from purely analytic questions of jurisprudence
proper. Individual laws that prohibit certain behaviors
might be thought of as functions which link specific
behaviors to punishments. Ideally, a system of law is a
fully contained, logically coherent system, where the
role of the judiciary is analytic rather than judgmental.
The requirement for a rule to be a law, then, is simply
that it be declared by a duly constituted authority which
has the power to force compliance.
9
^l11 s famous declaration that "The only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community
is to prevent harm to others" seems to be the operative principle
concerning which moral rules should be declared as law. Thus we have
legal prohibitions against violence, while private issues such as
beneficence and recreational sex are left largely to individual
conscience. See H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty
,
and Morality
(California: Stanford University Press, 1963)
.
10 This is the very antithesis of the Augustinian view where moral
obligations were legal obligations. This position is still widely
held among those nations where Islam is the official religion and the
Koran is the state constitution and the source of municipal law.
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our
We quickly see the importance of this to
enterprise. If law is understood in this way, there are
no international laws of war because rules cannot
properly be considered laws when there is no recognized
(or effective) common authority to enforce compliance or
punish noncompliance.il Even treaties must be considered
as prescribing moral rather than legal obligations.
Obligations which cannot be enforced are not really laws,
but mere voluntary prescriptions like charity or
friendliness. The problem is summed up in the following
passage
:
t is obvious that, in the present state of the world, no
civil law exists between independent states—such nationshaving no common superior, no common tribunal, and no
common executive, can have no legal relations—in the
strict sense of the word legal.
Because sovereign states recognize no authority
outside of their own will, they are free to adopt
whatever rules they choose; and of course, they can
abrogate them whenever it is in their interests to do so.
What is called 'international law,
'
proponents of this
position argue, should more properly be called
international morality.' In Chapter 2 we rejected the
Of course there may be national laws regulating the conduct of
war, such as Lieber's code or the U.S. Uniform Code of Military
Justice
.
12 Nassaw W. Senior, "A Review of Henry Wheaton's History of the Law
of Nations, " published as an appendix in Henry Wheaton, A History of
the Law of Nations in Europe in America (New York and London: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1973), p. 301.
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realists' arguments that self-interest is always the
overriding principle in politics. Here we must show
that there are certain rules of conduct in the
international arena which must be regarded as laws
proper-i.e. they impose a legal obligation as well as a
moral one-even without a constituted, sovereign
authority which can mandate compliance.
There are a number of ways jurists have responded to
the Positivist argument
.
13 Some argue that formal
sanctions are not a necessary condition for the efficacy
of laws. in primitive societies, for example, taboos may
be obeyed without question for such long periods of time
that their raison d'etre is completely lost. And as
Freud notes: "Taboo is a command of conscience," where
conscience is defined as "the inner perception of
objections to definite wish impulses that exist in us;
[and] the emphasis is put upon the fact that this
rejection does not have to depend on anything else, that
it is sure of itself ." 14 This would require that the
Positivist deny the status of law to those primitive
societies which have no need for and, hence, no formal
13 An excellent criticism of the legal positivists' position can be
found in D' Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect, esp Chap.
2, "Is International Law Really Law," pp. 1-26.
14 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, in The Basic Writings of Sigmund
Freud, tr. and ed. by A. A. Brill (New York: The Modern Library,
1938), pp. 859-60.
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sanctions
.
notes
:
15
In this same vein, Grotius, quoting Plato,
effect' ^For
”ith
t°
Ut a
K
San°ti0n
' “ not entirely void of
in-
jus ice brings peace of conscience, while
describes Tn^he^T^ an9UiSh ' SUCh 33 Plato, in the breast of tyrants. Justice i,approved, and injustice condemned, by the common
thaTan\h
f ^ men --" [andl M°3t true is the sayin"hat all things are uncertain the moment men depart from
Of course, this "common agreement" is not always
apparent in observed behavior because it extends only
insofar as there is a consensus that justice is good;
there are widely divergent views on how justice is to be
understood and how it may be achieved.
A second response might be that there are sanctions
available in the international community, even without a
common authority. 1 * These include increases or
reductions in such areas as foreign loans, debt
structuring, tariffs, trade embargoes, foreign aid,
technological innovations, scientific discoveries, and
access to educational institutions. Additionally,
increased information exchange and world awareness have
made most nations more sensitive to world opinion now
than they were just decades ago.
Law of War and Peace, Prolegomena, 20 & 22, pp. 16-7.
Of course, in international society the extreme form that
sanctions take is the resort to arms.
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Thirdly, one might point out, as Fisher does, that
much of what we accept as law in our daily i ive s i s
equally unenforceable, such as when a state or private
person or corporation wins a case against the federal
government
.
17 in such cases compliance by the government
could not be enforced in any strict sense because there
is no higher authority which can mandate compliance or
impose sanctions on the federal government.
H. L. A. Hart
A more recent defender of a version of Positivism
which accounts for these objections is H. L. A. Hart.
His theory of law provides us with an excellent model for
understanding some of the difficulties with international
central tenets of his
are relevant to the
international community.
Hart takes issue with those legal positivists who
argue that the force of compliance is a necessary
condition for a rule to be a law, but denies any
essential relationship between moral rules and laws
.
18
Fisher, "Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, " Harvard Legal
Review 74 (1961), quoted and discussed in D'Amato, International
Law: Process and Prospect, pp. 1-3.
18 Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). Hart's criticism
of Austin [see note 8 above] is that he [Austin] views laws primarily
as functions which link certain actions to specified negative
consequences. Obligations are defined in terms of the likelihood
that threatened punishment will follow deviation from certain lines
of conduct (p. 86) . This makes the commands of the state no
different from "the case of the gunman who says to the bank clerk.
law Let s first lay out the
position, then see how they
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According to Hart's account, the rules that are operative
in primitive societies are primary or "pre-legal." These
rules can only be considered to constitute a legal system
after a formal structure of secondary rules is in place
that governs the way that primary rules are introduced,
eliminated, varied, and the facts relating to their
violation conclusively determined. Moreover, in SUCh
SOClStlGS thSTG 1 C! o-Ft-rdn „ _ 1 . ,IS often no distinction made between
moral and legal obligations. As Hart puts it : 19
[In a primitive society] there might be nothingcorresponding to the clear distinction made, in morl
Whin th
societies, between legal and moral rules....e is early stage is passed, and the step from thepre-legal into the legal world is taken, so that themeans of social control now includes a system of rulesontaining rules of recognition, adjudication, and
'Hand over the money or I will shoot'” (p. 19) . This implies an
“t\ry wine'6™ 1 '’ f relati°nship bst“ee" the lawmaker and hersubjects, hile in practice, most subjects routinely conform to laws
]
V6 of the threat of punishment (i.e. they have an
I If,- ip tD the law-giver) . Moreover, while
rl!lf t
y ° £ PUnlshment important aspect of sole legalules, i is not a factor in those types of laws which "facilitate"social harmony such as ones defining ways in which valid wills orcontracts or marriages are made (p. 27). We will discuss Hart's owntheory of jurisprudence momentarily.iy Ibid., p. 165.
This would correspond to the early Christian position which did notdistinguish between legal and moral rules which we discussed in
apter 5. Interestingly, some modern Islamic nations which
recognize the Koran as the source of all law seem to meet Hart'sdescription of a state with just primary rules. In Islamic political
systems changes in the shari'
a
occur either through ijtihad, aprocess of reinterpretation, or takhayyur, a procedure of selectionbetween the four schools of interpretation. This process of
"reopening" the law to interpretation is called for by a national
leader and is conducted by a conference of ulama (although Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, as the Faquih, conducted an individual ijtihad)
I don't believe that ijtihad has been invoked in modern times.
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other rules
thlS COntrast between legal andhardens into something definite.
In "advanced" legal systems moral questions are
restricted to the secondary rules which specify
procedures for how laws are recognized, adjudicated, and
changed. Legal questions are strictly concerned with 'is
there a law that is relevant to this case?'
Sanctions do not play the same crucial role in
Hart's formulation of Positivism (compared to earlier
ones such as Austin's) because Hart believes that most
group members willingly follow the group's rules. m
fact, one's personal identity is derived, at least in
part, from membership in a community or group which is
itself defined by the rules that it recognizes or that
bring it into existence. These members of a community
have what Hart calls an "internal point of view." This
means that they view violations of the group's rules as
sufficient reason for incurring punishment and/or group
hostility— i.e. the rules themselves provide a reason for
behaving in certain ways and punishing those who do not
because they are my rules. In advanced societies this
internal point of view consists of an identification with
the system of secondary rules— such as a constitution.
In other words, when a person derives some of her
personal identity from her status as a citizen of a
particular nation, the rules passed in accordance with
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that nation's constituting document
rules. A system of secondary rules
primitive societies because members
in a way, her
is not necessary in
live in an intimate
relationship with the primary rules.
Those who have an external point of view, on the
other hand, are motivated to follow the rules because of
the threat of sanction; they see predictable punishment
or group hostility as sufficient reason for not violating
a rule There will always be some members of a
community or group. Hart notes, who will view the rules
as an imposition and will follow them only when coerced.
Because of their external point of view they view the
rules as: "your rules that I must follow to avoid
punishment. Hence, sanctions are necessary so that
"those who would voluntarily submit to the restraints of
law shall not be mere victims of the malefactors who
would... reap the advantages of respect for law on the
part of others without respecting it themselves .” 21
20 Ibid., pp. 86-8. Hart summarizes: "At any given moment the life ofany society which lives by rules, legal or not, is likely to consist
volun^ I*
1
™ betWSen th°Se who
'
on the one hand, accept andtaniy co operate in maintaining the rules, and so see their ownand other persons' behavior in terms of the rules, and those who onthe other hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from the
externai point of view as a sign of possible punishment. One of thei f lculties facing any legal theory... is to remember the presence ofboth these points of view and not to define one of them out of
existence. Perhaps all our criticisms of the predictive theory of
obligation [i.e. John Austin's] may be best summarized as the
accusation that this is what it does to the internal aspect of
obligatory rules" (p. 88) .
2 1 Ibid., p. 213/ see also p. 193.
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Hart's view has considerable appeal. it establishes
an evolutionary link between morality and positive law,
while at once insisting on the ideal objectivity of the
latter. Moreover, he provides an explanation for at
least a prime facie obligation to obey the law based on
one's personal identity as a member of a group, the
domain of which is defined in terms of those who view the
rules as their own. Finally, he notes that even though
there is generally a common disposition among the members
of a group to obey the group's rules, sanctions are
required as a guarantee that those who voluntarily obey
cannot be taken advantage of by those who do not. Before
we explore just how Hart's concept of law helps us
considerably in our attempts to understand international
law, let's examine critically one aspect of Hart's
account which has proved problematic.
A key aspect of Hart's theory is that while the mere
presence of laws tends to obligate those who are subject
to them, they are void of any essential moral content.
An articulate and persistent critic of Hart's version of
Positivism has been Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin argues that
the meaning of a law extends beyond a literal
interpretation of the meaning of the words which express
the law, much the way a literal meaning of a poem often
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fails to capture the poet's intent. 22 And ln fact> thg
legal debates that occur in appellate courts often
concern this quest for "real" or intended, rather than
literal, meanings. Dworkin cites a number of case
examples, one of which will suffice to elucidate his
point
.
Elmer murdered his grandfather in order to inherit
his estate. 23 He was caught and convicted. The deceased
man's daughters, who would have been entitled to the
inheritance had Elmer died before his grandfather, sued.
They argued that Elmer should not enjoy the fruits of his
crime, and that the inheritance should go to them. The
will in question had been legally executed and there was
nothing in the state statutes that would allow for any
deviation from the letter of the will. Nevertheless, the
court upheld the suit and denied Elmer the inheritance.
Judge Earl, writing for the majority, argued thus:
...a thing which is within the intention of the makers of
a statute is as much within the statute as if it were
w
-'-thin the letter; and a thing which is within the letter
of the statute is not within the statute, unless it be
within the intention of the makers. 2 ^
22 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London:
Harvard University Press, 1986) . The notion of interpretation is
introduced on pp. 16-20, and is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Ibid., pp. 15-20. Dworkin cites this case as: Riggs v. Palmer,
115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
2 ^ Ibid., p. 18.
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Dworkin notes that this was not a case of altering
the law, but of interpreting what the law that
legislators had enacted really meant. in law, as with
the other operative rules of a community, "value and
content have become entangled . "25 indeed, upon reflection
we must conclude that the decisions which judges
routinely make in applying legal rules rest on certain
moral principles, such as fairness, equality, and so
on. 26 While a literal interpretation of the rule is one
important principle--in most cases the prevailing one,
i.e. that legitimate judicial expectations should be
25 Ibid., p. 48.
The same point is made by Roscoe Pound, who also chooses a case
where an heir commits murder in order to inherit (Perry vStrawbridge, 209 Missouri 621, 628-629)
. In overturning a lower
court ruling Judge Graves states: "We do not believe that these
courts have fully applied and used the canons of statutory
construction which we have the right to use and ought to use to avoid
a result
.
so repugnant to common right and common decency. The
construction as has been given such statutes bruises and wounds thefiner sensibilities of every man To us this seems abhorrent to
all reason, and reason is the better element of the law."
Pound goes on to add: "However much the analytic theory of 'genuine
interpretation' may purport to exclude the moral ideas of the judge,
and to insure a wholly mechanical logical exposition of a logically
implied content of legal precepts, two doors are left open. The
court must determine whether the criteria of the literal meaning of
the words and of the text read with the context yield a
satisfactory' solution. If he holds that they do not, he must
inquire into the 'intrinsic merit' of the competing interpretations.
'Satisfactory' will almost always mean in practice, morally
satisfactory. 'Intrinsic merit' will always tend to mean intrinsic
ethical merit." Law and Morals (London: Oxford University Press,
1926)
.
pp. 52-3.
2 6 In the cases cited above, the operative principle is that persons
should not profit from their criminal actions. This principle can be
traced to Elijah's condemnation of Ahab who murders Naboth and then
inherits his property, as recounted in the Talmud.
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sometimes
fulfilled other principles should (and do)
override this principle.
Whatever relationship morality has to law, we can
conclude that moral principles do serve as metaphysical
bridges that link legal decisions to justice in those
cases where the letter of the law is inadequate. In this
sense, then, law cannot be separated from moral
considerations as Hart would have it. Moral principles
are not merely the means whereby we evaluate the law, as
Hart argues, but also are interwoven in the juridical
administration of the positive laws themselves. We will
explain how this is relevant to our enterprise
momentarily; let's first return to Hart's theory of
jurisprudence
.
A more palatable aspect of Hart's account (than his
insistence in the absolute moral/legal separation) is
that in societies where there is no secondary rule of
recognition (e. g. no legislative body to formally
declare laws)
,
the operative rules must be viewed as
simply a set of individual 'laws' rather than as a legal
system. In the international society of states, for
example. Hart notes that "there is no basic rule
providing general criteria of validity for the rules of
international law, and that the rules which are in fact
operative constitute not a system but a set of
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rules
....
" 27 Among these rules, he adds, are those which
provide for the binding force of treaties. And in fact,
according to Hart, the international community is best
understood as being in a pre-legal state, and
international laws should be understood as primary rules
much like the rules operative in primitive societies.
Thus he concludes that states do not enjoy unlimited
autonomy in their relationships to other states, but also
that the operative limiting rules should not be regarded
as part of a legal system in the same sense that
municipal rules are. What is lacking in international
society, Hart argues, and what keeps international
society void of law in the traditional sense, is the
absence of the secondary rules of recognition,
adjudication, and change. And of course, the obligation
to obey laws in the international community cannot be
derived from one's identity with a system of secondary
laws like it can in modern domestic societies.
Nevertheless, this does not negate the binding nature of
international law:
It is a mistake to suppose that a basic rule or rule of
recognition is a generally necessary condition of the
existence of rules of obligation or 'binding' rules.
This is not a necessity, but a luxury, found in advanced
social systems whose members not merely come to accept
separate rules piecemeal, but are committed to the
acceptance in advance of general classes of rule, marked
out by general criteria of validity. In the simpler form
27 Concept of Law, P- 231 .
243
of society we must wait and see whether a rule getsaccepted as a rule or not; in a system with a basic Tullrecognition we can say before a rule is actually made
If Hart is correct
, and I am convinced that he is,
then even though the form that international law takes
differs from that of municipal law, the content and
function of international law is analogous, whether it is
derived from treaties, customary practices, or legal
precedents. Certainly the need for a sovereign authority
which links rule infractions to punishments is less
important than the requirement that members of the
international community internalize the de facto laws.
Perhaps, as Hart notes, multilateral treaties can
take the place of legislative enactments in the
international community
.
29 in any event, the practical
question is: 'How do we get the members of the
international community to internalize the principles of
the just war tradition?' Of course, nations can't
internalize rules because they can't hold beliefs; this
must be done by persons. We recall that when rules are
internalized this not only provides a sufficient
criterion for conforming to them, it also provides a
sufficient justification for punishing those who break
them. And if the distinction between legal and moral
28 ibid., 229.
29 Ibid., p. 231
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rules is blurred in societies which lack secondary rules,
as Hart argues, then perhaps certain moral principles can
be enforced as legal obligations in the absence of a duly
constituted, sovereign authority. 30 Put another way> the
distinction between what the law requires (lex lata) and
what the law ought to require (lex ferenda) is not
relevant to societies without secondary laws, such as the
society of nations.
We can begin to address this issue by noting that
certain rules (or principles) can already be said to be
internalized by the majority of the civilized world.
This is the idea that is embodied in the prosecutions'
opening statement at the Nuremberg trials, where (among
other things) eight Nazi leaders were convicted of the
crime of aggression:
The
.
.
real complaining party at your bar is
civilization The refuge of the defendants can be only
their hope that international law will lag so far behind
the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is crime in
the. moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law.
Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be
utterly helpless to deal with crimes of this magnitude by
criminals of this order of importance
.
Hart is not entirely consistent on this point. On one hand he
compares international law to a pre-legal society where thedistinction between moral and legal rules is not clear because itlacks secondary rules. On the other hand, he argues that there is a
clear distinction between moral and legal rules in international
society. The point is less important in light of Dworkin's argument
that no such clear distinction is possible.
of the Major War Criminals before The International Military
Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1947), transcript of 21 Nov. 1945, p. 155.
(Chief prosecutor Jackson speaking.)
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This reflects an acknowledgement of the lack of
distinction between moral rules and legal rules that Hart
argues is characteristic of societies void of secondary
rules of recognition and adjudication. The Nuremberg
example establishes that there are moral rules which can
also be considered as legal obligations even without a
system of secondary rules of recognition, adjudicature
and change. We might debate where, precisely, the limits
of acceptable behavior in the international community of
nations are, but we recognize that there are limits.
This means that persons brought before the bar, as were
the Nazi war criminals, are not tried ex post facto, but
in terms of some commonly held notions of what
constitutes morally and legally acceptable behavior.
Clearly this way of interpreting the laws of war is the
intention of the signatories of the Hague Conventions
when they affirm:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been
issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to
declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience, (see
n. 4 above)
The obvious question to ask is that given that there
exists among the peoples of the world a disposition to
obey rules and punish violators even in the absence of de
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outrage against
jure laws, as evidenced by the world
Nazism, why isn't the tradition of Jus ad helium
considered obligatory by members of the international
community? There are, after all, certain rules in the
international community which have been signed and duly
ratified as treaties by all the nations of the civilized
world—such as the tradition of justum bellum which dates
back at least to Ancient Greece and Rome.
One possible explanation is that while the tenets of
just war tradition have been promulgated in the
international community, they are almost virtually
unknown among the population. And as Aquinas notes : 32
...in order that a law obtain the binding force which isproper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men whohave to be ruled by it. Such application is made by itsbeing notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore
promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain itsforce
.
Because the subjects of international law are
states, promulgation of the laws between states presently
consists in ratification procedures. But this is
obviously inadequate. As Hart has argued, the primary
motive for obeying rules is "the internal point of view."
In advanced societies this is accomplished through a
belief in or commitment to the political system that
Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 90, A. 4, p. 9. Grotius, too, notes that
some laws are binding only insofar as they are known. The Law of War
and Peace, Bk
. I, Chap. 1, XV, p. 45.
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formalizes the rules by the constituents of that system;
in less developed systems this consists simply in the
acceptance of the rnlpq k„1 by the group members, probably
through education. Certain minimum principles of
humanity, like those governing the resort to arms and the
conduct of war, are good candidates for the kind of
primary, international rules to which the people of the
world could take an "internal point of view," as somehow
Identifying their status as rational members of a
civilized, international community. But of course, one
cannot have an internal point of view towards rules that
are unknown to them. Perhaps the failure of the just war
tradition to effectively limit instances of the resort to
violence can be attributed largely to the fact the it is
virtually unknown among the populations of the world's
nations
.
This observation is not new. The requirement that
the international laws of war be promulgated to citizens
of those nations which have formally recognized them is
clearly stated in the treaties where these laws are
articulated. The following passage from the Geneva
Convention (IV) of 1949 on the protection of civilians is
telling
:
33
33 The Law of War: A Documentary History, p, 689.
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Article CXLIV
The H igh Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace
Con h .
me ° f War
'
t0 dlsseminate the text of the present
countries
0
^d ^ their res™
thereof in the'
^ partlcular
' to include the study
n ln ,l ^
Pr°9rams military and, if possible,
ruction, so that the principles thereof mavbecome known to the entire population.
Of course, the nations of the world have been
profoundly remiss in abiding by the requirements of this
article
.
3 Promulgation of the rules of both jus ad
bellum and jus in bello is perhaps the most promising
method for improving their efficacy in reducing the
likelihood of war and moderating suffering when it does
occur. Even though state governments are notoriously
contemptuous of external condemnation, the politicians
who govern them are sensitive and responsive (to varying
degrees) to internal pressures from the people they
govern. Certainly, in the long term at least,
governments reflect in many important ways the collective
will of the populace.
Public conscience must dictate to rulers and
government officials the parameters of acceptable
behavior as an important step in avoiding the problem
posed by expecting normative judgments from "sovereign"
abstract entities. Just as individual conscience
This criticism is especially pertinent in the United States where
Article 6(2) of the Constitution states that "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding."
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provides a primary motive for right action in domestic
society, we must muster public judgment to provide the
moral force in national decisions. Thus the criticism
that international law should properly be called
international morality is not a criticism at all but a
mandate-recognizing, of course, that it imposes legal as
well as moral obligations.
Internal and External Views of the Rules of War
Up to this point our discussion in this chapter has
not distinguished between the rules governing jus in
bello and jus ad bellum; although what we have been
saying seems to be more relevant to political (i.e. jus
ad bellum) decisions. In the remainder of this chapter
we will attempt to see how Hart's concept of rules which
derive their normative force from an internal point of
view can help us to understand soldiers and their
relationship to jus in bello.
When we focus on the conduct of war, we find that
there is a tendency among soldiers and sailors to take an
internal point of view toward certain of the rules that
are spelled out in international law. Together these
rules comprise what might be called the code of chivalry
or the ethos of the warrior. The origin of this
tradition among military persons stems from their sharing
certain values which are common to the profession of
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arms, such as courage, honor, loyalty, and obedience.
This notion of an ethos for warriors harkens us back to a
passage cited earlier by Saint Ambrose where the King
David of Israel praises his enemy (Abner) for his valor,
honors him with a banquet after his defeat, weeps for him
when he is killed, and requires that the same justice be
shown to Abner's soldiers as to his own men. 35
Sailors of all nations recognize certain customs of
the high seas, and the code of chivalry which was
observed by the pilots on both sides during World War I
is well known. 36 Walzer discusses instances Qf this code
being observed during World War II, when it was customary
for the victorious commander to receive the commanding
general of the vanquished out of respect for his
profession. Walzer writes: "Historically, such visits
were not merely matters of courtesy; they were occasions
for the reaffirmation of the military code." 37 J. Glenn
Grey, in his classic The Warriors: Reflections on Men in
Battle, chides Eisenhower for ignoring his staff's
recommendations that he allow the captured German General
35 7'^ ls passage was cited in Chapter 5 as footnote 13.
One pilot gives the following account of having successfully
attacked a German plane: "I was almost equally gratified the next
second to see the German pilot level off his blazing machine and with
a sudden leap overboard into space [with a parachute] let the Fokker
slide safely away without him 1 truly wished him all the luck in
the world." Edward Rickenbacker, The Fighting Circus (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965), pp. 251-2.
37 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, Inc
,
1977), p. 37.
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Jurgen von Armin to call on him. Grey observes: "One of
the most time-honored and persistent images of the enemy,
today very suspect in democratic lands, is the one held
by the professional soldier, who regards all military men
3S coirursciGs in arms
.
"38
Another author, writing about the American Civil
War, relates that "when General John Bell Hood realized
that the enemy troops he was about to attack were unaware
of the Southerners' presence, he ordered, 'Major, send a
shell first over their heads and let them get in their
holes before you open with all your guns. '"39 This
author argues that the source of this tradition of
camaraderie between enemy soldiers lies in the shared
reverence for that virtue which is intrinsic to success
as a fighting person—courage
. Linderman cites the
following personal account by a Union soldier as an
example of how soldiers could experience such a bond: 40
I saw an officer on a milk-white horse ride forth from
the woods in the rear of the Confederate work. Confident
that he would be torn to bits by shells, I dropped my
pipe, and glued my glass on him and waited for the
tragedy. He trotted briskly over the plain where shells
were thickly bursting, and into the fort. I saw him hand
a paper to the officer in command of the work. He sat
calmly on his horse, and talked and gesticulated as
quietly as though he were on dress parade. My heart went
3 8
3g
The Warriors (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pp. 142 & 146-7.
Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat
in the American Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1987), p. 68.
Ibid., p. 69. Linderman cites Frank Wilkeson, Recollections of a
Private Soldier in the Army of the Potomac (New York and London: G.
P. Putnam's Sons, 1886), pp. 113-4, as the source for this passage.
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It is easy to see how a common bond based on shared
values could develop among members of the profession of
arms. Such an internal point of view toward the rules of
war or the warrior ethic is at the heart of jus in bello.
During both World Wars, especially in the European
Theater, there was much mutual admiration between
soldiers on opposite sides. One soldier, describing a
German detachment in October 1918, writes:
I grew proud of the enemy who had killed my brothers.They were two thousand miles from home, without hope and
without guides, in conditions bad enough to break thebravest nerves. Yet their sections held together,
sheering through the wrack of Turk and Arab like armoured
ships, high-faced and silent. When attacked they halted
took position, fired to order. There was no haste, no
crying
,
no hesitation. They were glorious
.
^
For another Veteran, John Roberts, the same war held.
No personal hostility whatever. Indeed, when an enemy
position had been taken, one tended to take the same
attitude of care and welfare to the dead and wounded as
if they belonged to our own side. There was an
4
1
' T. E. Lawrence, quoted by Richard Holmes in Acts of War (New York:
The Free Press, 1985), p. 373
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Another veteran of Vietnam made the
observation during the war:
following
...it occurred to me that we were becoming more and moreIke our enemy. we ate what they ate.... We enduredcommon mrsenes. In fact, we had more in common with
t*
Vle
ff
COn9 than “e did " ith that of clerks ands aff o icers in the rear. 4
The current U. S. Army publication on the conduct of
war. The Law of Land Warfare, requires that belligerents
"conduct hostilities with regard for the principles of
humanity and chivalry. The Air Force pub i ication on
the same topic is even more specific: 4 ^
Chivalry
. Although difficult to define, chivalry refers
to the conduct of armed conflict in accord with well-
40
Ibid., pp. 373-4.
43 Ibid., p. 372.
44 , ,Philip Caputo, A rumor of War (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977)
p. 262. '
Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare
,
Department of the
Army, (u. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), para. 3, p. 3.
Air Force Publication 110-31, International Law— The Conduct of
Armed Conflict and Air Operations, United States Air Force (U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1976), chap. 1, p. 6 (1-6).
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^ leSS * ^ntlemanlytest N vertheiess, the principles of chivalry remainn specific prohibitions such as those against poisondishonorable or treacherous misconduct, misuse of enemyflags uniforms, and flags of truce. The principle ofchivairy makes armed conflict less savage and morecivilized for the individual combatant.
The empirical evidence, however, indicates that
soldiers have frequently refused to regard their
opponents as moral equals. in other words, soldiers have
recognized the jus in bello rules, taken an "an internal
point of view" toward them, and still not always extended
them to certain enemy soldiers because they regarded them
as outside the bounds of moral judgment. This is
Eisenhower's explanation for refusing to acknowledge von
Armin as a moral equal, an action which became the topic
of national debate and criticism. in his memoirs
Eisenhower explains : 47
Daily as it [the war] progressed there grew within me the
conviction that as never before in a war between many
nations the forces that stood for human good and men's
rights were this time confronted by a completely evil
Crusade in Europe
,
(New York: 1948), pp. 156-7, quoted by Grey,
The Warriors, p. 147. Walzer cites this example and provides a
provocative assessment of the distinction between the crime of war
for which political leaders are responsible and crimes in war which
are a military responsibility. He cites Rommel as an example of a
German General who is widely admired because of his adherence to the
laws of war in the face of Hitler's orders to the contrary, but
"sympathizes" with Eisenhower's decision. Just and Unjust Wars, pp
37-8
.
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Nazi Germany presents us with a difficult case
because the Third Reich was the most objectively evil
political regime the world has known. This is the
reasoning which allows soldiers on one hand to take an
internal point of view toward certain rules applicable to
their profession, while on the other hand not to
acknowledge the applicability of these rules toward a
particular class of persons. Military and political
leaders are often guilty of characterizing the enemy as
less than human in order to lend righteousness to the
cause for which the war is fought. As Grey puts it: 4 8
Equally ancient, and apparently as persistent, is theimage of the enemy as a creature who is not human at allEspecially common to simple uneducated soldiery whenlghting a foe of another color or race, it is by nomeans unknown to educated unimaginative men. They regardthe enemy as subhuman, a peculiar species of animal withindeterminable qualities and habits, all evil.
An example of this can be seen in the rules that
were generally observed among the European military
forces in World War II who recognized a common culture
and heritage with their belligerents, and those that
prevailed in the Asian Theater, where a common heritage
was lacking. Reports of battles with Japanese soldiers
most often contain metaphors connoting animals or
4ft The Warriors, p. 148.
256
insects, such as "they came in hordes," or "they appeared
as swarms of yellow" or "they burrowed into the
mountains. Grey cites a passage from Herman Wouk's, The
Caine Mutiny, as indicative : 49
Like most of the naval executioners at Kwajalein, he
seemed to regard the enemy as a species of animal pest.From the firm and desperate taciturnity with which theJapanese died, they seem on their side to believe they
were contending with an invasion of large armed ants.
Of course, soldiers do not hold the franchise on
regarding other races as less than human, as the
following quotation from one of the pillars of the
Enlightenment, Voltaire, attests : 50
Their [the negroes'] round eyes, squat noses, and
invariable thick lips, their woolly heads, and the
measure of their intellects, make a prodigious difference
between them and other species of men; and what
demonstrates that they are not indebted for this
^ifference to their climates, is that negro men and
women, being transported into the coldest countries,
constantly produce animals of their own species.
One explanation, then, for the historical fact that
soldiers have sometimes failed to observe rules of humane
treatment even though they recognized certain moral
obligations that should govern behavior between human
beings, is that they compartmentalized their beliefs in
ways that allowed them to view the enemy as less than
49 Ibid., p. 149.
50 Voltaire, The Philosophy of History (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1965), p. 5.
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human
.
A second explanation for such behavior is to
collectively view the enemy as guilty and deserving of
punishment. Unfortunately, it is not difficult to
imagine either of these views being held by citizens of
even the most civilized nations today. One need only
recall the brutal injustices of My Lai or the recent
pronouncements in this country pertaining to the "evil
empire" nature of the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, it is as Grotius put it, a fiction to
conceive of the enemy as forming a single body.
Generals," he writes, "are responsible for the things
which have been done while they were in command; and all
the soldiers that have participated in some common act,
as the burning of a city are responsible for the total
damage ." 51 Elsewhere he notes that "guilt is personal
let those responsible for crimes be held for them; and
let not the fear of punishment extend beyond those in
whom an offense may be found ." 52 And concerning the
Guilt that a community might bear for crimes initiated by
the majority:
When the community is at fault through the crime of the
majority,
. .and when, for this cause, it loses things
[such as] political liberty, fortifications, and other
profitable things, the loss is felt also by the
individuals who are innocent, but only in respect to such
51 The Laws of War and Peace, Bk
. Ill, chap. 10, IV, p. 719.
52 Ibid., Bk. II, chap. 21, XIII, pp. 539-40.
258
things as belonged to
community . 53
them not directly but through the
we can understand that this is so when we consider
the possibility of holding a military leader such as
General Robert E. Lee personally responsible for the
American Civil War, 54 or even for the crimes committed a(.
Anderson prison where 45,000 prisoners of war died. 55
Perhaps improvements in communications media,
increased travel, and international financial
interdependence have all contributed to an increased
awareness of the common emotions which peoples of the
world share, as well as the common problems (such as
pollution, ozone depletion, and the nuclear threat) with
which they must contend. if so, then it is reasonable to
believe that this trend will continue. Certainly persons
^
Ibid., IX, pp. 537-8.
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Christianity are not less obligatory in the country
enemy han in our own. The commanding general considers thatno greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our wholepeople, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon theinnocent and defenseless and the wanton destruction of privateproperty that have marked the course of the enemy in our country....
e commanding general, therefore, earnestly exhorts the troops toabstain with most scrupulous care from unnecessary or wanton injuryto private property, and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest andbring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend againstthe orders on this subject. Quoted in Peter Karsten, Law, Soldiers,
and Combat, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press^
1978), 103.
Lee was charged with treason, but never tried. He spent the last
years of his life as President of Washington College in Virginia.
The Commandant of Anderson Prison, Captain Henry Witz, was tried
and found guilty of violating Lieber's Code and hanged on 11 November
1865. For a summary of the case see The Law of War: A Documentary
History, vol
. 1, pp. 783-98.
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are less likely to cling to a false belief in the innate
inferiority of a particular group when there is increased
interaction. in any event, professional soldiers of all
nations must continue to regard the rules of war as their
rules if the humanitarian principles of jus in bello are
to be effective in reducing the brutality of war. in
Hart s terms, they must take an "internal point of view"
toward the jus in bello rules and contribute to their
refinement, promulgation, and enforcement. One goal of
the military establishment should be to reconcile
revolutionary technological innovations with traditional
principles before battlefield scenarios prove the last
war's rules to be obsolete. This should be a military
responsibility because these are the soldier's rules, not
rules that are imposed on him by a political system.
Moreover, there must be an increased effort to
promulgate the laws of war and the ethos of the warrior
in peacetime
. International conferences and treaties
should include stipulations that soldiers of all services
and nations receive periodic instruction in the just war
tradition, the laws of war which reflect this tradition,
and the ethos of the soldier. International agreements
to this affect should receive the same or greater
priority--to include emphasis on verification--as arms
control efforts. Without changes in this aspect of jus
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war as
in bello, many will continue to treat the laws of
theoretic ideals rather than legal and moral mandates.
In the next section we will turn our attention to
the content of the laws of war. We will examine those
issues that are the most problematic and that generate
the most confusion and criticism, by both professional
soldiers and others, for the jus in bello tradition.
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CHAPTER 9
THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR CRIMES
In the last chapter I argued that if the just war
tradition and the laws that formalize it are going to
ameliorate the tragedy of war, there will have to be an
increased emphasis on promulgating the prescriptions and
prohibitions contained in these laws. In this section I
will argue that the rules, as written, afford so many
opportunities for mitigation and extenuation after crimes
are committed that they can make distribution of fair and
equitable punishment for transgressions seem capricious.
Additionally, even if all soldiers obeyed all the rules
of war as they are presently recognized in international
law, either because they identified with them (the
internal point of view) or because of the fear of
sanctions (the external point of view)
,
there would still
be serious difficulties with what the rules prescribe and
permit. A brief sampling of actual cases from the last
century points to the inefficacy of sanctions for war
crimes and highlights the extent of the problems with
enforcement
.
In 1901, following the Philippine War, Lieutenant
Preston Brown was found guilty of willfully murdering an
unarmed prisoner of war. His sentence was forfeiture of
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one-half month's pay per month for nine months.
1
Brigadier General Jacob Smith was tried in 1902 and found
guilty of ordering his subordinates to "take no
prisoners" and to kill all persons over ten years old in
an attack on the Island of Samar. His punishment was an
official admonition. During the same year, Major Edward
Glenn was convicted of having tortured a prisoner of war
and was fined fifty dollars. 2
At the close of World War I the Allies were
unsuccessful in their attempts to bring to trial 896
Germans who were alleged to be war criminals. German
officials insisted that Germany conduct its own trials,
but ended up prosecuting only 12 of the 896. Of these,
six were convicted. Major Benno Crusius was found guilty
of ordering the murder of wounded prisoners of war and
was sentenced to imprisonment for two years. The
stiffest penalties were given to two officers of a German
submarine who sank a British troop ship and ordered their
crew to surface in order to machine-gun the helpless
survivors. They were sentenced to four years each, but
were soon allowed to escape. 3
The high water mark for accountability for war
crimes came following World War II. The International
The Law of War: A Documentary History, vol. 1, ed. by Leon Friedman
(New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 820-829.
2 Ibid., pp . 799-813.
3 Ibid., p. 777.
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Military Tribunals established by the Allied Powers at
Nuremberg and in the Far East were the first (and last)
international courts formed to try war criminals. 4 But
seemingly, the Nuremberg and associated trials conducted
in the aftermath of World War II were an anomaly, brought
on perhaps by the stark naked predation and undisguised
evil of the Nazi Regime. After this flood of
prosecutions, the enthusiasm for trying war criminals
dried up. This has given rise to charges of "victor's
justice" and ex post facto laws in referring to the post
World War II trials.
During the Korean War General MacArthur established
a war crimes commission which conducted extensive
investigations and compiled detailed evidence on war
crimes committed by North Korean and Chinese soldiers.
An interim report issued by the Korea War Crimes Division
of the Judge Advocate General's office in June 1953
listed numerous cases which were ready for referral to an
international tribunal. Records of atrocities— some
involving the torture and subsequent murder of thousands
4 Twenty-two members of the German government were tried, nineteen
convicted, and twelve sentenced to death by this tribunal. Of these,
eight were convicted of "crimes against peace" (i.e. aggression).
Additionally, military courts of the occupying powers conducted
numerous additional trials of German military and government
officials. For example. Great Britain prosecuted 937 Germans, and of
these, 230 were sentenced to death; and France tried 2107 and
executed 104. At the same time, in the Far East, an international
military tribunal tried 25 senior Japanese citizens, convicted 23,
and imposed the death penalty on seven. See ibid., pp. 779-81.
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and signed confessions,
ever held
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ictures, statements by witnesses,
Nevertheless, no trials were
Only a few members of the United Nations forces were
tried for war crimes. In one case, u. s. v. Kinder, a
soldier was tried and convicted of executing a Korean
prisoner despite his claim that he was directly ordered
to do so by his commanding officer. He was sentenced to
life, but the convening officer reduced this to two
years
.
6
North Korean and Chinese soldiers were not tried because it waseared that thus would interfere with repatriation. A summary of the
Extract of rT’ and readV for trial is contained inInterim Hxstoncal Report
,
Korea War Crimes Division,Cumulative to 30 June 1953, U. S. Army Korea Communications Zone.is significant that there were very few substantive charges ofwar crimes brought against United Nations forces during the Korean
ar. North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union claimed that the
nited States was guilty of employing bacteriological weapons and
1
.
ing 82 Prisoners at Pongam. Upon examining the evidence, theUnited Nations determined that the prison deaths all occurred as a
result of attacks on prison guards during a mass riot, and formally
rejected the charges of criminal actions. At the request of theUnited States, the United Nations appointed a five nation group toinvestigate the use of bacteriological weapons, but China and North
Korea refused to participate in or cooperate with any investigation.
The United Nations General Assembly took this as sufficient evidence
that the charges were false.
See L. C. Green, "Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man," in
Essays on the Modern Law of War (New York: Transnational Publishers
Inc., 1985), p. 68.
The strong regard that the multi-national United Nations forces
showed for the laws of war can probably be attributed to the
influence of the Commander of the United Nations forces. General
MacArthur, who also served as the convening authority for the
International Tribunal of the Far East which prosecuted war crimes
after World War II. in upholding the death sentence for a Japanese
general officer whose men had committed atrocities without his
knowledge, MacArthur had noted that military commanders are
responsible for the actions of their subordinates even when they
don't know about them. The behavior of United Nations forces.
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During the Vietnam War, the attempted cover-up of
the illegal, immoral, unnecessary, cowardly, counter-
productive, and profoundly stupid atrocities of My Lai,
and the farcical, token admonishments meted out to the
guilty parties by the Army, are often cited as evidence
the sterility of the laws of war. Lieutenant Calley,
a platoon leader at My Lai, was tried and convicted of
the premeditated murder of numerous Vietnamese civilians.
He served a total of five years on house arrest where he
was allowed all amenities, including frequent
unsupervised visits with his girl friend. Of the other
24 persons charged in the incident, five were tried and
acquitted, and charges were dropped on the remainder
(although some had their awards for valor rescinded
and/or received administrative reprimands). 7
especially in light of the atrocities committed by the opposing side,is a good indication of the extreme influence corrmanders can have ontheir subordinates.
For a good analysis of the entire My Lai affair see The My LaiMassacre and Its Cover-up (New York: The Free Press, 1976) This
work also reproduces the Army's own investigation into My Lai, "The
Peers Commission Report."
Referring to the U. S. handling of the case, Telford Taylor (who
served as the Chief U. S. Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trails) writes:
"As in the United States in 1902, as in Germany in 1921, the criminal
consequences of Mylai were 'almost farcical .many inferential
lessons might be drawn from these events. One of them is that
American and German military establishments are alike in that neither
can be counted on for diligent enforcement of the laws of war against
its own men. Another conclusion, readily to be drawn from the events
in the world around us, is that many other national military
establishments do not make the slightest effort to ensure internal
compliance with the rules of war." See The Law of War, pp. xxiv-xxv.
Despite the My Lai tragedy, the United States tried more of its own
soldiers for war crimes during the Vietnam War than any government
ever has before. Nevertheless, although we might conclude that there
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In this section we win explore: a) why the United
States has not been more vigorous in its enforcement of
the jus in bello rules; and b) those factors in the way
the laws are formulated that impede consistent
enforcement. I believe that these issues must be
addressed in some satisfactory way if the just war
tradition is going to be a viable force in future
conflicts
.
We will approach these problems from two related
perspectives. The first concerns how the military virtue
of following orders or obedience can interfere with
determining the culpability for war crimes after they are
committed; this will be the topic of Chapter 9. The
second concerns certain caveats built into the laws of
war--military necessity and reprisals--that permit
setting aside the humanitarian principles of jus in bello
for the sake of military objectives. These will be the
has been an increased commitment to the laws of war, this should not
be construed to mean that there is now sufficient commitment. The
more specific rules which have been adopted by the United Nations and
promulgated in international agreements have not always found their
way into military education programs. The truth is that as I write
this in 1990, the officers and men of the U. S. Army have no more
knowledge of or internal commitment to the laws of war than they did
during Vietnam. Nor does the American people. We should not forget
that after two marines involved in killing 5 women and 11 children
were convicted of murder, 160,000 citizens of Oklahoma signed a
petition and sent it to the Commandant of the Marine Corps reguesting
the release of these "unjustly confined men." Moreover, within
months of Calley's conviction for the premeditated murder of not less
than 22 innocent civilians, President Nixon received 15,000 letters
critical of the conviction. See Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) . The statistics above are
taken from pp. 356-7 of this work.
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we will shift our
subject of Chapter 10. m Chapter 11
focus somewhat and explore how our previous discussions
of the just war tradition might help us to understand
various arguments concerning terrorism as a legitimate
means of seeking justice in the international arena.
H. L. A. Hart notes that even though it is the
internal point of view rather than sanctions that
provides the primary motive for obedience to laws,
sanctions are still necessary in order to motivate into
conformity those who take an external point of view
toward laws and don't view them as their laws. The
imposition of sanctions, however, becomes problematic
when the rules are vague or widely ignored. This is
particularly important to our study because sanctions are
a crucial aspect of the humanitarian laws of war for at
least two special reasons. First, as I argued in the
last chapter, nations have been remiss in promulgating
these laws to their armed forces in ways that allow
soldiers to take an internal point of view to them. This
increases the need for effective sanctions as a
deterrent
.
Second, before sanctions can be imposed, there must
be a means for establishing culpability. This has often
been problematic in the military because one
characteristic specific to the military profession--and
one which all soldiers understand clearly--is that the
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orders one receives from one's superiors inherently bear
with them the force of law. Because obedience to orders
is emphasized during all phases of a soldier's service—
in peacetime and in combat— and is an integral part of
the indoctrination each receives in Basic Combat Training
or boot camp", instant and unquestioning obedience to
superior orders soon becomes a rule toward which soldiers
almost invariably take an internal point of view. when
one considers that the rule of instant obedience is one
that soldiers understand the reasoning behind, accept as
important to their own interests, and know the punishment
for violating, it is not surprising that they have often
committed war crimes when directed to do so by their
superiors, especially since many of the laws and
sanctions associated with these crimes are vague or
ambiguous. Moreover, the units to which soldiers are
assigned soon become their units
,
and the officers and
noncommissioned officers of these units become their
leaders, i.e., those who will look out for their welfare.
This increases even further the soldier's disposition to
obey without question orders received from their
superiors. The military principle of obedience, then,
might be stated this way:
MP1. Soldiers have a legal duty always to obey the
orders of their superiors
.
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Even if MP1 is true (we will return to it
momentarily) there remains the additional question of
whether or not soldiers have a moral duty always to obey
the orders received from their superiors. We might
formulate this as a principle thus:
MP2
. Soldiers have a moral duty always to obey
orders of their superiors
.
the
Of course, if soldiers have a moral duty to always
obey the orders of their superiors, then this would
severely limit their moral agency in those cases when
they are acting under such orders. This seems to be
reinforced by a third military principle, recognized by
virtually all nations, that holds Commanders legally and
morally responsible, at least to some extent, for the
actions of their subordinates. This might be formulated
this way:
MP3. Commanders are responsible for any actions performed
in accordance with their orders
.
There are a number of reasons why these principles
warrant rigorous scrutiny. As the cases in our
introduction to this section demonstrate, commanders
accused of ordering or overlooking criminal acts have
frequently been excused or received only token
punishments because they did not commit the acts
themselves. On the other hand, those who have executed
270
superior orders as a
war crimes have often claimed
justification or excuse for their actions. m many cases
the result of this "who is responsible?" shell game has
been either that no one has been held accountable for war
crimes, or that the extent of culpability has been so
mitigated as to seem ridiculous, as the historical
evidence shows.
Without clear, established criteria for delineating
individual responsibilities for war crimes, the issue of
sanctions becomes moot. And without sanctions, the jus
in bello rules found in national and international laws
of war might be interpreted as ideals to be followed only
when expediency permits, rather than legal prescriptions
grounded in moral principles.
Let's now examine these three military principles
more closely and explore ways that the difficulties each
presents might be resolved.
Obedience as a legal obligation
Prior to World War II, the lack of consensus
concerning a subordinate's responsibility always to obey
superior orders was reflected in the divergent laws which
various nations adopted concerning this issue (referred
to by lawyers as respondeat superior)
. The English
military code of 1749 specified that soldiers only had to
obey lawful orders. Oppenheim' s classic, International
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Law
' Published in 1906, however, states that members of
the armed forces who violate the laws of war under orders
from superiors are not war criminals and may not be
punished by the enemy. 8 This probably influenced the
British and U. S. World War I army manuals which absolved
from culpability those who violated the laws of war under
orders from their superiors. 9
The 1914 edition of the United States' Rules of Land
Warfare, enumerates all of the acts which are prohibited
in war, and adds: "Individuals of the armed forces will
not be punished for these offenses in case they are
committed under the orders or sanction of their
government or commanders
. During World War II,
however, both Great Britain and the United States adopted
variations of Article 47 of the German Military Code of
1872 which states that a subordinate "is liable to
punishment as an accomplice if he knew that the order
involved an act the commission of which constituted a
civil or military crime or offense." 11 Unfortunately,
o
Guenter Lewy, "Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, and the Dictates
of Conscience," The Political Science Review 55 (1961): 3-23,
reprinted in War and Morality, ed. by Richard Wasserstrom (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 115-6.
9 Ibid, Chap. 26, "Superior Orders and Reprisals," pp. 434-5. Taylor
cites the Manual of Military Law (1914) p. 302 as the source for
British law.
-*-0 Rules of Land Warfare (United States: War Department, Office of
the Chief of Staff, 1914), para. 366, p. 130
11 Article 47 of the German Military Code is discussed in "The High
Command Case," Nuremberg, October, 1958, in Laws of War: A
Documentary History, vol 2, 1431-2.
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neither the Geneva nor the Hague Conventions addresses
the subject of superior orders.
In the armed forces of United States, disobeying a
lawful order can be prosecuted as a felony under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. in their oath of
enlistment, for example, U. S. soldiers swear to obey the
lawful orders of their officers and those legally
appointed over them. 12 This is in consonance with present
U. S. doctrine on obedience to superior orders as
discussed in Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare
,
published in 1956, which states that "members of the
armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders 13 (my
italics)
. Thus even though orders carry with them the
force of law, there are certain laws which are more
fundamental and which take precedence over orders.
Lawful orders, we may presume, are those given by a duly
appointed authority and which prescribe lawful acts;
unlawful orders are those that either originate with an
improper authority or which command acts that are
In Chapter 2 of Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, Telford
Taylor cites other (earlier) legal precedents, notably the trial of
Major Henry Witz, Commandant of the Andersonville Prison Camp during
the U. S. Civil War. Witz was hanged for his treatment of prisoners
despite his claims (which were verified) of superior orders. For a
summary of the case see Laws of War: A Documentary History, vol. 1,
pp. 783-798.
-I O
f (The oath for officers is different. Officers swear to support and
defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic.
12 Department of the Army (Washington D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1956), para. 509, pp . 182-3.
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illegal. Perhaps we are ready to alleviate part of the
difficulty with the legal obligation of obedience by
rewording our principle so that obedience is required
only in response to lawful orders.
MPl Soldiers have a legal duty to obey the lawful
orders of their superiors and to disobey all
orders that are unlawful.
This formulation seems to address some of the
difficulties with MPl because it provides for limitations
to the rule of obedience by making certain legal
prescriptions more fundamental than others. In other
words, superior orders carry with them the force of law
provided that they do not prescribe criminal acts. Now,
however, although we have limited the domain of actions
into which superior orders may take subordinates by
excluding those that are illegal, we are faced with the
practical question of how recipients of orders are going
to be able to distinguish between legal and illegal acts.
This is particularly problematic because in war the
boundaries between legal and illegal behavior are
drastically different from those recognized in peacetime.
Consider the distinction between criminal acts for which
soldiers are culpable, and lawful acts of war for which
they are not, as explained by Telford Taylor, the United
States' chief counsel at the Nuremberg trials:
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ho T the area ° f irranunity is not unlimited, and itsb undaries are marked by the laws of war. Unless theconduct in question falls within those boundaries itdoe s not lose the criminal character it would have shouldt occur in peacetime circumstances. in a literal sensetherefore, the expression "war crime” is a misnomer, formeans an act that remains criminal even thouohcommuted in the course of war, because it lies outsidethe area of immunity prescribed by the laws of war. 14
The difficulty arises when we attempt to determine
just how far the "blanket of immunity" extends. Taylor
argues that its limits are "marked by the laws of war,"
but the laws of war are often themselves unclear. For
example, international law permits reprisals against the
enemy as a legitimate means of responding to violations
of jus in hello when other efforts to curb criminal
actions fail. in other words, as a means of deterrence,
one side can legally violate the rules of war in response
to enemy violations. This means that soldiers may be
legally ordered to commit acts which would otherwise be
war crimes as reprisals. As one jurist, commenting on
the Trial of General Falkenhorst, Commander in Chief of
Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam : An American Tragedy,
reprinted as Chap. 25, "War Crimes," in War, Morality, and the
Military Profession
,
ed. by Malham M. Wakin (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1979), pp. 415-16.
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Possibly there is no more difficult subject in the ambitof the law relating to war crimes than a correctapplrcatron of the principles in a case where reprisaland superior orders are raised by the defense in respect
to r * 3ame °rder whioh the defendant is allegedhave carried out. a
Moreover, it is not only reprisals which cause such
difficulties: almost every humanitarian law adopted by
the Geneva and Hague conventions and expressed in the
Nuremberg Principles specifies that certain actions are
prohibited unless required by military necessity. (We
will return to reprisals and military necessity in
greater detail in the next chapter.) And of course, all
of this complexity is compounded by the extreme stress of
combat situations where such decisions are generally
made. As a German court noted in convicting two submarine
officers who had sunk a British troop ship and,
afterwards, under orders from their captain, surfaced to
destroy the survivors in life boats with machine-gun
fire: "A refusal to obey the commander on a submarine
would have been something so unusual that it is humanly
possible to understand that the accused could not bring
themselves to disobey ." 16
15 » Tri a i 0 f Generaloberst Nickolaus von Falkenhorst , " July 1946, in
The Laws of War: A Documentary History, p. 1564.
In this case the court ruled, however, that superior orders did
not constitute an adequate justification in those cases where "an
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Given these overriding considerations which are
built into the international laws of war, the boundaries
of the "blanket of immunity” are not as obvious as they
might initially seem. Because soldiers routinely perform
acts at the direction of their superiors which would be
crimes under peacetime conditions, it seems unreasonable
to require soldiers to distinguish between acts which are
illegal in peacetime but legally obligatory in war from
those which are illegal in peacetime and in war-
especially when this latter group can change entirely
depending on the circumstances. As one well known
author, commenting on his World War II experience
observes
:
To be sure, since the Nuremberg trials. Western Nationshave officially denied the soldier's right to obey ordersthat involve him in crimes. He must distinguish betweenillegitimate orders and those that are in line with hisduty as a soldier. Presumably, the distinction is always
clear according to official pronouncements, but in
reality under the conditions of total war few things are
more difficult to distinguish. Our age is caught in a
painful contradiction for which there is no resolution
other than the renunciation of wars or at least of the
way we have been waging them in this generation. 17
The difficulties inherent in requiring soldiers to
distinguish between lawful and unlawful orders in light
order is known to everybody, including the accused, to be without any
doubt whatsoever against the law." The excuse of superior orders was
considered in mitigation. "The LLandovery Castle Case," Leipzig, July
1921, in Laws of War: A Documentary History, pp. 868-882.
J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 182.
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doctrine. The previous passage cited from u. s. Army
Field Manual 27-10, The La. of Land Warfare, is prefaced
with the following discussion:
In considering the question of whether a superior orderconstitutes a valid defense, the court shall take intoconsideration the fact that obedience to lawful military
that "the "l^
*** ° f BVeSy ° f the
-med force;atter cannot be expected, in the conditions of
r discipline, to weigh scrupulously the legal merits ofthe orders received; that certain rules of warfare may becon roversial, or that an act otherwise amounting to awar crime may be done in obedience to orders conceived as
a measure of reprisal. At the same time it must be borne
iL.
m
^"
-,.
tl
!
at
.
in
f
mberS ° f
i 8
the armed forces are bound toobey only lawful orders
This passage reinforces a number of concerns. On
one hand it acknowledges that soldiers cannot "weigh
scrupulously the legal merits of the orders received" and
that certain acts of war may be criminal under some
circumstances and legal under others. On the other hand,
however, it enjoins soldiers to obey "only lawful
orders." It seems, then, that soldiers should always obey
military orders unless they know such orders to be
unlawful; but because what is lawful can change
dramatically depending on the circumstances, it will
often be impossible for soldiers to know with any
reasonable degree of certainty whether or not certain
1
8
Department of the Army (Washington D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1956), para. 509, pp. 182-3.
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orders are unlawful. 19 In other words, the relevant
military manual advises soldiers to obey only lawful
orders while at the same time admitting that they will
often be unable to tell lawful orders from unlawful ones!
With this in mind it is not surprising that the
imposition of sanctions on soldiers who have violated the
laws of war under orders has been minimal.
In sum, we have identified two serious problems for
the just war tradition that are associated with a
soldier's legal obligation to obey lawful orders. The
first is that soldiers often view the rule of obedience
to superior orders as more fundamental than other
relevant rules such as those associated with the
humanitarian principles of jus in hello. In most cases
this may be attributed to soldiers taking an internal
point of view to the former and an external point of view
to the latter. The second problem is with the
formulation of the rules themselves. Soldiers cannot
reasonably be expected to conform to rules that require
them to choose between alternative courses of action
based on information that they will frequently not know,
as required by MP1' and the existing laws of war.
Unfortunately, these two difficulties present for us
a case where developing an acceptable solution may be as
1
9
My use of 'know' in this context refers to a soldier's ignorance
of relevant empirical data rather than to an ignorance of the
relevant law.
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challenging as explicating the nature of the problem and
understanding its causes. One possibility is to modify
the laws themselves by reducing the situational aspects
of caveats such as military necessity and reprisals.
This topic is best postponed until our detailed
discussion of these doctrines in the next chapter. A
second solution might be to question the merits of
obedience as a central military virtue. We might ask,
for example, whether obedience to orders is of sufficient
importance to the military profession in terms of
expediency to justify its codification into laws and
enforcement through sanctions in light of the
difficulties we've identified. And if it is crucial to
military methods and purpose, how can the rules that
reflect this principle be modified so that soldiers can
reasonably be expected to distinguish between those
orders that they have a legal obligation to obey and
those that they have a legal obligation to disobey.
Similarly, we might establish the relationship of the
principle of obedience to other relevant principles such
as those that are reflected in the jus in hello
tradition. These are guestions of how the law ought to
be (lex ferunda)
,
and we can proceed in this direction by
examining the moral and prudential considerations that
motivate the military emphasis on obedience as a legally
obligatory and morally praiseworthy requirement. If we
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can determine where the moral boundaries of the
of obedience lie, then perhaps we can better
its relationship to other relevant principles
the legal rules accordingly.
principle
ascertain
and modify
Obedience to orders as a moral duty
In the widely read The Soldier and the State, Samuel
Huntington argues that obedience to legal orders is the
paramount virtue of soldiers; that is, soldiers have a
moral duty to follow the legal orders of their superiors.
He provides the following rationale:
or the [military] profession to perform its function,
each level within it must be able to command theinstantaneous and loyal obedience of subordinate levels.Without these relationships military professionalism isimpossible. Consequently, loyalty and obedience are thehighest military virtues when a military man receives
a legal order from an authorized superior, he does not
argue, he does not hesitate, he does not substitute his
own views; he obeys instantly. He is judged not by the
policies he implements, but rather by the promptness and
efficacy with which he carries them out. His goal is to
be an instrument of obedience; the uses to which that
instrument is put are beyond his responsibility
.
Huntington's position is that as long as an order is
legal, soldiers have a moral obligation to obey it. He
concludes that soldiers carry no moral responsibility for
20 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957),
reprinted as Chapter 2, "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of
the Professional Military Ethic, " in War Morality and the Military
Profession, ed. by Malham M. Wakin (Westview Press: Boulder,
Colorado, 1979), p. 39.
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war crimes committed in response to superior orders. 21
This can be summarized with the following principle:
^‘ssr.st-s sya“
One might object to this principle on the grounds
that it is impossible to determine legal orders from
illegal ones, as we noted in our earlier discussion.
Huntington could respond, however, that the assumption
always favors obedience, and that soldiers are morally
obligated to obey except in those cases where they have
reasonable evidence to believe that the order is
illegal. We can incorporate this into our principle this
way
:
MP2'
. Soldiers have a moral obligation to obey all
orders except in cases where they have reasonable
evidence to believe the orders to be illegal, andin such cases they have a moral obligation todisobey them.
To his credit, Huntington is uncomfortable with all of the
consequences of his own argument. He notes that his position places
the principle of obedience into conflict with "basic morality." He
writes: "For the officer this comes down to a choice between his own
conscience on the one hand, and the good of the state, plus the
professional virtue of obedience, upon the other. As a soldier, he
owes obedience; as a man, he owes disobedience. Except in the most
extreme instances it is reasonable to expect that he will adhere to
the professional ethic and obey" (Ibid., p. 44) . This brief
paragraph at the conclusion of his discussion of the topic of
obedience seems to retract everything he has said about obedience up
to the point
. Furthermore note that by not stipulating any of the
considerations that might make disobedience permissible (or
obligatory) his position becomes almost useless as a practical guide.
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Let's turn now to the reasons that Huntington
provides to support his claim.
Huntington argues that without complete and
unquestioning obedience, military units will be unable to
perform their functions. (Let's define "function'' as
defeating the enemy with minimum loss of life.) of
course, we can all thin* of examples where this claim
would be false. Soldiers or even entire units might
disobey orders when they become aware of information that
the person issuing the orders does not have, and
disobedience under such circumstances could possibly
produce better results than obedience.
Surely, however, Huntington recognizes that his
position admits of dire exceptions. if so, then it is
difficult to understand just what his justification for
advocating unquestioning obedience might be. Perhaps he
means that in the long run, better performance of
soldierly functions will follow from all soldiers
conforming to the rule(s) of obedience all the time than
would follow from conformance to any alternative rule(s).
The very idea of a military unit, he might argue,
requires that various roles be assigned to individual
group members and that each member perform his role as
efficiently as he can with the conviction that others
do likewise
. The role of decision-maker is reserved
for the commander. it certainly would not do to have
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each individual soldier deciding which orders to obey and
which to ignore. Moreover, the commander is in a better
position to make moral decisions on behalf of the members
of his unit because he is the only one who has access to
all the information relevant to such decisions.
Understood this way, the principle of obedience isolates
the culpability for war crimes with those commanders who
initiate such orders rather than extending it to those
who simply execute them. Better results, he might claim
(both in terms of overall conformity to humanitarian
principles as well as achieving military objectives), can
be obtained by isolating the responsibility and
culpability for war crimes in commanders who are better
educated and have access to the crucial information
needed to make tactical decisions.
Although this rule utilitarian argument initially
seems appealing, it is not without difficulties. One
might challenge the consequential aspects of Huntington's
claim by examining the relationship between defeating the
enemy and obeying orders. For example, is instant and
unquestioning obedience to orders really as crucial to
military success as he maintains; or might there often be
cases where acts of disobedience would contribute to
military success? We can address this question by first
considering some possible reasons why a soldier might
refuse to obey orders, and then speculating how such
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behavior might affect the ..milltary function .„ As ^
pursue this, our goal will be to distinguish those cases
where instant and unquestioning obedience is crucial to
military efficiency from those where disobedience would
not have a significant negative affect on performance, so
that we will later be able to modify the rules of
obedience to reflect these differences. Hopefully, we
will be able to fine tune the rules of obedience in ways
that preserve the consequential considerations that
Huntington raises without negating the moral agency of
individual soldiers.
I can imagine three types of reasons why a soldier
might disobey an order. First, suppose that after having
received lawful orders to perform some action (Al ) , a
soldier concludes that there is an alternative course of
action available (A2 ) that is better in terms of
achieving the military objectives than the one
prescribed. Let's call this the prudential argument.
Second, one might believe that by following orders there
IS a greater chance of coming in harm's way than there is
by not following orders (he is afraid). We'll refer to
this as the self-interest argument. Finally, one could
believe that the order received prescribes actions that
are either morally or legally wrong. We will call this
the moral objection argument. Let's see if any of these
pose a problem for the obedience principle.
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The prudential argument advocates that disobedience
may sometimes be morally justified based on expediency.
The very nature of rules is such that they often can't
take into consideration all the relevant aspects of
particular situations. And if one discovers a better way
of accomplishing an objective than the one decreed by
one's superiors, then it would seem foolish not to adopt
it. This point is developed nicely by Plato in a
discussion concerning the shortcomings of civil laws, but
seems equally applicable to our discussion because
soldiers are legally bound to obey lawful orders:
Laws can never issue an injunction binding on all which
really embodies what is best for each; it cannot
prescribe with perfect accuracy what is good and right
for each member of the community at any one time. The
difference of human personality, the variety of man's
activities, and the inevitable unsettlement attending all
human experience make it impossible for any art
whatsoever to issue unqualified rules holding good on all
questions at all times. But we find practically always
that the law tends to issue just this invariable kind of
rule. It is like a self-willed, ignorant man who lets no
one do anything but what he has ordered and forbids all
subsequent questioning of his orders even if the
situation has shown some marked improvement on the one
for which he originally legislated. (294b-c) 22
Plato' s criticism is that laws are never completely
universizable, they must inevitably admit of exceptions.
Military orders given by commanders in combat, however,
are legal prescriptions that are not subject to this
22 Statesman, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1982), pp. 1063.
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criticism because they are particular judgments aimed at
specific situations. It follows that they should take
precedence over more general rules that are written to
cover general scenarios. 23 if so, then individual action
should take precedence over superior orders, which would
take precedence over standing orders, and so on. of
course, if conflicts in orders are to be resolved at the
lowest level, then individuals will always be permitted
to set aside orders received based on their own
individual assessment of the alternatives.
The distinct aspect of military operations that
makes Plato's observation unconvincing when applied to
military orders and thereby favors the rule utilitarian
perspective in our case, is the importance of coordinated
action to military tactics and strategy. Even if there
is a better way (call it A2 ) of accomplishing a
particular objective than the one delineated in an order
(call it A]_), the importance of unison of action is
crucial enough to combat operations to almost always
override this as an argument for disobedience. 24 In
23 Of course, formulated, this way the rule that particular orders
should always take precedence over general orders would itself be
subject to exceptions. Presumably this is the intention behind the
caveat the soldiers obey only lawful orders. Thus the limits of the
exceptions are specified.
I say that the requirement for coordinated action almost always
prohibits disobedience because there could be isolated situations
where individual initiatives don't affect other elements. Suppose
that a small unit was moving along a prescribed route to an objective
and encounters an obstacle. Should they modify the route to bypass
it, attempt to traverse it, or wait for additional orders? The
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other words, because the success of military operations
depends on coordinated efforts, alternative A2 is better
only if everyone were to adopt it in place of Al . But it
doesn't follow from the fact that a better outcome would
result if everyone were to adopt A2 that one individual
should refuse to obey an order to do A1 so that he might
adopt A2 on his own. And even if we grant uniform
disobedience in some cases (a rout for example)
,
the rule
utilitarian can still respond that rules must be
evaluated against types of cases rather than particular
ones. 25 The prudential argument, then, doesn't cause
serious problems for MP2
' ,
and in fact seems to support
it
.
The second possible explanation for disobeying
superior orders, the self-interest argument, also seems
to support rather than cast doubt upon MP2 ' . When one
choses to disobey lawful orders for the sake of one's own
format for military orders in the U. S. Army has recently been
modified to allow for such contingencies by requiring commanders to
include a discussion of their intention. This permits soldiers some
latitude in modifying methods in rapidly changes scenarios
characteristic of combat with the purpose of remaining focused on the
intention of the action rather than the method.
While this objection to the principle of obedience does not
persuade us to reject the principle, it might provide a good argument
against the instant and unquestioning obedience that Huntington
advocates. There is considerable difference between suggesting an
alternative to a legal order and then performing the same order when
it is reaffirmed, and simply disobeying an order. In other words,
one might argue that more utility would result from a rule that
allowed for the possibility of an open exchange of suggestions
followed by compliance than would result from a rule requiring
instant, unquestioning compliance without such a possibility.
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"cowardice
welfare or safety during combat it is called
in the face of the enemy" and is a felony that is
punishable by death. Nor can the self-interest argument
be defended against the rule utilitarian position by
appealing to another generally acceptable moral theory
(either teleological or deontological) because such
theories invariably require that the interests of others
be given the same importance as our own interests. Act
utilitarian calculations, for example, require that the
consequences of alternatives be calculated in a manner
that gives equal weight to all persons affected.
Likewise, Kantian respect for persons prohibits anyone
from giving preference to his own ends over the ends of
others; or, put another way, actions should always be in
accordance with rules that can be universalized without
resulting in preferential treatment for anyone. Natural
law, too, requires that men, as social beings, not pursue
selfish interests when doing so would have a detrimental
affect on their fellows. In each case, these moral
theories support MP2 ' over disobedience based on selfish
motives. While self-interest might provide an
explanation for immoral behavior the same way that greed
or hatred do, it doesn't serve as an adequate
justification
.
In addition to the prudential and self-interest
arguments, another possible objection to MP2 ' is the
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argument that soldiers have a moral duty to disobey legal
orders if they believe such orders to be immoral. For
example, one might argue that while the principle of
obedience is considered a virtue for soldiers, there are
nevertheless more fundamental human principles that are
always operative regardless of the role one occupies.
Perhaps the difficulty this raises for Huntington's
position can be made more apparent if we imagine that the
process of obeying an order involves two components: the
obedience of an order, and the performance of that which
is entailed by the order received. Huntington's position
blurs this distinction by describing those who carry out
commands as mere "instruments;" and of course, the
responsibility for the uses to which an instrument is put
rests entirely with the user of the instrument. But
obedience, like courage, perseverance, and genius, cannot
be judged independently of the ends toward which it is
directed. Certainly we can imagine a murderer whose
courage, perseverance, and intellect assist him in
accomplishing heinous injustices. And while we might
generally regard courage as virtuous, it is only
contingently so because in the final analysis it takes
its character from the end toward which it is directed.
Huntington's argument would make obedience the
fundamental principle regardless of the evil nature of
the ends one may knowingly bring about under the rubric
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of obeying. We can best point out the difficulties with
this line of reasoning if we digress for a few moments
and reflect on the derivation of certain special rights
and duties that are normally associated with particular
roles, the way that obeying orders or attacking enemy
combatants is associated with soldiering.
In domestic society, for example, the universal
human right of punishing others for attacks upon one's
person or property, or of seeking redress, are located in
the office of the magistrate. The community has, through
its system of secondary laws, assigned certain individual
rights to various roles, and the persons filling these
roles, by proxy, act on behalf of the community's
members indeed, they have a duty to so act. As Grotius
puts it, according to natural law, "everyman has the
right to punish wrongdoers;" but in civil society, the
rights of preventing and punishing wrongdoers are
restricted to particular offices. 2 ^ Only in those places
where there is no civil authority, he adds, do "the old
natural liberties remain ." 27 It is not the case,
therefore, that wrong acts become right when condoned by
a legitimate authority, but rather that acts that were
permissible for everyone in pre-civil society have become
2 6 The Law of War and Peace, Hugo Grotius, tr. by Francis W. Kelsey
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1962), Bk . II, chap. 20, IX, P.
476.
27 Ibid., pp. 473-4. See my earlier discussion of this in Chapter 7;
esp. note 39.
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restricted to those legally endowed with the public
authority for such acts.
We can conclude, then, that the power of the
magistrate is not unlimited because no rights can be
assigned to an office that don't exist in the population
in the first place. Likewise, the rights that individual
members of a family or community have to protect
themselves, their fellows, and their property from
foreign attack, as well as to seek redress for wrongs
suffered, are collected in the role of the military for
reasons of expediency. it is not because a "blanket of
immunity" is spread over certain actions that would
otherwise be crimes that soldiers are permitted to
inflict harm on other human beings, as Telford Taylor
argues (above), but because certain natural, universal
rights intrinsic to all human beings have been given up
by the population at large and assigned to those filling
the role of soldier. This idea is not new. The Romans,
for example, commissioned their military to fight in
specific campaigns. Soldiers who fought in campaigns
other than the one for which they were commissioned could
be charged with murder for any deaths they caused.
As in the example of the magistrate, soldiers at the
very most acquire only those rights that are inherent in
individual persons or communities. Those actions that
would be illegal or immoral for individuals (acting alone
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or collectively as members of a community) to engage in-
torture, mutilation, intentional harming of innocents-
cannot ever become permissible for a person based on a
"blanket of immunity" or a particular role, because
actions that are morally „r0ng cannot become permissible
by fiat. It follows that the duty to obey orders is not
unlimited and certainly the principle of obedience is at
least limited to the extent that no person can ever incur
a moral obligation to obey an order that prescribes
actions which would always be immoral for one to perform
if no civil authority were to exist.
In other words, the office of personhood is a
natural, inalienable one that all human beings hold; it
is always more fundamental than other offices that
individuals might occupy concurrently, such as that of
soldier. m this respect, obedience is a second order
principle that acquires its character from the ends at
which it aims. This is not to deny that soldiers have a
prima facie duty to obey lawful orders; it is simply that
this is not their most fundamental duty as Huntington
would have it.
Another closely related difficulty with the rule
utilitarian argument for obedience is that it absolves
soldiers from any moral responsibility for actions done
at the direction of superiors. In its application, Rule
Utilitarianism can be likened to a kind of moral
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positivism in that acts are morally right if they are in
accordance with a prescribed rule which, if followed
universally, would produce better results than any
alternative rule would if followed in a like manner,
regardless of the particulars of the case. if Rule
Utilitarianism is true, and one of the rules is that
soldiers must always obey legal orders, then soldiers are
only morally responsible insofar as they do what they are
told regardless of the consequences of the specific case.
Even if an order prescribes an immoral act, under this
formulation, we could condemn the act and still praise
the agent who carried it out. Put another way, the
soldier's intention is to obey the legal orders received,
the act inherent in this obedience is beside the
intention. This is not a rejection of personhood per se,
but a subordination of it to the command of God or the
community
.
This view, which makes obedience to orders the most
fundamental rule for soldiers, harkens us back to
previous discussions concerning obedience to unjust laws.
Only if we view law as originating entirely by fiat
through a law giver—e.g. Jehovah to Moses, Allah to
Mohammed, Sun-god to Hammurabi, philosopher-king to
subjects as Augustine does, can its domain be considered
ubiquitous, timeless, and sacrosanct. As we have seen,
Aquinas (and Aristotle) reject this notion and conclude
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that as rational agents persons are always responsible
for their actions unless they are done out of ignorance
or under duress. And Kant, inspired by Hume, argues that
the fact that God wills us always to follow rule R is
sufficient reason for always following R only if „e add
the additional premise that whatever God commands is
unequivocally, objectively good; 2 *! and even then it would
have to be verifiable or at least compatible with our
reason. Rules made by transitory political entities and
their agents, however, are not unequivocally good; and
rules that are situational in their content
— like the one
requiring obedience--are extremely suspect.
Our experience and reasoning tell us that not only
is no set of rules completely universal, but that the
means whereby rules are formulated are often biased or
influenced by false beliefs. And even if the subjunctive
conditional that more utility would result from everyone
always following a particular rule ( R
)
than would result
from their following an alternative, is true, this can
only provide a prima facie obligation for following R.
The historical existence of orders issued by heads of
state as well as military leaders which were illegal,
immoral, and unnecessary is irrefutable. Two orders
2 8 See R. M. Hare, Applications of Moral Philosophy (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972), pp. 1-8. The discussion is
reprinted in War Morality and the Military Profession, Chapter 27,
pp. 443-450.
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issued by Hitler
passage is taken
June 1941: 29
will suffice as examples. The first
from the Commissar Order issued on 6
1 ' * n thls fight (against Russia), leniency andconsolations of international law are out of place indealing with these elements....
2 The originators of barbarous Asiastic methods ofwarfare are the political commissars. They musterefore be dealt with most severely, at once andsummarily. Therefore, they are to be liquidated at oncewhen taken in combat or offering resistance
I. (2) Political corrmissars as organs of the enemy troopsare recognizable by special insignia
—red star withinterwoven gold hammer and sickle on the sleeves. They
*** ** se <?reg*ted at once, e.g. still on thettlefield, from the prisoners of war the protection
o prisoners of war by international law does not applyto them. They will be liquidated after segregation.
The second quotation (below) is from the infamous
Commando Order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942: 30
3. From now on all enemies on so-called commando
missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops,
even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform
or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle
or m flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man
Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently
be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be
granted them on principle.
.
.
4. If individual members of such commandos, such as
agents, saboteurs, etc., fall into the hands of the
military forces by some other means, through the police
in occupied territories for instance, they are to be
handed over immediately to the SD
. Any imprisonment
under military guard, in PW stockades for instance, etc.,
is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for
a short time
. .
.
2 9 Laws of War: A Documentary History, vol. 2, pp. 1438-9.30 Ibid., p. 1445.
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failing to' e«£ ^ l3 “' £<~
officers who either have °
t' 311 comnandero and
•
.
n n neglected their Hnf„i^trnctmg the troops about this order, or acted againstthis order where it was to be executed.
We must conclude that while the argument can be
sustained that one should generally obey superior orders,
the mere recognition of possible fallibility of
catastrophic proportions demonstrates that there cannot
be a universal prescription that all orders must always
be obeyed. At a minimum, soldiers have a moral
responsibility to refuse to obey orders which patently
violate the traditions of jus in hello and cannot be
justified by military necessity. Rommel's burning of
Hitler's Commando Order provides a good example of a
military leader exercising this judgment.
One need only recall the defense of war criminals
such as Adolf Eichmann: "
. . . I could feel that the guilt
was not mine, since... the men at the top, the elite, the
popes of the empire, laid down the laws. And I? I had
only to obey." 31 Or statements by officers like Rudolf
Hoess: "I commanded Auschwitz until 1 December 1943, and
estimate that at least 2,500,000 victims were executed
and exterminated there by gassing and burning, and at
least another half million succumbed to starvation and
disease.
. . His explanation: "
. . .the only one and
31 The Eichmann Trial," in Laws of War; A Docutnsntary History, vol.
2
, p. 1646 .
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decisive argument was the strict order and reason given
for it by the Reichsfuhrer Himmler. "32 Such exaitlples make
Huntington's rule utilitarian justification for obedience
indefensible.
Moreover, the Nuremberg trials make it clear that
legal considerations are subordinate to moral ones when
considering the issue of obedience. The most common
defense of the Nazi criminals was that their first duty
was to their national laws—that there can be no higher
authority than the sovereign state. The International
Tribunal, however, ruled that the very essence of the
Nuremberg Charter is that "individuals have international
duties which transcend the national obligations of
obedience imposed by the individual state. He who
violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while
acting in pursuance of the authority of the state, if the
state in authorizing action moves outside its competence
under international law ." 33
Soldiers are judged twice. They are judged based on
the compatibility of their actions with the common good
of their unit or nation; but more importantly, they are
judged based on the compatibility of their actions with
personhood. Thus soldiers also have a moral
32 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before The International Military
Tribunal
,
vol XI (Nuremberg, 1947), Transcript of the Proceedings of
15 April 1946, pp. 401 & 415.
33
"The Nuremberg Judgment," Ibid., p. 941.
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responsibility to disobey orders even legal orders
--when
they prescribe immoral acts.
Nor can duress be used aas a defense for obeying
illegal or immoral orders, unless it can be shown that
there was a direct and immediate danger to one's safety.
In the trial of German military officers of the German
High Command by the Nuremberg Tribunal, the court
noted : 34
crLin^
6
^ 115 ^ 0936 Wh° received obviouslyrim nal orders were placed in a difficult position, butservile compliance with orders clearly criminal for fear
° disadvantage or punishment not immediately
Cannot be ^cognized as defense. To establishthe defense of coercion or necessity in the face ofanger there must be a showing of circumstances such that
a reasonable man would apprehend that he was in suchimminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to
choose the right and refrain from the wrong.
And though both the Geneva and Hague Conventions are
silent on the subject of superior orders, the Nuremberg
Charter and Nuremberg Principles are not. The Nuremberg
Charter states:
Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to
order of his Government or of a superior shall not free
him from responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines thatjustice so requires. 33
34 Ibid., p. 1431.
35 Laws of War: A Documentary History, vol. 1, p. 887.
Principle IV of the Nuremberg Principles prepared by the
International Law Commission for the United Nations General Assembly,
states : The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility
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We must conclude that soldiers are obligated only to
obey orders that are lawful and that prescribe acts which
would be permissible for individuals to do in similar
circumstances were there no legitimate civil authority.
The questions which were unsettled prior to World War II
concerning a soldier's culpability for crimes committed
under orders were settled at Nuremberg. One commentator,
after citing current u. S., British, German, and Soviet
laws on obedience to superior orders and, "after
surveying the relevant provisions of many other national
military codes," concludes that "the principle of
unconditional obedience and of complete freedom from
responsibility for superior orders has all but
disappeared today ." 36 The acceptance of this principle
by most nations, as evidenced by their having
incorporated it into their national laws, is sufficient
to give it status as customary law in the international
community
.
The debate which occurred during the Nuremberg
trials--that there can be no punishment for crimes in the
absence of laws ( Nullem crimen sine lege
,
nulla poena
sine lege ) —could not now be successfully used as a
under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible
to him." Melzer, Concepts of Just War, p. 61.
Lewy, "Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, and Conscience," p. 124.
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defense--even by members of a uy o a nation having national laws
which require universal obedience to all orders.
Obviously this places a greater personal
responsibility on individual officers and soldiers to be
able to determine where the moral and legal boundaries
are in various wartime circumstances. This mandates that
the international laws of war must be promulgated and
understood by those soldiers who are subject to them so
that they can make the kind of moral decisions which the
laws of war require.
Command Responsibility for War Crimes
The question we must now answer is "To what extent
are commanders responsible for the illegal actions of
their subordinates?" This is the inverse case to the
defense of superior orders discussed above. In the case
of a subordinate carrying out a war crime at the
direction of his superior, the only act that the order
giver performs is that of giving the order. The
subordinate, on the other hand, has two components with
which to contend: his obedience to the order and the act
that is prescribed by the order, and it is the latter
that forms the basis for our moral judgments. This might
lead us to conclude that orders are themselves morally
irrelevant--that it is the performance of the act itself
regardless of the existence of an order that provides the
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basis for judging the agent. Understood this way, it
would seem that a commander's responsibility for actions
performed by subordinates is severely limited.
Others might argue that the purpose of prohibiting
superior orders as a defense is not to shift the focus
downward from those who issue the order to those who
execute it; rather it is to implicate all the parties
involved in the commission of criminal acts. We might
formulate this as a principle thus:
MP3. Commanders are responsible for any actionsperformed in accordance with their orders.
Grotius argues that "...to participate in a crime a
person must not only have knowledge of it but also have
the opportunity to prevent it." 37 He adds, however, that
"we may presume that acts which are conspicuous, or
frequent, are easily known, for none can be ignorant of
what is done by many." 38 This would require a revision of
MP3 which would extend command responsibility for crimes
performed by subordinates to include those who fail to
initiate positive action to stop crimes from occurring.
Before we attempt to revise MP3, let's examine some
actual cases. There are two divergent legal precedents
37 Hugo Grotius, Laws of War and Peace, Bk. II, chap. 21, II, 4, p.
524.
38 Ibid, 6, p. 526.
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to work With here, both of which seem to be based on
different interpretations of Grotius.
in December 1945, General Tomoyuki Yamashita was
tried for crimes committed by his soldiers (particularly
those who had occupied Manila) while defending the
Philippines during the U.S. re-invasion. The prosecution
charged that he did not adequately perform his duties as
a commander in that he failed to initiate positive
measures which would have prevented illegal actions by
those assigned to his command. The court's decision
noted:
Assignment to command military troops is accompanied bybroad authority and heavy responsibility. This has beentrue in all armies throughout recorded history. it is
absurd, however, to consider a commander a murderer or
rapist because one of his soldiers commits a murder or a
rape. Nevertheless, where murder and rape and vicious,
revengeful actions are widespread offenses, and there is
no effective attempt by a commander to discover and
control the criminal acts, such a commander may be held
responsible, even criminally libel, for the lawless acts
of his t roops
. . .
.
^
y
General Yamashita was not charged with personally
participating in any acts of atrocity, or even of
condoning them; in fact, it is unlikely that he was even
aware that the atrocities occurred. Nevertheless,
because the acts were so conspicuous and widespread, the
court believed that he should have known about them. He
3 9 The Yamashita Case," in Laws of War: A Documentary History
,
vol
2, p. 1597.
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effective
was therefore convicted of failing to provide
control of his troops and was hanged. 40 Based Qn this
case, MP3 might be revised thus:
MP3
taken appropriate action against those known i-rxhave committed such crimes t0
The second case we will examine is the court-martial
of Captain Ernest Medina, which occurred in September
1971. Soldiers and officers under Captain Medina's
command committed numerous atrocities during assaults on
Vietnam villages. In one village. My Lai, hundreds of
unarmed civilians were murdered and numerous persons were
raped and/or mutilated by members of Medina's company.
The prosecution argued that Medina was in and around the
^7 hai and in continual radio communication
General Yamashita's conviction remains controversial. in adissent ing opinion Justice Murphy noted: "read against the background
° mi events ’• n the Philippines
.. .these charges amount to this:We, the victorious American forces, have done everything possible todestroy and disorganize your lines of communication, your effective
control of your personnel, your ability to wage war. In those
respects we have succeeded. We have defeated and crushed yourforces. And now we charge and condemn you for having beeninefficient in maintaining control of your troops during the period
when we were so effectively besieging and eliminating your forces andblocking your ability to maintain effective control ... .We will judge
the discharge of your duties by the disorganization which we
ourselves created in large part.'" There were also other issues,
such as the excessively hasty trial (3 weeks). Ibid., pp. 1596-1623.
There are numerous books available on the details of the trial.
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with his subordinate elements during the time the
atrocities were committed, and that he failed to take
P oper actions to control his men. Moreover, there was
conflicting evidence as to whether or not Medina had
actually directed that his men destroy everything in the
village or that he had himself intentionally murdered at
least one unarmed women and specifically ordered the
killing of another
.
41 At a minimum, it is certain that
he did not take any positive action to prevent violations
of the laws of war by his subordinates either in advance
or during the operation even though he knew that they
were operating in a civilian community. Nevertheless,
despite the Yamashita precedent, the military judge
provided the following instructions to the jury : 42
[A commander is responsible] if he has actual knowledge
that troops or other persons subject to his control arein the process of committing or are about to commit a war
crime and he wrongfully fails to take the necessary and
reasonable steps to insure compliance with the laws of
war. You will observe that these legal requirements
placed upon a commander require actual knowledge plus a
wrongful failure to act. Thus mere presence at the scene
without knowledge will not suffice.... (my italics)
Based on this guidance, Medina was acquitted
.
42
Medina admitted killing a wounded female but pleaded self-defense
in that he thought she was armed with a grenade. He also admitted to
ordering one of his men to shoot a child, but claimed that it was in
the heat of battle and that he quickly attempted to retract the
order, but that it was too late.
43
"Court Martial of Ernest L. Medina," Ibid., p. 1732.
There are other problems with the Medina case. The Peers
Commission Investigation conducted at the direction of General
Westmoreland and the Secretary of the Army reached the following
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This case implies
than MP3'
.
a principle somewhat different
MP3 A
. Commanders are responsible for war crimes
tW^£ ed by ^hei^ subordinates in cases wheren°w crimes have occurred and take no°n
.
lnvestigate them and act appropriatelyagainst those responsible. ** ^
conclusions (among others) relevant to this case- m Th 0resulted primarily from the nature of the orders Issued hi
massa“®
the chain of command.... (2) On 16 March ... y
persons ln
and platoon level, within soL eleLnt3’V T*murdered noncombatants while under the supervision and control oitheir immediate supervisors. (3) Part of fho . .
inhabitant 3 of Son My Village included individualand"grou^ acts 'oJ
mistreatment * anTTAuTgZTdetainee^“>
°" ™ncombata "ta a "d the
y u d s
. (4) The commanders of Task
of theTnl
Ut
f
h Bri9ade had su t)Stantial knowledge as to the
KithS the DiV •
° noncombatants.... ,5) At every command levelw hin vision, actions were taken, both wittingly and
war o
9 ^ Ch ef£ectivel y suppressed information concerning thecrimes counted at Son My village. (6, At the company level
committed
3 * " tC th* w,r Crimes “hich had
Concerning Captain Medina personally, the Commission reached thefollowing conclusions
:
(1) He planned, ordered, and supervised the execution by his companyof an unlawful operation against inhabited hamlets in Son My Village
which included the destruction of houses by burning, killing oflivestock, and the destruction of crops and other foodstuffs, and theclosing of wells; and impliedly (sic) directed the killing of anypersons found there. (2) There is evidence that he possibly killed as
many as three noncombatants in My Lai. (3) He probably conspired withLieutenant Colonel Barker and others to suppress information
concerning the killing of noncombatants.... (4) He actively
suppressed information.... (5) He failed to report the killings....
(6) He obstructed an inquiry in the killings of civilians.... (7) Hefailed to prevent the killings of suspects.... (8) He gave false
testimony.
. . .
The Peers Commission Report can be found in The My Lai Massacre and
Its Cover-up (New York: The Free Press, 1976). The finding cited
above are on pp. 314-340 of this source.
And finally, Mary McCarthy notes that the acquittal party held in
F. Lee Bailey's (the defense counsel) suite, after the trial, was
attended by the military judge and one of the prosecuting attorneys.
See Medina (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. 81.
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Clearly, the same standard was not applied in each
case. In the case of Yamashita, it is unlikely that he
knew of the atrocities committed by his troops;
nevertheless, he was convicted because he should have
known, and therefore he should have initiated positive
measures to prevent or stop them. In the case of Medina,
it is likely that he knew of the atrocities, and it is
certain that he should of known; nevertheless, it was not
demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that he must
have known of the crimes committed by his officers and
men. The mere possibility that he didn't know of the
widespread atrocities was enough for acquittal.
Oppenheim's International Law states that commanders
may share the responsibility for atrocities committed
against civilian and prisoners. It continues: "Such
responsibility arises, directly and undeniably, when the
acts in question have been committed in pursuance of an
order of the commander concerned, or if he has culpably
failed to take the necessary measures to prevent or
suppress them ." 44 The U. S. interpretation of
international law concerning the responsibility which
commanders have for subordinate actions follows the
Yamashita precedent:
44 International Law, by L. Oppenheim, 7th edition, edited by H.
Lauterpacht (New York: David McKay Company, 1952), p. 572.
307
.. .when troops commit massacres and atrocities against
the civilian population of occupied territory or against
prisoners of war, the responsibility may rest not only
with the actual perpetrators but also with the
commander... The commander is responsible if he has
actual knowledge, or should have knowledge, through
reports received by him or other means, that troops or
other persons subject to his control are about to commit
or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the
necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with
the law of war or to punish violators thereof. (my
italics) 45
Other nations have adopted similar rules. Following
Grotius' argument that one can't claim ignorance of
widespread crimes, the Canadian War Crimes Regulations
state: "where there is evidence that more than one war
crime has been committed by members of a format ion ... the
court may receive that evidence as prima facie evidence
of responsibility of the commander for those crimes ." 46
It seems, then, that the Yamashita case and MP3' best
represent the degree of responsibility that commanders
should have for the actions of their subordinates . 47
Unfortunately, Medina was not tried for violations
of war crimes under either the Nuremberg Principles or
international law. He, like other members of the U. S.
Armed forces who have committed war crimes, was tried by
a military court for violations of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) . This is in keeping with the
4 ^ Department of the Army (Washington D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1956), para. 501, pp . 178-9.
4 ft Oppenheim, International Law, p. 573, n. 2.
47 An important issue that I have not addressed is whether or not
commanders are guilty of the crimes that they order when their orders
are not carried out.
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Geneva Convention which states that because there is not
an international court, nations may either bring those
guilty of war crimes before their own courts, or hand
them over to another nation for prosecution
.
48
I am not convinced that it is hopeless to expect the
military community to prosecute vigorously their own
members for crimes against "outsiders" (i. e . enemy
soldiers and civilians)
, but certainly the procedure is
suspect. Perhaps such cases could be handled with less
bias by a federal court established for that purpose.
In any case, the fact that war crimes are committed
is not an indictment of the laws of war. The failure to
seek out and punish criminals is, however, a serious
indictment of those responsible for maintaining the laws.
In the case of My Lai, the military and political systems
failed. The extent of responsibility which commanders
have for enforcing the laws of war is summed up well in
General Douglass MacArthur's rejection of General
Yamashita's appeal : 49
Rarely has so cruel and wanton a record been spread to
the public gaze. Revolting as this may be in itself, it
pales before the sinister and far-reaching implication
thereby attached to the profession of arms. The soldier,
be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of
the weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason
4 8 Geneva I, Art. 49, Geneva II, Art. 50, Geneva III, Art. 129, and
Geneva IV, Art. 146, in Documents on the Laws of War, ed. by Adam
Roberts and Richard Guelff (New York and London: Oxford University
Press, 1982), pp. 189, 210, 267, & 323, respectively.
49 Laws of War: A Documentary History, vol 2, p. 1598.
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for hl s being. when he violates this sacred trust he not
fabric
hlS entirS CUlt but thre«ens the very
fighting Jnternatlonal society. The traditions of
noblest^ of
9 ^ honorable
' *>«ed open the
T?. human traits—sacrifice
. This
autho
er;*' e
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trUSted WUh 3 high c°™nd involvingonty adequate to his responsibility, has failed this
o
rre
h7s°
a
c r
Standard; has £ailed his dut
^ hi= troop"i ountry, to his enemy, and to mankind; he hasfailed utterly his soldier faith.
If protection of the innocent is one of the
fundamental responsibilities of soldiers, then it is not
enough for a commander to simply react to violations of
the laws of war; he must also take positive steps to
prevent violations before they occur. Based on the
detailed prohibitions against acts which would harm or
endanger innocents which comprise the bulk of the Geneva
and Hague Conventions, it is reasonable to conclude that
insuring their protection is one of the primary
responsibilities of Commanders under international law.
Moreover, the references to chivalry in both U. S. Army
and Air Force documents pertaining to the law of war
provide additional emphasis to this responsibility for U.
S. officers. We can conclude that commanders who do not
take action to prevent war crimes from occurring, or to
apprehend and punish those who commit war crimes,
themselves share in the culpability for them.
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CHAPTER 10
MILITARY NECESSITY AND REPRISALS
In our previous discussions we noted that part of
the reason why nations have been remiss in prosecuting
those who commit war crimes is that the laws prohibiting
certain actions in war— such as those against intentional
killing of innocents contain so many caveats that it is
often impossible for soldiers to determine whether or not
such acts are crimes in particular situations. The two
issues that create the most difficulty in this regard are
military necessity and reprisals. in this chapter we
will examine these doctrines to determine how they might
reasonably be modified so that soldiers acting under
orders will be able to distinguish illegal acts from
legal ones.
Military Necessity
There is a tension between what the Germans call
Kriegsraison, or the logic of war, and Kriegsmanier
,
or
the customs of war. Sometimes this tension is referred
to as a dialectic between military objectives on one hand
and humanitarian principles or the demands of
civilization on the other. We have been referring to
these opposites as jus in bello principles and military
necessity. Historically, the tension has always yielded
to military necessity.
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Military necessity' should not be confused with
'necessities of war.' The latter refers to the suffering
and hardship-in both the military and civilian
populations—that is an inevitable by-product of the
resort to force as a means of resolving political issues.
this sense it is a descriptive expression that
reflects an inevitable aspect of the use of force.
'Military necessity,' on the other hand, specifically
addresses the tension inherent in attempting to minimize
suffering through rules while at the same time employing
a method (violence) which necessarily causes suffering.
We previously noted briefly the distinction between the
necessities of war and military necessity found in the
work of Vitoria. Recall that in his discussion of the
protection of innocents Vitoria added the caveat that "it
is right, in virtue of collateral circumstances, to slay
the innocent
... [otherwise] war could not be waged against
even the guilty." Grotius' formulation of the issue
places greater emphasis on the protection of innocents,
and he argues that care must be taken to prevent the
death of innocents "except for reasons that are weighty
and will affect the safety of many."
More recently, 'military necessity' has been used to
refer to a justification for setting aside or overriding
the jus in bello principles found in the laws of war for
the sake of military objectives. In Lieber's Code, for
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example, consequentialist justifications for violating
the sanctity of innocents receive considerable emphasis
under the rubric of 'military necessity.' Lieber writes:
"Military necessity does not admit of cruelty.
. .and does
include any act of hostility which makes the return
to peace unnecessarily difficult -”i m every instance
Where he addresses the protection of the innocent,
however, he includes a caveat
:
The principle has been more and more acknowledged thatthe unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, propertyand honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.
2
...the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed inis private relations as the commander of the hostileforce can afford to grant in the overruling demand of a
viaorous war 3
Military necessity admits of all direct destruction oflife or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whosedestruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed
contests of war. [All the italics are mine.]
These passages--which seem to relegate humanitarian
principles to the status of ideals--were influential in
the development of subsequent international documents. 5
The Preamble to the 1907 Hague (IV) Convention states
that signatories shall abide by "these provisions, the
Francis Lieber, Francis Lieber and the Laws of War, ed. by Richard
Shelly Hartigan (Chicago: Precedent, 1984), p. 48.
2 Ibid., p. 49.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 48.
5 For later examples of references to military necessity see Hague IV
(1907), Article XXII, & Geneva IV (1949), Article CXLVII, in The
Laws of War: A Documentary History, pp. 318 & 690, respectively.
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wording of which has been inspired by the desire to
diminish the evils of war, as far as military
requirements permit .”6 Even the Nuremberg Principles,
formulated by the International Law Commission at the
request of the United Nations General Assembly, includes
a similar caveat in its discussion of what constitutes a
war crime:
VI ( b) War Crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of
war which include but are not limited to, murder, ill-
treatment or deportation to slave-labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities,
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity. 1 (my italics)
In the absence of any specific criteria for
assessing when military necessity might legitimately be
invoked, Grotius' emphatic declaration that "Advantage
does not confer the same right as necessity" might be
interpreted as a plea rather than a mandate; and in any
case, it is certainly too vague to serve as a practical
guide. Under existing international and national laws
the prohibition against harming innocents may be
subjectively set aside for the purpose of military
advantage
,
or even military convenience. Moreover, there
6 Ibid., p. 309.
7 • •
"Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, " reproduced
and discussed in Concepts of Just War, Yehuda Melzer (Leyden: A. W.
Sijthoff, 1975), pp. 88-93.
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IS no distinction made between military necessity in
terms of tactical, strategic, or political objectives.
Understood this way, military necessity amounts to a
claim that certain crimes are justified on no other basis
than they might contribute in some way to military
objectives. When this is considered in light of our
earlier discussion concerning a soldier's responsibility
to obey lawful orders and to disobey unlawful ones, the
problem becomes even more profound because any action
imaginable might on some occasion be legal based on
military necessity. And as we noted in the last chapter,
this makes it virtually impossible for soldiers to know
with any surety whether certain orders they might receive
are lawful or not. This is inadequate. If the just war
tradition is going to function as a viable set of legally
enforceable rules, the principle of military necessity
must be more precisely defined and its relationship to
other principles clearly articulated in law . 8
0 Colonel Anthony Hartle argues that there are two humanitarian
principles reflected in the laws of war. The first, a deontological
principle (HP1) states that "individual persons deserve respect as
such." The second, a consequent ialist principle (HP2 ) , states:
"Human suffering ought to be minimized." Hartle argues that in
international law HP1 is more fundamental than HP2; i.e. only when
the first is satisfied will the second be applied. I am convinced
that Colonel Hartle is entirely correct. My analysis differs from
his in that his concerns the operative considerations inherent in the
humanitarian principles, while my concern is the relationship between
humanitarian principles and military objectives. See
"Humanitarianism and the Laws of War," Philosophy 61 (1986): 109-115.
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Our mission, then, is twofold. We must examine the
notion of military necessity to determine those
conditions where it might provide sufficient
justification for overriding certain humanitarian laws.
Second, we will want to specify which, if any, jus in
bello laws are indefeasible even in light of military
necessity. Our objective is to mark the boundaries where
military necessity may legitimately be invoked with
vivid, patently identifiable borders that can serve as
guideposts for soldiers and officers who subjectively
perceive themselves to be fighting the battle of
Armageddon. These legally enforceable guidelines must
spell out specific, objective criteria for determining
when instances of military necessity obtain.
The most problematic aspect of the tension between
military necessity and the just conduct of war, and the
one on which we will focus our discussion, is the
question of when innocent persons may be killed or
endangered in order to achieve some military objective.
I will proceed under the assumption that human beings
have a strong obligation not intentionally to harm
innocent persons. The issue facing us is to determine
when, if ever, a soldier's duties override this
obligation. If we can determine the necessary and
sufficient conditions for when innocents can be
intentionally attacked and perhaps killed based on
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military necessity, we will have addressed the most
problematic and extreme case. Let's begin, then, with a
brief review of who might be considered "innocent" in
war, as well as the basis for distinguishing innocents
from other categories of persons such as civilians,
combatants and noncombatants.
wartime, combatants are those who are either
directly or indirectly involved in attacking one
belligerent nation's constituents on behalf of another
nation or political group. The term 'combatants' refers
primarily to the members of the armed forces, but can
include certain political leaders who are engaged in
planning and carrying out the war effort as well as
civilians who are working on behalf of the armed forces.
Shopkeepers, farmers, and other members of what Grotius
refers to as the "peaceable population" are not
considered combatants, even though they may pay taxes and
even approve of the belligerent actions of their
government. Any civilians who are directly involved in
the war effort, on the other hand, such as those working
in munitions factories or manning radar sites, are
considered combatants and are subject to being attacked,
even though they have not performed any action that might
cause them to be considered guilty for having committed
some wrong. Nor can soldiers be considered guilty simply
for fighting on behalf of their nation, even if the war
317
itself is an unjust one, because (as we concluded in
Chapter Seven) soldiers are always presumed to be
shrouded in invincible ignorance as far as jus ad bellum
is concerned. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that
combatants are subject to attack by opposing combatants.
The justification, then, for soldiers intentionally
inflicting harm on one another cannot be based on their
mutual guilt; it must derive from some other basis.
Likewise, the conventional use of the term
'innocent' (i.e. anyone who is not guilty is innocent) is
problematic when applied to soldiers because it is
generally accepted that there is at least a prima facie
obligation not intentionally to harm innocents. One
might argue that if soldiers are not guilty, then they
are innocent; and if they are innocent, then they should
not be intentionally harmed. But of course, it is
permissible intentionally to harm enemy soldiers. Thus
we must conclude that the prima facie obligation not to
harm intentionally persons who are innocent (where all
those who are not guilty are innocent), is inappropriate
when applied to soldiers . 9 We will return to the reasons
for this shortly.
9 This point is made persuasively and discussed in detail by Jeffrie
G. Murphy, "The Killing of the Innocent," in The Monist 57, no. 4
(1973)
,
reprinted in War, Morality, and the Military Profession, ed.
by Malham M. Wakin (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), pp.
343-369.
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But while the notions of guilt and innocence are not
applicable to soldiers who are carrying out public
policy—they might apply to the officials who formulate
such policies soldiers can be guilty or innocent in
terms of the means they use in performing their soldierly
duties. For example, soldiers can be guilty of war
crimes when they violate the laws that govern the means
that can legally be employed in warfare. Nevertheless,
neither 'guilt' nor ’innocent' seem to be suitable terms
in discussing the combatant-noncombatant
distinction
.
Perhaps if we can determine the
justification for combatants intentionally harming one
another this will help us distinguish those who are
legitimate targets from those who should not be attacked.
Recall from our discussion of Grotius that a state's
right to engage in hostilities is grounded in the
fundamental individual right to defend one's own person,
one's property, and one's family or communal group from
unjust predation. (Grotius would call this a law of
nature.) It is permissible for communities and states to
use force in self-defense, and many nations have fixed
the responsibility for doing so in the office of the
soldier. Soldiers act as agents of their state in
exercising the state's right of self-defense. Because a
state's right to self-defense is derived from the rights
of individual citizens and families, soldiers cannot
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perform any action on behalf of their state that would be
an individual to perform in his or her own
In other words, the principle of self-defense
is not unlimited— at a minimum, it is limited by the
prohibition against intentionally harming innocent by-
standers in order to protect oneself. And because it is
defense that is the basis for violence done in wartime,
there is no justification for intentionally harming those
who are not involved in attempting to harm others
.
11
With these considerations in mind, it is more appropriate
to refer to the distinction between those who may be
attacked and those who are protected under the
10 Grotius ^gues that a sovereign's authority over his subjects is
limited in that he can not perform or order any actions that violate
natural law. John Locke develops the same idea more precisely. In
his discussion of the "extent of legislative powers," he argues that
it is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives
and fortunes of the people. For it being but the joynt power of
every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly,
which is legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a
state of nature before they enter'd into society, and gave up to the
community. For no body can transfer to another more power than he
has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over
himself, or any other.
. . having in the state of nature no arbitrary
power over the life liberty, or possession of another, but only so
much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself
and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the
commonwealth, .. so that the legislative can have no more than this."
Two Treatises of Government
,
with an introduction and notes by Peter
Laslett (New American Library, New York, 1963), Bk II, 135, pp. 402-
3.
11 Murphy notes that it is not necessary that enemy combatants be
sincerely engaged in trying to kill an opponent in order to justify
self-defense; it is reasonable to believe that individual enemy
combatants are so engaged, and that is sufficient grounds to kill
them in self-defense. The domestic example that parallels this is
the police officer who shoots a person in self-defense only to find
out that the weapon the victim was brandishing was a fake. "The
Killing of the Innocent," p. 347.
wrong for
defense
.
10
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humanitarian laws of war as a distinction between
combatant and noncombatant rather than between guilty and
innocent. Furthermore, it is important to note that
these are wartime distinctions; the role of combatant
comes into existence simultaneously with a state of war.
During peacetime even professional soldiers are not
properly considered combatants because they are not
imbued with the authority to act on behalf of their
society in inflicting harm on others. A soldier acquires
the right to use violence on behalf of the members of his
community only by political authority; and indeed, he has
the duty to do so for the safety of his constituents.
Despite these considerations favoring the use of the
terms 'combatant' and 'noncombatant' in wartime, many
commentators, some whose work we will discuss below, use
the term innocent' to refer specifically to any persons
protected from attack under the jus in hello tradition.
Additionally, prisoners of war and "protected persons,"
although they represent distinct categories in that they
are not considered either combatants or noncombatants
under international law, are often referred to as
noncombatants or innocents in the literature. For
purposes of our discussion, then, we will only make a
single broad distinction: we will use the term
'combatant' to refer to those opponents who can
justifiably be attacked in wartime, and the terms
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' innocent
' and 'noncombatant
' interchangeably to refer to
all those categories of persons who are protected from
attack under international law. what we will not
presume, however, is that all who are not guilty are
innocent because soldiers are both not guilty and still
subject to attack. Where special considerations are
required, such as in discussions which rely on the
particular rights afforded to prisoners of war or
ambassadors, I will specify the category of noncombatants
under discussion and the relevant rights particular to
that group under international law.
Finally, before we tackle military necessity, I want
to identify two humanitarian precepts that seem to be at
the heart of both jus ad helium and jus in hello. I'm
going to refer to these as precepts because they seem
more specific than moral principles such as "all persons
deserve respect" and "human suffering ought to be
minimized, " and yet, they also seem too timeless and
universal to be called rules or laws. They are, I
believe, examples of what Cicero, Ambrose, Augustine,
Vitoria, and Grotius would call "natural laws" or innate
dispositions. In any case, I believe that these precepts
do identify universal human dispositions, and will refer
to them as humanitarian precepts.
HP ^ . No one should intentionally harm innocent persons.
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HP2
'
°r "L
3retir 3 obli9ated b° protect innocentpersons from harm.
Of course, those who violate are not innocent
and may be harmed in self-defense or in retribution. The
more interesting and problematic case is when and HP 2
come into conflict. Let's first illustrate this with a
domestic example and then see if this helps us to
understand how these precepts aid us in thinking about
military conflicts.
Imagine that a construction worker is about to dump
a quantity of enormous slabs of granite into a narrow
pit. From your vantage point you see that a large group
of students on a field trip has climbed across a "no
tresspassing" boundary and is exploring the pit. You
conclude that many of them are sure to be crushed unless
you stop the worker, who knows nothing of the kids'
presence. The only means available to you is to shoot at
the worker with a small caliber rifle you have in your
pickup, thereby wounding him before he carries out his
task. You cannot simply execute a near miss because
there is so much noise that he will not be aware of the
shot unless it hits him.
The salient features of the example are that the
person effecting the harm to the innocent children does
not know that he is doing it, and if you conform to HP^
you violate HP2 and vice versa.
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This helps us to understand military examples
because soldiers are presumed to be possessed of
"invincible ignorance" as far jus ad helium is concerned-
-i.e. even though they know that they are inflicting harm
on others
,
they always believe that they are justified in
so doing. Soldiers do not attempt to harm enemy
combatants because they believe them to be guilty, but
because they believe that enemy combatants must be
stopped in order to protect innocent members of their own
community
.
12
Even political leaders who order their armed forces
into combat are motivated by a desire to protect their
own innocent constituents rather than to harm others.
The very act of declaring a state of war entails changing
the status of a group of soldiers, citizens, and
potential conscripts from innocents or noncombatants to
combatants who are subject to attack. Thus the act of
declaring war entails intentionally putting certain
innocent members of one's own community in harm's way,
thereby violating HP^, in order to protect other
innocents, thereby conforming to HP2. Now to various
12
I realize that there is a dis-analogy between the domestic example
and the military one, but the relevant factors seem to me to be
identical. Perhaps one could construct a case where the "ignorant
person" who is inflicting harm knows he is harming others but
nevertheless believes it to be justified. Perhaps a primitive tribe
that is about to sacrifice a group of sociologists at the command of
their local gods might be stopped by shooting one of the tribal
leaders, etc.
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versions of military necessity and how they relate to HP X
and HP 2
.
Military Necessity and Reducing Risks
Sheldon Cohen proposes certain guidelines for
military necessity. He writes: "The notion of 'military
necessity' lends itself to abuse, but every use of it is
not abusive. It is not being abused if the alternative
is to ask more of troops than we have any right to ask of
anyone or than anyone can deliver ." 13 The limits he
proposes are best understood in terms of his own example:
The law of war implies that soldiers are not obliged to
raise their already high risks to even higher levels in
order to lower further the risk to innocents in combat
zones. ...the rights of innocents are defeasible when
honoring those rights would push the soldiers' risk
beyond what it is reasonable to expect any group to
endure. The rule is, I suggest, that the attacker may,
given the presence of innocents in a combat zone, do
anything that it would be permissible to do if there were
no innocents there—subject to the restrictions entailed
by the principle of proportionality. This rules out
discriminatory (selective) attacks on innocents but
allows the indiscriminate shelling or bombing of defended
• •
. 14areas containing innocents.
Cohen wants to set limits on the amount of risk it
is reasonable to expect a soldier to take. He sees
limiting a soldier's risk as the criterion for when
military necessity might be invoked to justify setting
1 *3
, ,Arms and Judgment: Law, Morality, and the Conduct of War in the
Twentieth Century, Sheldon M. Cohen (Boulder, San Francisco, &
London: Westview Press, 1989) p. 32.
14 Ibid., p. 33.
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aside the laws of war. Stated as a conceptual theory
Cohen's position on military necessity seems to read:
MN-
* £
e
^
ain action is justified by military necessityiff its performance will reduce the risk to one'sown soldier' s lives and no alternative action will
result in less risk to their lives.
One difficulty with his account is that it does not
acknowledge that part of what it means to be a soldier is
taking risks. The problem with MN1 is best understood in
terms of an example.
During the Korean War, North Korean units would hide
among groups of civilian women and children and force
them to advance toward American positions at bayonet
point. American conscripts manning the forward positions
saw themselves faced with two alternatives: attack the
soldiers using either artillery or small arms fire, or
withdraw from their positions. The former choice would
result in numerous civilian deaths; the latter, the loss
of key defensive terrain. Certainly any other action
would substantially increase the risk to U. S. troops.
In this case, if the defensive positions were crucial to
the mission, one might argue that military necessity
justified an artillery barrage against the enemy troops.
The principle of double effect could be used to excuse
the inadvertent, unintended, and proportional civilian
deaths. Any civilian casualties, one could argue, would
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be the fault of those who placed them in harm's way to
begin with.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that both
alternatives are based on the assumption that no action
should be taken which would "unnecessarily" increase the
risk to American soldiers' lives. In order to appreciate
the more reasonable alternatives we need only remove the
assumed premise concerning the sanctity of soldier's
lives. Once we accept that it is part of the ethos of
the soldier to behave courageously and to protect
innocents, even at the risk of his own life, then it
becomes clear that it is the civilians' lives which must
be safeguarded, not the soldiers'
. In this case, for
example, the men could close with the enemy/civilian
formation and use bayonets to engage the combatants.
While all widely accepted moral theories require
some degree of impartiality or objectivity in choosing
between alternatives, the risk to the lives of combatants
should not be weighed equally against the risk to the
lives of noncombatants because it is in the nature of the
soldier to take risks--risking one's life is part of what
it means to be a soldier. To take the position that
minimizing the risk to soldiers is the basis for choosing
among alternatives undermines the very notion of
distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants. An
analogous domestic example might be to hire a police
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officer to prevent crime and to limit his duty to times
and/or places where there was little crime so that he
would not be put at risk; or to hire a bodyguard for
protection in the city and then to stay home so that the
body guard would not be endangered.
Still, the principle of impartiality applies within
the class of noncombatants. Although soldiers do not
have the same positive duty (HP2) to protect innocents
among the enemy population as they have to protect their
own population, they most certainly do have the same
obligation not to intentionally harm innocents regardless
of their national affiliation. This is because all human
beings--including soldiers--have a moral duty not to
intentionally harm innocent persons (HP^)
. There is no
similar universal moral duty that obligates all persons
to risk their lives to protect innocents. Soldiers,
however, do have a duty to protect others, and because
they acquire this duty from the individual right of self-
defense that is assigned to them from the members of the
society they are defending, the duty obligates only on
behalf of the constituents of that society. As Augustine
noted, humans have some duties in virtue of their
personhood, and some in virtue of their societal roles . 15
In sum, all soldiers have a like moral duty to
refrain from intentionally harming innocents regardless
15 See my discussion of this in Chapter Five, esp. pp. 117-8.
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of nationality, and they also have a moral duty to
protect the members of the society that are the raison d'
etre for their being soldiers. Of these, the former is
the more fundamental duty because it is a universal duty
common to all humans. When one assumes the role of
soldier one doesn't give up one's fundamental human
obligations. Moreover, social roles are merely
expedients whereby individual rights and duties are
collected in particular individuals in virtue of their
office. It follows that the parameters of permissible
behavior one acquires in virtue of a particular office
can never exceed the individual rights and duties of
those that bring the office into existence by assigning
certain of their personal rights to it. In this case,
because the right to self-defense is not absolute in that
one cannot sacrifice innocents to protect oneself, the
soldier must function under a similar constraint.
Undoubtedly, the most controversial aspect of this
position is the contention that no distinction should be
made between one's own innocents and those who are
citizens of an enemy nation. One might respond that the
domestic analogy justifies preferential treatment for the
members of one's own community in the same way that it is
reasonable for one to give preferential treatment to
one's family. This is true as a positive duty. There
is, however, an important difference between preferential
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treatment for one group over another, and sacrificing one
group to save another. if attacked by a wild beast, a
parent might well protect her family first even though
this would mean leaving others unprotected. She would
not be justified, however, in throwing the members of
another family to the beast in order to keep it away from
her own.
One troubling aspect of MNX is that the soldier's
right to safety becomes more fundamental than anyone
else' s including the very persons his office is created
to protect! The following example points to the
ludicrous consequences that are possible given this
formulation
.
Imagine that you are a member of an infantry rifle
squad which is surrounded, low on ammunition, and under
siege by an overwhelmingly superior force. Suppose that
the only way to escape is to force a nearby group of
innocent women and children to act as a shield and to
lead you and your men through a minefield to safety at
gunpoint. Suppose, further, that there is reason to
believe that if you surrender you will be murdered. Does
military necessity excuse endangering civilian lives to
facilitate your escape ? 16 Using Cohen's reasoning, a
16 One's belief that the enemy will behave criminally is not
relevant to the case. The possibility that another will act
criminally toward you does not justify your criminal actions toward a
third party.
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soldier might conclude that any action which can
substantially reduce the danger to his own life is
justified.
Note that in our example, the distinction between
military necessity and military advantage cannot be
determined from the soldier's point of view, primarily
because combat is characterized by scenarios which are
life threatening and extraordinary. Let's fill out a few
more details to the above situation which help point this
out
.
Now suppose that the scenario I've described above
is taking place in Virginia and that the innocent women
and children, as well as the soldiers who are surrounded,
are all U. S. citizens. There is, after all, no good
argument for distinguishing between innocents, all of
whom are the victims of war, on the basis of their
nationality. In this context, Cohen's argument would
justify U. S. soldiers putting the lives of U. S.
citizens at risk in order to reduce the risk to their own
lives. This is, of course, contrary to the very purpose
for which military forces are maintained, which is to
protect the civilian population. As Grotius reminds us,
while the basis for the resort to arms is self-defense,
this is not an absolute right--one does not have the
right to kill innocent persons against their will in
order to preserve oneself. Because Cohen does not pay
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sufficient attention to the logical basis for the resort
to force, he fails to recognize the limits of the amount
of force that may reasonably be employed. Hence, his
argument that military necessity may be invoked to reduce
risk to combatants, improperly subordinates the
humanitarian principles of Kriegsmanier or jus in bello
to tactical considerations. MN^ must be rejected.
Military Necessity and the Necessity of Success
Telford Taylor attempts to solve the problem of when
soldiers may invoke military necessity by completely
subordinating jus in bello to military objectives.
Referring to the humanitarian aspects of the laws of war,
he writes
:
These requirements [the laws of war] are followed more
often than not, and for that reason millions are alive
today who would otherwise be dead. But they are not
infrequently violated; the rules read like absolute
requirements, but circumstances arise where military
necessity, or even something less, cause them to be
disregarded. In the heat of combat, soldiers who are
frightened, angered, shocked at the death of comrades,
and fearful of treacherous attacks by enemies feigning
death or surrender, are often prone to kill rather than
capture. Under quite different circumstances, the
killing may be done in cold blood, by order of humane
commanders. Small detachments on special missions, or
accidentally cut off from their main force, may take
prisoners under such circumstances that men cannot be
spared to guard them or take them to the rear, and that
to take them along would greatly endanger the success of
the mission or the safety of the unit. The prisoners
will be killed, by operation of the principle of military
necessity, and no military or other court has been called
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upon, so far as I am aware, to declare such killing a warcrime. 11 (my italics)
Taylor provides two independently sufficient reasons
for setting aside the jus in bello rules: safety and
success. Since we have already determined in our
previous discussion that the safety of one's soldiers is
not a sufficient justification for setting aside the
rules of war, it remains for us to examine the second of
Taylor's criteria: mission success. Taylor's "necessity
of success principle might be stated in this manner:
MN2
. An action is justified by military necessity if it
will contribute to the success of the mission.
One interesting aspect of Taylor's position is that
he does not offer any arguments on behalf of military
necessity. Instead, he assumes that military necessity
should always override the laws of war, and presents
arguments concerning why we should continue to accept and
promulgate the laws of war in light of their sterility.
He states that although the laws of war are frequently
violated, and even though such violations are justified
based on either military necessity or simply the awful
realities of combat, the laws of war are still useful for
two reasons. It is worthwhile for us to examine these
1
7
Telford Taylor, Nuremburg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (Random
House: New York, 1970), reprinted as Chapter 24, "War Crimes" in War,
Morality, and the Military Profession, ed. by Malham M. Wakin
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 426.
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two justifications for the laws of war because they
provide us insights into how Taylor understands the
relationship between these laws and military necessity.
In his own words:
Violated or ignored as they often are, enough of the
rules are observed enough of the time so that mankind is
very much better off with them than without them if
it were not regarded as wrong to bomb military hospitals,
they would be bombed all of the time instead of some of
the time ....
[and the laws of war] are necessary to diminish the
corrosive effect of mortal combat on the participants....
Unless troops are trained and required to draw the
distinction between military and nonmilitary killing, and
to retain such respect for the value of life that
unnecessary death and destruction will continue to repel
them, they may lose the sense for that distinction for
the rest of their lives. The consequence would be that
many returning soldiers would be potential murderers. 18
The latter of Taylor's two consequent ialist
justifications for the laws of war is that they are
necessary so that soldiers will be able to distinguish
legal killing on behalf of the state from illegal killing
done for selfish reasons. This seems troublesome,
however, in light of his earlier discussion (quoted on
the previous page) of justifications for violating the
laws of war which included the heat of combat, fear,
anger, and shock, as well as military necessity. If one
is justified in violating national and international laws
as a result of such reasoning in wartime, this would seem
to encourage violations of similar laws for similar
18 Ibid., p. 429.
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reasons in peacetime. Indeed, almost any alternative
would support Taylor' s consequence of reducing the
"corrosive effect of mortal combat" more than the one he
defends. For example, it would be more persuasive to
argue either that in wartime the laws operative in civil
society cease to apply and a different set of absolute
laws is in effect, or that war is characterized by the
absence of rules, than it is for Taylor to argue that in
wartime there are rules against certain actions (such as
intentionally killing innocents) but that these can be
overridden on the basis of anger, fear, the heat of
battle, mission success, or the safety of friendly
soldiers. I can't imagine any policy that would be more
pervasive to a wanton disregard for the law than the one
Taylor justifies by appealing to a need to teach respect
for the law. Indeed, Taylor's own argument supports a
much stronger regard for the laws of war than the one he
advocates
.
His second justification for the laws of war is that
they reduce suffering. If there were no such laws, he
argues, there would be increased suffering.
Nevertheless, he makes it clear that any suffering that
contributes significantly to military success is
justified. The only suffering, then, that is prevented
by the laws of war, according to Taylor, is that which
does not contribute significantly to military success.
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But even this seems questionable given Taylor's earlier
contention that the laws of war may be set aside because
of anger. fear, the heat of battle. and so on. This
would seem to make the humanitarian dimension of the
"laws" of war not laws at all, but merely a set of
voluntary guidelines. Moreover it is difficult, given
Taylor s perspective, to distinguish between military
necessity and military advantage. In fact his discussion
seems to make the humanitarian dimension of the laws of
war entirely defeasible in the name of military
advantage
.
This view is especially troublesome given Taylor's
background as the Chief U. S. Prosecutor at the Nuremberg
trials. Before we explore some additional difficulties
with Taylor's position, we should perhaps note that the
view I have attributed to him is one that has often been
defended in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, and that
the text from which I have taken the above quotations is
Taylor's critical analysis of U. S. actions in Vietnam.
This is relevant to our discussion because the Vietnam
War was characterized by a lack of distinction between
friendly and enemy territory and between combatants and
noncombatants. Those prosecuting the war believed that
the rules that had worked in the wars of Europe and in
Korea--wars where enemy and friendly forces and territory
were clearly delineated--were no longer practical in a
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guerrilla war, and they blamed this on the guerrillas.
Another well known commentator on the Vietnam War notes
the many problems for the jus in bello tradition that
resulted from the new tactics and concludes:
U. S. violations of the jus in bello were in substantial
measure the result of deliberate Communist policies of
using the populations as a shield. Often it was
impossible to get at the enemy without risking
disproportionate indiscriminate actions. 19
And Paul Ramsey, specifically addressing U. S.
actions in Vietnam, argues that guerrillas who fight
between and behind women and children are themselves
responsible for any innocent deaths, not the
counterguerrillas who have no choice of battlefield. He
goes on to note: "To draw any other conclusion would be
like, at the nuclear level, granting an enemy immunity
from attack because he had the shrewdness to locate his
missile basis in the heart of his cities ." 20
In each case these writers are proposing that the
military community had no choice but to set aside the
principles of jus in bello on the basis of military
necessity. Their argument is that if winning requires us
to set aside the humanitarian principles of jus in bello,
IQ This brief quotation from p. 123 of The Conduct of Just and
Limited War does not reflect the detailed and insightful analysis of
the Vietnam debacle which O'brien provides in this work. William V.
O'brien, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981).
20 The Just War: Force and Personal Responsibility (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 437.
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then we should set them aside. Each of these writers
seems to advocate a version of necessity of success
argument in MN2 . Now let's see why MN2 provides a poor
justification for overriding the laws of war.
There are certain difficulties inherent in MN2
simply because of the various ways one might define
success. For example, one might argue that there is a
correlation between the likelihood of success and the
number of friendly casualties; i. e., the fewer soldiers
one side loses in a mission relative to enemy losses, the
greater is that side's chance of success. This, however,
takes us back to the previous argument that any actions
which reduce the risk to U. S. lives are justified under
military necessity— a position we've already shown to be
untenable
.
The most problematic aspect of this ambiguity is
that success can be defined in terms of tactical,
strategic, or political objectives. Thus the necessity
of success principle would allow soldiers at every level
to ignore the rules of war in order to be successful.
But as we noted in earlier discussions, it is unlikely
that soldiers have the rightful authority to condemn
innocents to death under any circumstances, and certainly
not on behalf of some tactical objective that is only
contextually "necessary." Permitting soldiers at each
level to set aside the rules because of a subjective
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assessment of how doing so might contribute to success is
almost the same as doing away with the rules altogether.
The oft quoted remark by an Army major after U. S. air
force attacks had destroyed the village of Ben Tre with
heavy civilian casualties— "It was necessary to destroy
the town to save it"—exemplifies the "necessity of
success" reasoning
.
21
One of the most serious problems for the prosecution
of the Vietnam war was that military success was often
defined entirely in terms of "body count" without any
relationship to the political objectives which were the
raison d' etre for the resort to violence. This is
especially troublesome in light of the
fundamental obligations that dictate the parameters of a
soldier's charter. Certainly soldiers have a duty to
protect those innocents on behalf of whom they are
fighting. In the Vietnam War these were the people of
South Vietnam. In fact, it seems obvious to me that
American soldiers in Vietnam had the same obligation to
protect South Vietnamese innocents (HP2) that they would
have had to protect U. S. innocents had they been
fighting in theUnited States.
Second, American soldiers in Vietnam had the same
obligation not to intentionally harm any innocents--
21 Quoted by Taylor in Vietnam and Nuremberg, p. 169. Taylor cites
the 7 February 1968 edition of the New York Post as the source for
this quotation.
339
friendly or "enemy" that they would have had if they had
been fighting in the U. S. or in any allied country in
Europe or the Western Hemisphere (HP^
. m view of these
precepts, it is certain that for commanders and platoon
leaders and squad leaders, success must be defined in
terms of both the military objectives and the weans
employed to attain them
. And of these two, the military
objectives and the means, it is the latter that is the
more fundamental at the tactical and even strategic level
because these principles provide the basis for creating
the office of soldiers in the first place. It is
co^t radictory to create the office of soldier in order to
enforce certain moral prescriptions and prohibitions and
to then permit those filling this office to violate these
same prescriptions and prohibitions as their means of
enforcing them!
Yet another problem for the necessity of success
view is that if we accept the argument that success
justifies setting aside the humanitarian laws of war,
then in every battle of every war only one side--the
winning one--will be obligated by these laws! The losing
side will always be justified in invoking military
necessity under Taylor's necessity of success account.
Of course, this is ridiculous. We have no choice but to
conclude that soldiers do not have the authority to
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intentionally harm innocents. Hence MN 2 will not suffice
as a theory for military necessity.
An alternative way to understand the relationship of
the laws of war to military objectives is to view the
laws as absolute prescriptions that are never defeasible.
Let's examine the arguments of one well-known philosopher
who defends this view.
The Absolutist Position
Thomas Nagel, in defending an absolutist argument
for the principles of jus in bello, describes the dilemma
as a moral blind alley," and rejects military necessity
as a justification for setting aside the rules.
In situations of deadly conflict, particularly where a
weaker party is threatened with annihilation or
enslavement by a stronger one, the argument for resort to
atrocities can be powerful, and the dilemma acute. There
may exist principles, not yet codified, which would
enable us to resolve such dilemmas. But then again there
may not.^2
Nagel's frustration at the "dilemma" is reminiscent
of Augustine's lamentation that we are often faced with
alternatives each of which seem to entail evil
22
"War and Massacre," in War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1974) p. 23.
I'm not sure that Professor Nagel ever held the views which I
attribute to him, and I'm even less sure that he holds them now. In
a recent lecture to a group of prospective army officers at the
United States Military Academy, Professor Nagel advised his audience
that often there aren't rules to which one can always turn for the
right guidance in difficult situations. Once all the considerations
on all sides of a difficult choice have been identified, the final
decision will still amount to a matter of judgment.
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consequences
.
Grotius, too. notes that there are
situations where evil may result no matter what one does.
But where Augustine counsels that moral agents keep their
intentions pure and answer their calling, and Grotius
advises that in such situations the lesser evil assumes
the character of the good, Nagel balks: "...it is naive
to suppose that there is a solution to every moral
problem with which the world can face us. We have always
known that the world is a bad place. It appears that it
may be an evil place as well ." 23
We might liken Nagel's assessment that the world is
an evil place to Hamlet's lamentation regarding the state
of Denmark, and although we may sympathize with Nagel's
assessment of the difficulty with moral choices in such a
world, it is likely that his solution would fare as
poorly in wartime as Hamlet's does in Shakespeare's play.
Certainly the moral principles which are manifested as
rules in the laws of war represent key, even crucial,
terrain; and it may very well be that we should often
defend them to the death. Nevertheless, there may arise
situations where this terrain must be abandoned in order
to defend other important positions
—
positions which
could affect the safety of thousands of innocents.
It is just this type of assumption that justifies
the resort to war in the first place, an assumption which
23 ibid., p. 24.
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Nagel seems to accept. Once one accepts that there may
be scenarios where the outcome is so important, the
alternatives so heinous, that the intentional expenditure
of human life is justified in order to gain a particular
result, then one has already committed oneself to some
type of consequential! st analysis.
Nagel argues that it is naive to believe that there
is a solution to every moral problem; what he means is
that in human affairs there is not a perfect solution to
every problem. But that is not a good reason to "dig in"
behind a Maginot Line of absolute moral principles and
contend that the principles are indefeasible, especially
since his commitment to the resort to arms in the first
place has already shown that he accepts some
justifications for intentionally setting aside these same
principles. For consider: the decision to resort to arms
entails a decision that certain noncombatants become
combatants for the sake of some political objective. In
other words, a declaration of war is a declaration that
the requirements of justice are so great that the
innocent lives of one's own citizens must intentionally
be put at extreme risk for the sake of some worthwhile
end. Just as the resort to force is sometimes the best
solution among a number of repugnant alternatives, so
might certain actions in warfare that are normally
prohibited "assume the character of the good" based on
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the available alternatives
.
24 when multiple "absolute-
principles conflict with one another in such a way that
all alternatives entail violating the same principle or
ones that are equally weighty, we have no choice but to
decide on the basis of a comparison of probable
consequences
.
25
2 4 R. M. Hare offers a cogent, common-sense analysis of the tensionbetween
.
military necessity and humanitarian principles. indiscussing the practical considerations of the problem he writes: "Onthe one side there is the danger that a too rigid adherence of the
standard general principles will lead us to disregard specialfeatures of the situation which ought to make a difference to our
appraisal of it. On the other side, there is the danger that, if we
once allow ourselves to question the general principle, our lack ofknowledge and our partiality to our own interests may distort our
reasoning." His solution is to treat the humanitarian principles as
practical guides, habitualized by training and education, but not
sacrosanct. In certain extraordinary situations which call for
special considerations, they may be criticized, justified, or even
rejected. The problem with Hare's view is that combat is
characterized by extraordinary situations just like the kind that
Taylor mentions: heat of battle, death of comrades, fear, etc. See
"Rules of War and Moral Reasoning, " in War and Moral Responsibility,
ed. by Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon (Princeton,
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 46-61.25 In an essay titled "Utilitarianism and the Rules of War," R. B.
Brandt responds to Nagel's absolutism by suggesting a version of
Rawls' rule utilitarianism (i.e. rules which enlightened, rational
agents might contract to from behind a veil of ignorance)
. He
incorporates, however, a form of military necessity into these
utilitarian rules: "The rules of war, then, subject to the
restriction that the rules of war may not prevent a belligerent from
using all the power necessary to overcome the enemy, will be ones
whose authorization will serve to maximize utility.... This
restriction, incidentally, itself manifests utilitarian
considerations, for a nation is limited to the use of means necessary
to overcome an opponent." This "solution," however, is simply a
restatement of the problem of military necessity as being more
fundamental than the rules of war. The interesting question which
Nagel attempts to answer (i.e "never") and Brandt sidesteps is: "when
should military necessity override humanitarian principles?" For
Brandt to advise one to use only the means necessary to insure
victory is as complete a denial of the humanitarian principles as
Nagel's is a denial of military necessity. See War and Moral
Responsibility, ed. by Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas
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Because the resort to force as a legitimate means of
achieving political objectives must always be a political
decision, perhaps this is a reasonable perspective from
which to invoke military necessity as a means of
realizing objectively important ends. Let's consider one
author who only accepts military necessity as a political
decision
.
Political Necessity
Michael Walzer presents a thoughtful, provocative
attempt at providing some guidelines for determining when
military necessity would justify setting aside the laws
of war. ^ According to his argument, the laws of war must
be obeyed "until the heavens fall." He calls such a
calamity a supreme emergency, and uses Nazi Germany's
early successes in World War II as an example. Walzer
argues that only in the case of imminent defeat, with
"backs to the wall," facing an enemy so heinous and
fearful that the very idea of restraint seems ludicrous,
may a nation set aside the principles of jus in bello.
Walzer concludes that the Allies may have been justified
in bombing German population centers because of military
necessity, though only during the early part of the war
when the outcome was extremely doubtful.
Scanlon (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1974)
,
pp. 25-45.
^ Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 251-268.
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more
For Walzer
, then, 'military necessity' could
appropriately be called 'political necessity': supreme
emergencies, as he has defined them, do not exist at
tactical or unit level. Applied to the soldier in the
foxhole or the lieutenant general in a corps command
center, Walzer' s interpretation makes the humanitarian
principles of jus in bello absolute prohibitions.
According to his argument, only in those cases where a
nation is faced with imminent, disastrous defeat (e. g.
enslavement or genocide) may military necessity be
invoked
.
One rule that might serve as a practical guide is
that if the situation is grave enough to justify killing
or putting at risk one's own citizens to accomplish
military objectives, then military necessity may be
invoked. In other words, no factor analysis is permitted
which gives a greater weight to those innocents that will
be put in harm's way because of their nationality. This,
it seems to me, is what occurs when a nation decides to
employ force in order to achieve some political objective
because, as we noted above, the decision to resort to
arms entails a decision that certain of one's own
innocent citizens be put at risk. Perhaps we can now
identify our guidelines for deciding when military
necessity may be invoked as a justification for attacking
innocents
.
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The only justification for setting aside HP^ is to
satisfy HP 2 . Because doing this is so extraordinary a
step, it is important to establish a set of clearly
defined, objective conditions which must be met to insure
the efficacy of the circumstances and to prevent abuse.
The same jus ad bellum criteria that justify the resort
to force in the first place, it seems to me, would
satisfy the conditions for when military necessity might
be invoked because both cases involve violating HP1 for
the sake of HP2
. in this regard it must always be a
political rather than a military decision. Moreover, the
decision to invoke military necessity and the specific
rules that will be set aside by so doing, must be
publicly declared by a lawful authority. 27
Additionally, the importance of the end sought must
be proportional to the amount of human suffering that
will be incurred in achieving it. In other words, if the
cost is measured in terms of innocent lives, decision
makers would be just as willing to exchange the same
number of lives of their own citizens in order to achieve
it. We generally call this criterion proportionality,
although it has not usually been framed in this context.
Of course, meeting this criterion is not impossible as it
I pass over any discussion of the methods whereby political
decisions are made (even though it is obviously crucial) except to
note that truth and freedom of information are necessary conditions
for a government to "legitimately" represent a people.
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IS precisely what is done when a nation resorts to force
in the first place— i.e. when it exchanges the lives of
its own citizens (as soldiers) in order to achieve some
political objective.
Finally, the means used must be both necessary and
sufficient to attain the desired end—necessary because
overriding the prohibition against intentionally
attacking innocent people must always be truly a last
resort, and sufficient, because the total means which one
is willing to employ must be weighed against the outcome.
Put another way, the limits of the means to be used must
be specified in advance. For example, one must not argue
that bombing a city is justified in order to achieve a
specific objective; and later, after the means employed
fails to achieve the desired outcome, argue that the
bombing of a second city is justified to achieve the same
objective, and so on ad infinitum. This does not
preclude the sufficient conditions from including a
graduated response in advance; it merely requires that
this be part of the decision making process so that these
means are not weighed against the outcome in a piecemeal
fashion
.
If followed, the criteria I've suggested would
eliminate military necessity as a tactical decision and
severely limit the occasions where military necessity
might be invoked as a national or strategic decision.
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This would eliminate the ambiguity inherent in the
international laws of war without eliminating military
necessity altogether. The jus ad bellum criteria that
provide the key for unleasing the dogs of war will also
open the door to military necessity on those rare
occasions where it is justified.
Reprisals in War
Like military necessity, the doctrine of reprisals
can provide a justification for setting aside the
protection that is normally afforded to innocents under
the international laws of war. Reprisals constitute the
traditional remedy for belligerents against whom war
crimes have been committed. They are conducted either to
deter further occurrences of the crimes, or to force
one's opponent into offering redress for those already
committed. In the parlance of contemporary international
law, reprisals are acts which would normally be
violations of the laws of war, but which are
exceptionally permitted as a means of compelling a
lawless enemy back into conformity with the law. There
is no requirement that reprisals reflect the type of
violation which they seek to stem. If, for example, one
nation uses a certain type of illegal weapon (say a viral
or bacteriological agent)
,
the nation against which it is
employed can legally employ another type of "illegal"
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weapon (say nuclear missiles) in reprisal. The form that
reprisals may take is left entirely to the discretion of
the party initiating them. The important thing is that
reprisals be motivated by a desire to force obedience to
the law rather than by a desire for revenge. This type
of belligerent reprisal is not to be confused with our
previous discussion of reprisals in Chapter Six. The
earlier discussion addressed reprisals conducted outside
of or in lieu of war; here we will focus on reprisals
which are conducted by belligerents during war, although
both types are undoubtedly similar in many respects.
When the doctrine of reprisals is coupled with the
current doctrine regarding military necessity, the
potential for "lawlessness" becomes disturbing. if one
side, the one losing the war, invokes military necessity
to justify violating the laws of war, then the opposing
side is then justified in violating the same or other
laws in reprisal. And because, under current
international law, one side will always be justified in
invoking military necessity, and the other will always be
justified in conducting reprisals (and counter-reprisals,
etc.), there can never be a war in which the humanitarian
laws are anything but ideals to be followed just in case
you are winning and your opponent continues to follow
them even though he is losing.
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means of
The status of reprisals as a legitimate
enforcing the laws of war has long been an issue of
contention. In 1874, the Russian delegation fought to
get a variation of Lieber's restrictive use of reprisals
written into the Brussels documents, and when they were
unsuccessful, F. F. Martens, a Russian jurist and
President of the 1899 Hague Convention, noted: 28
I regret that the uncertainty of silence is to prevail
with respect to one of the most bitter necessities of
war. if the practice could be suppressed by this
reticence, I could but approve of this course. But if it
is still to exist, this reticence may, it is to be
fs^red, remove any limits to its exercise.
Neither the members of the Brussels Conference of
1874 nor the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were able
to reach any agreement on the topic and the issue of
reprisals does not appear in international documents
until the Geneva Convention of 1929.
Reprisals against prisoners of war are expressly
prohibited by Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 1929
and Article 13 of the Geneva Convention (III) of 1949- 29
Other limitations in international law on the conduct of
2 8 Quoted in Gregory Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1980), p. 172.
2 Q* The 1929 Convention states: "Prisoners of war are in the power of
the hostile Power, but not of the individuals or corps who have
captured them. They must at all times be humanely treated and
protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults, and public
curiosity. Measures of reprisal against them are prohibited." In The
Law of War, vol 1, p. 494. The Geneva Convention (III) of 1949
reiterates this message. Ibid., p. 594.
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reprisals include prohibitions against harming wounded,
sick or medical personnel or equipment, shipwrecked
persons, and all persons under the protection of the
nation contemplating reprisals. 3 ®
In spite of these restrictions, two of the examples
I've chosen for our discussion concern reprisals against
prisoners. I've included them primarily because they are
widely discussed cases, but also because the interesting
aspects of the issue of reprisals are identical whether
one postulates prisoners of war or civilians as the
victims
.
During the American Revolutionary War, General
Washington, angered by the British refusal to respond to
his inquiries concerning the death of a New Jersey
militia captain, ordered the designation of a British
prisoner (Captain Asgill) to be executed in reprisal.
After Washington had designated the time and place of the
execution, the British responded with an explanation,
Washington was satisfied, and the "terrible alternative"
was avoided . 31
30 The restrictions may be found in the following 1949 conventions:
Geneva I, Art. 46, Geneva II, Art. 47, and Geneva IV, Art. 33. See
Documents on the Laws of War, pp. 188, 209, & 284 respectively.
Additional restrictions may be found in the Protocols (not ratified
by the United States) of 1977.
31 I have taken this example from Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 168. Best cites
Charles de Martens, Causes celebres du droit des gens, Leipzig, 1827,
vol. 2, pp. 169-82, as the source for this case.
352
e one discussed by Telford
The second exampl
Taylor
:
32
In 1864, the Union general David Hunter burned manyVirginian homes during his advance in the ShenandoahValley. The Confederate General Jubal Early drove
unter's forces back across the Potomac and, whenConfederate troops reached Chambersburg, Pa., Early
ordered the town burned by way of reprisal. The
regimental commander in Chambersburg, Colonel William E.Peters, refused to obey Early's order, and was relieved
of his command and placed under arrest, while others didthe burning.
My third example occurred during World War II when
the French Forces of the Interior continued to fight
German occupation forces in France. Germany refused to
treat members of the French resistance as combatants
—
even though they wore insignia, carried their arms
openly, and were in touch with both the Allies and the
French Provisional Government in Algeria— and subjected
them to summary execution despite formal protests by the
Provisional Government. The French Forces of the
Interior threatened reprisals, and when the executions
did not stop, they shot 80 German prisoners under their
control
.
33
32 Taylor notes that Colonel Peters was never tried for his refusal
to obey superior orders. Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 55. Taylor refers the reader
to General John B. Gordon's, "Reminiscences of the Civil War" (1903)
for a more detailed account of the incident.
33 Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals (The Netherlands: A. W.
Sijthoff, 1971), pp. 193-200.
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Lastly, in 1965, the National Liberation Front
(Vietcong) executed three American prisoners (one officer
and two noncommissioned officers) in reprisal for South
Vietnamese executions of three captured vietcong
"terrorists .
”
34
The consequential! st logic of such cases is
manifest: by conducting reprisals the harm suffered by
one's own soldiers and/or civilians is less than if
reprisals are not conducted. And of course, the
assumption undoubtedly true in some cases at least--is
that no alternative method will yield the same desirable
results
.
Sheldon Cohen has recently used variations of this
argument to defend the doctrine of reprisals. I'm not
sure that he is really as committed to reprisals as he
seems to be, or even that he would endorse the arguments
I attribute to him. Nevertheless, I will refer to the
arguments as Cohen's and will use them to point out some
34 In April 1965, a South Vietnamese court sentenced a Vietcong
prisoner to death. The Vietcong immediately named a captured
American officer who would be shot in reprisal if the execution was
carried out. On 22 June 1965 a Vietcong prisoner was executed by the
South Vietnamese government after being convicted by a military
court
. The Vietcong immediately executed an American sergeant being
held as a prisoner of war in reprisal. On 22 September the same
year, three Vietcong prisoners were executed after having been tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death. On 26 September the Vietcong
executed two American prisoners of war, a captain and a sergeant, in
reprisal. No more Vietcong prisoners were executed (at least
officially) by the South Vietnamese. See Kalshoven, Belligerent
Reprisals, pp. 295-305. Kalshoven cites the 22 June, 26 June, and 28
September 1965 issues of the New York Times as sources for some of
this information.
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as it is
difficulties for the doctrine of reprisals
currently manifested in international law and practiced.
After discussing the above example concerning
Germany and the French Forces of the Interior, Cohen
writes : 35
The French had an obligation to their own fighters and to
their own cause, which would be harmed if every would-be
volunteer had to mull over the fact that he would be
executed if he were captured. The execution of the
German prisoners was a terrible act, but when the Germans
did not reply to the French protests, nor to the French
threats for taking reprisals on captured Germans, the
responsibility for those deaths passed to the Germans,
who had left the French with no other effective means of
ending the executions The eighty dead Germans should
be added to the eighty dead Frenchmen as the result of
German decisions. When a criminal act by one belligerent
leaves the other no effective means of compelling the
first to desist except another act of the same kind,
responsibility lies, not in the hands of those who have
been placed in the dilemma, but of those who created it.
Cohen's argument is that "the French had an
obligation to their own fighters and their own cause"
which was being harmed because prospective soldiers had
second thoughts about joining the resistance in light of
the German policy. Moral dilemmas are invariably
questions of competing obligations. In this case Cohen
provides two obligations which he believes override the
obligation which belligerents have not to harm prisoners
of war. The first is that the French cause is of greater
r> c
Arms and Judgment: Law, Morality, and the Conduct of War in the
Twentieth Century, Sheldon M. Cohen (Boulder, San Francisco, &
London: Westview Press, 1989), p. 39.
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importance than the prohibition against murdering
prisoners. The second is that the French resistance had
a responsibility to protect those of their forces which
had fallen into enemy hands which was greater than their
responsibility not to execute enemy soldiers under their
own control. Let's take the arguments one at a time.
Even if we concede Cohen's contention that the
importance of the French cause justifies intentionally
murdering innocents, he must also convince us that there
is a correlation between the German policy of murdering
partisans and the French Cause. Cohen suggests that some
patriots who would otherwise volunteer to fight the
German soldiers occupying their country might be deterred
because of the German policy. If so, then this would
hurt the French cause. Put this way, we can recognize
this argument as a veiled appeal to military necessity as
the justification for conducting reprisals. But this
appeal to necessity seems highly questionable. Surely
patriots who voluntarily enlist to fight in a guerrilla
war against a world power like Germany are profoundly
aware of the possibility that they may be killed. In
order for Cohen's argument to persuade, we would have to
imagine a prospective volunteer who is ready to join the
resistance against the Germans despite the realization
that he may very well be killed in battle, but who
decides not to join because of the possibility that he
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Will be captured and then killed. This seems too far-
fetched to be plausible. And even if we grant that this
dubious line of reasoning may have been taken by some
French patriots, it is too much of a concession to
presume that they would be of sufficient number to "hurt
the French cause." If anything, the German policy made
the French partisans fight with even more tenacity,
realizing as they did that surrender meant execution.
Put this way, the German policy may have actually helped
the French cause rather than hurt it as Cohen argues.
Cohen s second justification for the French
reprisals is somewhat more plausible. Here Cohen
maintains that if one side can prevent the murder of
their soldiers who are in enemy hands by murdering enemy
prisoners in their hands, then they have an obligation to
do so. The conflict is between the negative duty not to
intentionally harm innocents (HP^) on one hand, and the
positive duty to prevent others from intentionally
harming innocents (HP 2 ) , on the other. One could, of
course, respond that the former is more fundamental; but
this seems problematic, especially since military leaders
have a special obligation to care for the welfare of
their soldiers. It is at least reasonable to accept that
the positive and negative duties associated with the
prohibition against harming innocents are equally
weighty, at least in this case. Granting this, one can
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furthermore argue that in those cases where the
alternatives are governed by the same or equal
principles, it is reasonable to resort to a comparison of
consequences as a means of choosing between them.
Applying this line of reasoning to the case at hand,
Cohen can argue that given that the Germans have executed
80 French prisoners, the French are faced with only two
alternatives: either not retaliate and expect more French
prisoners to be executed; or retaliate and make it in the
Germans' interests to stop executing French prisoners in
order to protect their own soldiers. The alternatives
might look something like this:
A 1 The French do not conduct reprisals and the
Germans continue to execute n number of French
prisoners: total innocent deaths: 80 plus n.
A 9 The French conduct reprisals , kill 80 German
prisoners, and the Germans stop executing
French prisoners: total innocent deaths: 160.
One might object that while the two alternatives
presented in the example are exhaust ive--i . e . either
conduct reprisals or not conduct them—the consequences
which are presumed to follow each course of action
(integrated into A^ and A2 with a conjunction) are not so
certain. This argument, one might object, only justifies
reprisals when they are successful; i.e. in order for A2
to be justified on a purely objective, consequentialist
evaluation, one would have to assume that n > 80. And
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since it is impossible to say with any assurance that any
particular act of reprisal will be successful (e.g. that
n > 80), it will always be a question of committing a
known wrong for a possible good.
Moreover, objectors might add, if one is going to
use a consequent iali st argument to justify making
exceptions to the most fundamental, universal
prohibitions--such as the one against intentionally
executing innocent people—then the consequent ialist must
live with the results when she is not successful. In
those cases, then, where one side intentionally executes
innocent people in an unsuccessful effort to deter like
actions by the other side, those who perpetrate the
crimes are guilty of premeditated murder, regardless of
their worthy motives. And in fact, my earlier examples
notwithstanding, the arguments supporting reprisals based
on consequences are not convincing because the empirical
evidence is that reprisals tend to lead to counter-
reprisals and an eventual denegation of all restraints in
the conduct of war. As Telford Taylor notes in his
discussion of this topic: "Reprisals ... are not much used
today, partly because they are generally ineffective, and
partly because the resort to crime in order to reform the
criminal is an unappetizing method." 36 Another well
known commentator on the laws of war writes: "the
36 Nuremberg and Vietnam, p. 54.
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doctrine of reprisals in its present somewhat obscure and
undefined state provides the chief loophole for the
evasion, violation, and nullification of the laws of
war." One good example of an attempt at abusing the
doctrine can be found in the opening sentence of Hitler's
Commando Order: "For some time our enemies have been
using in their warfare methods which are outside the
international Geneva Conventions . "38 Hitler used this as
his justification for ordering the summary execution of
all allied forces found behind German lines.
One way to avoid the difficulty with this
consequentialist argument as I've constructed it is to
give special weight to the deaths of one side over the
other. One may believe, for example, that because the
Germans are guilty, both of starting the war and
violating the laws of war. they have forfeited their
right to protection under the law. This line of
reasoning would allow one to conclude that the execution
of 80 guilty Germans is justified regardless of whether
or not it prevents the deaths of more innocent Frenchman.
This will not do however, because, as Grotius
reminds us, it is a fiction to imagine that an entire
people share in the guilt of a crime perpetrated by a
few. Soldiers are subject to attack because of their
37 Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1959.), p. 408.
38 The Law of War : A Documentary History, vol. 2, p. 1444.
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status as combatants, not because of their guilt. The
execution of 80 Germans based on this line of reasoning
is motivated more by retaliation or revenge than a desire
to enforce the law, and such action is both morally wrong
and expressly prohibited by international law.
Perhaps these consequential formulations are not
Cohen's arguments at all. Perhaps he means that the
rules of war are only binding on one side insofar as they
are observed by the other side. Some justification for
this argument may be found in common Article II of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 which states that parties
shall remain bound by the provisions of the present
convention if the other parties thereto "accept and apply
the provisions." 39 This argument seems reasonable when
applied to the use of certain strategies or weapons
systems that might give one side a potentially decisive
military advantage. Suppose, for example, that one side
could gain a military advantage by violating rules
concerning use of nuclear or chemical or bacteriological
weapons. In such cases a policy of reprisals might be an
effective means of compelling compliance with the
prohibitions against those weapons. One stipulation that
would have to be met before reprisals could be conducted
would be that the initial violation constitute a policy
decision, rather than simply an irresponsible action by
39 The Law of War: A Documentary History, vol 1, p. 525.
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some individual. This type of reprisal does not seem to
create the same sense of injustice as the one involving
the execution of prisoners.
The difference between the prisoner case involving
the French Forces of the Interior and the example of
outlawed weapons systems is that the initial and
subsequent use of illegal weapons in the latter example
are directed at combatants who are the proper targets of
attack, whereas in the prisoner examples the reprisals
are directed against innocents who have surrendered with
the understanding that they would be safe from harm.
Reprisals that are conducted in response to crimes
conducted as the result of an intentional policy decision
and that are directed solely against combatants, seem to
me to be justifiable because combatants are legitimate
objects of attack. It still remains for us to determine
if reprisals against innocents are ever justified.
An alternative to accepting the legitimacy of
reprisals against innocents might be to argue that
violence and punishment must always be directed either at
combatants or at the guilty, and that the thread of guilt
between national policies and individual citizen
responsibility is a tenuous one, especially in nations
where the government owns the franchise on information
mediums. Perhaps an analogy with a domestic example will
be instructive.
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Imagine a young man who is a murderer and a
fugitive. He is positively known to be guilty, the
authorities believe that he is likely to kill again, and
his whereabouts are unknown. Further imagine that he
comes from a large family and has strong ties with his
siblings • Government officials are convinced that one
way to get this criminal to turn himself in, or at least
to cease his criminal activity, is to execute members of
his family in reprisal for any additional killings. We
begin by killing his married older sister (who is a
mother of three and a graduate of Stanford) in response
to the murders he has already committed, and announce
through the media that further crimes by him will produce
like responses. As Cohen would put it: "Add the death of
your sister to the crimes you've already committed."
Of course, it is outrageous to kill an innocent
person on the basis of such reasoning. War time
reprisals only seem more palatable because we project
some modicum of guilt on the enemy population in general.
As we noted previously, however, this is a fiction.
Recall that the argument we are attributing to Cohen
claims that because the Germans' abrogated their
responsibility to French prisoners, the French were
released from their responsibility toward German
prisoners. The problem with this line of reasoning is
that it assumes that the legal obligation not to harm
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prisoners is based purely on the contractual agreement
between the parties. Because one side has broken the
agreement, the other party is no longer bound by it. But
while this may be true of conventions concerning the
weapons that combatants may use to attack each other, the
argument is not persuasive if we believe that there is a
moral principle behind the prohibition against
intentionally killing innocents. If so, then the act of
killing innocent people is morally wrong unless it is
done for the purpose of protecting other innocent
persons. And even when this is the case, it would have
to be a political decision that meets the same set of jus
ad helium criteria that we determined was required to
justify military necessity.
Walzer takes up the issue of reprisals and,
discussing the case of the French Forces of the Interior,
reaches a conclusion opposite to Cohen's . 40 His approach
is to deny the premise that reprisals are ever the only
alternative. In his discussion of the Germans and the
French resistance, he suggests that the French could have
conducted raids on German prison camps, published the
names of the Germans who would be tried as war criminals
after cessation of hostilities, or merely claimed to have
conducted reprisals without actually doing so. In any
40 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 207-216.
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must always beevent, he argues, the "last resort"
something short of attacks on innocent persons. 41
Suppose, for example, that reprisals are directed at
a civilian community. This seems to be the basis for the
NATO/Warsaw policy of mutually assured destruction. If,
during a conventional war in Europe, the Soviet Union
were to attack a U. S. city with a strategic nuclear
weapon, would the U. S. be justified in a reprisal
against a Soviet City? Obviously the targets of both
attacks would be innocent citizens. 42
Article 51(6) of the 1977 Protocol states that:
"Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by
way of reprisals are prohibited." 43 This article was
hotly debated prior to its adoption. Those who opposed
it argued that the civilian populations of belligerent
nations were not entirely innocent when it came to the
4
-*- Ibid., p. 215.
Walzer condemns reprisals as morally wrong, but still argues for a
moral distinction between those who commit the wrong acts initially,
and those who do so as a response in order to force the transgressors
back into conformity with the law. He writes: "I don't know how to
measure the difference between them; perhaps it isn't great; but it
is worth stressing that there is a difference, even as we give their
crimes a common name."
42 H. L. A. Hart argues that proliferation of nuclear weapons might
give nations enough equality (in terms of the ability to harm each
other) that the fear of reprisal would deter war.
43 Documents on the Laws of Mar, p. 416. Other restrictions on
reprisals in this document include prohibitions on attacks against
civilian objects (Art. 52(1)), against cultural objects and places of
worship (Art. 53(c)), against the natural environment (Art. 55(2)),
against objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian
population (Art. 55(4)), and against the works and installations
containing dangerous forces (Art. 56(4)).
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political actions of their country
.
44 At some point, they
argue, a nation's citizens must shoulder some
responsibility for their government's actions. One can
certainly sympathize with their logic: "Are we to let the
enemy blow our cities to smithereens without striking
back when we have the means?"
Formulated in this context we have limited the cases
where reprisals might legitimately be conducted in such a
way that they can now be subsumed under the doctrine of
military necessity. If so, then it seems to me that
reprisals might be justified using the same criteria that
we used to justify military necessity. That is,
reprisals are not a military option, but a political one
subject to the same jus ad bellum conditions as the
initial resort to force.
In this chapter we' ve examined some of the more
controversial aspects of the rules of war and made some
modest efforts at clarifying ambiguities. In the next
chapter we will examine how these deficient aspects of
just war tradition and the international laws of war are
invoked by groups which employ international terror as a
means of achieving political objectives.
44 Frits Kalshoven, Constraints of the Waging of War, (The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 103.
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CHAPTER 11
THE TACTICS OF TERRORISM
A distinctive mode of violence conducted under the
banner of justice that is becoming increasingly common
and that uses variations of the doctrines of military
necessity, reprisals, and obedience to orders to justify
its methods is terrorism. 'Terrorism' is a pejorative
term used to denote a particular type of violence
designed to achieve political objectives. It differs
from other types of politically motivated violence in
that the victims of terrorist attacks are not themselves
the objects of the attacks. That is, the terrorist
intentionally and systematically harms random innocent
persons in order to coerce others into conceding to her
demands. From the terrorist's standpoint, the identity
of the victims is important only insofar as it generates
the desired effect in the target population.
It is a common misconception that the terrorist's
success is somehow linked to the fear (or terror) she
instills in the target population. The Oxford
Dictionary, for example, defines terrorism as "a policy
intended to strike with terror those against whom it is
directed." This is inaccurate. We abhor terrorism not
because we are afraid that we or someone close to us will
be attacked, but because the intentional harming of
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random, innocent persons violates our notion of justice
or fairness
.
1
While most of us experience moral outrage at the
intentional harming of innocents, not all acts of
terrorism are widely regarded as morally wrong. Certain
types of terrorist tactics are effective in appealing to
our sense of justice without provoking in us any sense of
anger toward those who initiate the terrorist acts. The
"nonviolent" tactics or Satyagraha of Mohandas Gandhi are
a case in point
. Satyagraha is aimed at coercing a
target group into adopting political change in order to
put an end to the suffering of innocents. The
distinction, of course, is that unlike the victims of
most terrorist attacks, a Satyagrahi volunteers to serve
as an innocent victim. Nevertheless, both types of
terrorism use systematic violence directed against
innocent persons to shock a target group into conceding
to political demands. In each case, it is moral outrage
at the harm that befalls innocents that motivates the
political concessions by a third party. Except as noted,
however, our analysis will focus on acts of terrorism
conducted against unwilling innocents.
1
I have never known anyone who personally felt threatened by
terrorist activity, despite my association with numerous important
military officials. Even when there is consensus among group members
that the group should yield to terrorist demands, it is not fear for
their persons that motivates their decision but compassion for the
victims of terrorist acts.
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It is also this same abhorrence of injustice that
motivates many to sympathize with the political
inequities that the terrorist seeks to remedy by his
actions. Thus there are some, like Martin Oppenheimer,
who "take the terrorist's side" and view him as a freedom
fighter responding to unjust oppression. As Oppenheimer
puts it:
Terrorism is always a response to institutional terror.
It is an evasion to label some acts as terrorism, while
ignoring the institutional terror which underlies this
form of protest.... The amount of terror inflicted by
"terrorists," no matter how dreadful, is a thimbleful
compared to official, legally-sanctioned terror.
^
In terms of the just war tradition, those who hold
such views argue that the ends which the terrorists seek
are of sufficient importance to justify the use of
violence, and because no other effective method is
available to them, they are justified in using terrorism.
This argument is similar in some respects to the
arguments for military necessity and reprisals. For
example, when a state invokes military necessity as a
justification for bombing cities, the deaths of innocent
persons that occur are regarded as unfortunate but
necessary results, incidental to the object of the
bombings. In actual World War II examples, such as
2 Martin Oppenheimer, "Defining Terrorism, " in The Nonviolent
Activist (May-June 1985), reprinted in Terrorism: Opposing
Viewpoints, ed. by David L. Bender (St. Paul, Minnesota: Greenhaven
Press, 1986)
,
p. 87
.
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Dresden and Hiroshima, the object of the attacks against
population centers was to pressure the
belligerent government into surrendering. Likewise, when
a nation conducts reprisals, certain "innocents” are
often killed in order to elicit a particular behavior
from one's opponents. With these similarities in mind,
we must examine seriously the terrorist's claim that he
is fighting a just war and that his attacks on innocents
fall under the rubrics of military necessity or reprisal.
Some commentators have sought to address the problem
of just causes and unjust methods by distinguishing
between acts which are justified and those which are
excusable: i.e. although terrorist acts are not
justified, they are excusable. I believe that in almost
all cases this distinction confuses unnecessarily the
objective evaluation of acts with subjective issues such
as intention and culpability. Some acts may be wrong but
excusable owing to ignorance of the facts. For example,
we might excuse a soldier who kills an innocent civilian
during a battle because he mistakes her for a combatant.
In this sense, the term 'excusable' seems more properly
applied to persons rather than acts themselves. Thus
while we might excuse one for a well-intended but wrong
action, it seems inappropriate to excuse an objectively
wrong act independent of such considerations as the
intentions or beliefs of the agent who performed the act.
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Even if one were to predicate certain act tokens as
excusable, one would always be referring to the
culpability of the agent who performed that specific act
rather than to an objective assessment of an act type.
In fact, the term 'excusable' itself implies that an act
is objectively wrong because there is, after all, no need
to "excuse" permissible actions. This means that an
objective assessment of the moral or legal status of an
act must be done prior to any determination of
excusability
. In the legal domain this is done by
ascertaining guilt or innocence independently of and
prior to considering issues of mitigation, extenuation,
and culpability. These latter issues are considered only
in deciding on the punishment which should be justly
meted out, and then only after the objective issue of
guilt has been concluded.
In terms of just war theory the issue is addressed
partly by distinguishing between political and military
responsibilities. Only those who make political
decisions can be guilty of committing political or jus ad
bellum crimes such as aggression; only those who make
military decisions can be guilty of war crimes. In
either case, the objective moral or legal status of an
act itself is logically prior to the guilt or innocence
of the agent performing the action. Thus in almost all
cases it is merely a moral shell game to say that
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soldiers fighting in an unjust war are morally wrong but
that their actions are excusable, or that politicians
committing a nation's armed forces to a war in which some
individual soldier commits a war crime have performed an
action that is wrong but excusable.
The only exception that I can imagine might be in
those cases where one sincerely believes that certain
acts are being performed at the behest of God. If so,
then one might accept certain Divine commands prescribing
immoral acts as exceptions to the moral laws just as
miracles are exceptions to physical or scientific laws.
Given this account, one could perhaps view certain acts
as objectively wrong because of human moral laws, but
excusable because of the miracle of God'
s
personal
intervention . We will have reason to return to this
argument in some detail momentarily
.
Other than the example of actions performed in
reponse to a Divine command, however, the predicate
'excusable' does not clarify, simplify
,
or explicate
moral issues in philosophical discussions of just war
theory or terrorism and we will not use it. Instead, we
will focus on whether or not certain causes justify acts
of terrorism rather than on how those who perform such
acts should be treated.
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The terrorist treats her victims as objects to be
used (or "used up" as one commentator puts it 3 ) as means
to the terrorist's ends. Our discussion will address
both the ends and the means. Concerning the former we
will be satisfied with merely pointing out the
difficulties that the traditional moral and legal jus ad
bellum criteria pose for terrorist organizations seeking
to justify their resort to arms; it is of course possible
for a group which employs terrorism to be justified in
resorting to some form of violence, and that is enough to
lead us to the second and more philosophically
interesting aspect of our inquiry: Given a just cause,
and assuming that adherence to the rules of war would be
ineffective (i.e. a bona fide case of military necessity
exists)
,
are there any moral or legal limits on the means
that may employed in seeking this end? And if so, what
are they? Answering these questions will allow us to
evaluate the terrorists' claim that they are freedom
fighters engaged in just wars and are therefore entitled
to protection under the terms of the Geneva and Hague
Conventions
.
One additional justification that is sometimes used
by those who employ terrorism and that also merits our
attention is the justification based on divine command
3 Nick Fotion, "The Burdens of Terrorism, " in Value in Conflict
,
ed
by B. Leiser (New York: MacMillan, 1981), pp. 463-72.
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that we mentioned a moment ago. We must begin therefore
with an examination of obedience to God as a possible
justification for terrorist tactics. We'll follow with
an examination of terrorist causes in terms of
conventional jus ad helium criteria; and finally, we'll
conclude with an analysis of the possible permissibility
of acts of terror independent of motives.
Terrorism Based on Divine Command
In a previous discussion (Chapter Eight) we
concluded that superior orders did not constitute a
sufficient justification for performing immoral acts.
This followed both from the necessary fallibility of
superior orders, as well as from the unassignable nature
of individual moral agency. Suppose, however, that man
is ordered to war by Divine command; certainly any act
commanded by God needs no justification other than simply
that God commands it. Even acts that would otherwise be
immoral could become obligatory if commanded by God.
Consider, for example, the story of Abraham and
Isaac as found in the Book of Genesis 22. Recall that
God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, his only son, as
a test of Abraham's faith. At the last instance, just as
Abraham prepares to kill Isaac, God intervenes, the boy
is saved, and a ram is offered in sacrifice instead.
Following, we get this account:
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By myself I have sworn, says the Lord, because you havedone this, and have not withheld your son, I will indeedbless you, and I will multiply your descendants as the
stars of heaven and as the sand which is on the seashore.
And your descendants shall possess the gate of their
enemies, and by your descendants shall all the nations of
the earth bless themselves, because you have obeyed my
voice. ( Genesis 22, 15-18)
Notice that it is not relevant that Abraham does not
actually carry out the murder of his son. The point
seems to be that the faithful should be willing to
perform even what is, at least from a human perspective,
the most heinous act imaginable at the command of God.
If so, then even the most abominable act of terrorism
would be obligatory should God command it. We will
proceed under the assumption that if God exists, then
anything He commands is obligatory. It follows that if
those who employ terrorism are indeed performing God's
will or carrying out His orders, then they are acting
rightly
.
One problem with extending the Abraham example to
other instances of violence is the difficulty with
determining the reason behind God'
s
commands
.
In
Abraham's case, we are told that God was testing the
faith of Abraham. In cases of a political entity
committing acts of terror or warring against another
identifiable political entity, we must presume that the
political purpose for which the acts are done is also
God's purpose. If the group's purpose is in fact God's
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purpose, then it is reasonable to
will be successful. This is
because groups seeking political
of God
suppose that the group
problematic, however,
objectives in the name
This was the problem created by Saint Ambrose's account
of God's intervention on behalf of Christianity that had
to be explained by Saint Augustine after the Holy Roman
Empire, having recently adopted Christianity as its
° ^ f c i a 1 religion, fell to the Germanic invaders.
Ambrose had argued that the pagan successes were due to
Rome's failure to adopt Christianity as its official
religion. Shortly after it was adopted, however, Rome
was sacked by Alaric the Visagoth. Pagan elements in
Rome argued that the downfall of the city was brought
about by the wrath of Jove due to Rome' s having forsaken
the traditional pagan gods for the Christian God.
Augustine responded to these charges by noting that
it is God's purpose that all of mankind suffer in order
that man achieve redemption for Adam's original sin, and
that the way in which specific acts contribute to this
purpose is only discernible from a timeless perspective.
Thus God could command a people to fight a war knowing
that they will lose it in order that some greater good be
achieved. In other words, a group might believe that
they are commanded by God to commit a particular act of
violence, and carry out this act believing that the
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political objective they seek is God's objective in
commanding the act, when in fact God's purpose, which is
something entirely different, is unknown to them.
This response leads to another difficulty for the
Abraham example, however; namely, determining when it is
reasonable to believe that the commands one receives are
indeed God's commands. For while Abraham receives his
orders from an angel of God, the orders received by those
who belong to political organizations must pass through
many levels of the organizational hierarchy before
reaching those who actually act on them. This presents
significant difficulties for those who break fundamental
moral prohibitions based on the commands of intermediates
who claim to be acting as agents of God. It seems to me
that it is not reasonable to override what one believes
to be a Divine rule-- such as don't intentionally harm
innocent persons--unless commanded to do so by God
himself because, after all, only God can negate His own
rule. Given the fallibility of human nature, it would
not be reasonable to break what one believes to be a rule
of an immutable God on the command of a corruptable human
being. Hence we need not reject the Abraham principle;
we only note that God's commands can only be set aside by
God Himself, as indeed He did in the Abraham example.
Those cases where God's command does negate a divine
moral rule, if they do occur, must be regarded as
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miracles
.
4 Without clear evidence of a miracle, however,
one would not be justified in setting aside what one
believes to be a divine rule based on hearsay or at the
urging of fallible human agents. Moreover, those who
have no evidence of a miracle must assume that those who
violate established moral rules, such as the prohibition
against attacking innocents, must be punished accordingly
even though they might claim divine inspiration for their
actions
.
In sum, divinely inspired moral rules, whether
grounded in rationality, natural law, or revealed truths,
might be set aside on divine command in the same way that
physical laws may be set aside by God. Both instances,
however, must be regarded as miracles because they
require God's personal intervention in the affairs of the
world. In the absence of any evidence indicating God's
personal intervention, it seems reasonable to act as if
He had not modified His own rules, and to treat others
likewise
.
The Terrorist's Cause
Before we can consider whether or not a political
group is justified in employing terrorists tactics, we
must first review the conditions under which the resort
to arms is itself justified. Although states can (and
4 Excepts from Augustine's discussion of exceptions to divine laws
may be found in Chapter Five.
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do) employ terrorism just as independent groups do, we'll
primarily focus this discussion on those political groups
that are not independent, sovereign states as these will
have the greatest difficulty meeting the conditions of
jus ad bellum. And rather than examine one of the many
specific organizations employing terrorist tactics, we
will simply point toward some of the important
difficulties that the traditional jus ad bellum
principles pose for groups seeking to justify the use of
force. Later, when we address the legitimacy of
terrorism as a means of conducting warfare, we will
include both states and other political organizations.
The just war tradition stipulates that one of the
necessary conditions that must obtain in order for a
nation to be justified in resorting to arms is that there
have been a wrong received that is of sufficient weight
that the consequences of not seeking redress are worse
than the consequences of resorting to force. This is
generally referred to as the conditions of just cause and
proportionality. The modern legal interpretation of this
is that the only wrongs that can possibly meet this
criteria are attacks against a nation's citizens,
territory, or political independence. When we use the
expression 'self-defense' in referring to political
entities we will mean either defending territorial
boundaries, protecting political sovereignty, or
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defending the safety of citizens. In international law
when a nation uses force without meeting the condition of
just cause it is guilty of aggression.
The United Nations General Assembly has adopted a
resolution which defines aggression as: "the use of armed
force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, or political independence of another state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the charter of the
United Nations .
"
5 The wording in this resolution is
designed to outlaw the use of force as a policy of
expansionism or as a means of gaining hegemony over other
nations, while at once permitting the use of force either
in self-defense or in order to free oneself from
political domination or colonialism. Article 2(4) and
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, taken together,
reflect this same intention. 6
2(4). All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political sovereignty of any
state
.
51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United
Nations
.
5 Quoted in Yehuda Melzer, Concept of Just War (Leyden: A. W.
Sijthoff, 1975), pp. 28-9.
6 Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United
Nations: Commnetary and Documents (Boston: World Peace Foundation,
1949), pp. 102 & 297. Article 2(4) is taken almost verbatim from the
Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928 (Treaty of Paris)
.
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Thus we may infer that a necessary condition for
groups to be justified in resorting to violence under
international law is that they possess either territorial
boundaries or political legitimacy as these are necessary
prerequisites for a group to be engaged in self-defense
under international law. And as self-defense is the only
acceptable just cause for war, a group must have either
territorial boundaries or political legitimacy in order
to enter a state of war with another group.
The above condition excludes from legimacy the
violence of those groups that employ terrorism to achieve
their ends even though they have not suffered any wrong.
The Barbary Pirates are a good example of a politically
and territorially autonomous group that employed
terrorism by attacking random passenger ships in order to
demand "protection" money from various nations. Nations
that refused to pay could expect to have their ships
attacked on sight by pirates patrolling the shipping
lanes. Under the above criteria their actions were
simply a form of criminal blackmail because they could
not meet the condition of just cause.
Another consequence of our condition that organized
violence is only justified in the defense of territorial
boundaries, political sovereignty, or the safety of one's
citizens, is that it clearly identifies as criminal those
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use
groups without any political constituency that
violence to achieve their ends.
The second of the traditional jus ad bellum criteria
that seems problematic for organizations employing
terrorist tactics is the requirement that war be
publically declared by a lawful authority. Recall that
the purpose of this jus ad bellum principle is twofold:
a) to present a potential adversary the opportunity to
offer redress in lieu of war, and b) to insure that the
resort to arms is a public, political act. In principle,
these conditions can and frequently are met by
"terrorist" groups, even in the absence of a legally
constituted government invested with the authority to
make formal declarations. Certainly revolutionary
movements, for example, are able to meet this criteria in
principle, as are wars of secession, as long as there
exists an identifiable political body. (The
distinguishing characteristic could be geographic,
religious, political, racial, etc.)
Moreover, soldiers fighting in conflicts of these
sorts traditionally have been afforded the legal status
of combatants under the laws of war. The Martin's Clause
found in the preamble to both the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions, for example, clearly extends the provisions
of these conventions beyond the domain of sovereign
states
.
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Until a more complete code of the laws of war can beissued, the High Contracting Parties think it expedient
to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of
the laws of nations, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of
humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience. 7
More recently, Article 1(4) of Protocol I of 1977
specifies that the provisions of the Protocol will extend
to "all armed conflicts in which the peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations...." 8
Because terrorist groups can comply in principle
with the jus ad bellum criterion that in order for
violence to be considered a state of war it must be
publicaly declared by a lawful authority, it would be
sophistry to insist on more specific stipulations than
those that reflect the above principle and that are
impossible for most terrorist organizations to meet. An
example might be the American War of Independence where
the British government refused to recognize the "lawful
authority" of the political body claiming to represent
the citizens of the various colonies. Of course, the
7 Leon Friedman, The Law of War: A Documentary History, vol. 1 (New
York: Random House, 1972), p. 309.
8 Quoted in Ingrid Detter De Lupis, The Law of War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 156.
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requirement that the groups meet this jus as bellum
condition in principle, if not in fact, remains. We will
explore how this might be evaluated in a moment. With
these conditions satisfied in principle, let's turn to
the condition that poses the greatest difficulty for
terrorist organizations that the use of violence as a
means of achieving political objectives must always be a
last resort.
The condition that force be used only as a last
resort presents difficulties for many organizations that
employ terrorism for a number of reasons. First, there
is little evidence that terrorist organizations ever try
any alternative methods, never mind all of them. But
this is precisely what is required by the last resort
condition. The explanation that many terrorists provide
is that there is no need to actually attempt other
methods because, practically speaking, terrorism is
clearly the only method available to militarily weak,
repressed groups. However, this argument, if one accepts
it, makes the terrorist's cause itself suspect. Even if
one accepts the contention that more conventional forms
of armed force would be suicidal against a militarily
strong government, this does not exhaust the range of
available options. This argument assumes that a just
cause is sufficient to justify the resort to force, and
military necessity justifies the resort to terrorism. In
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order to meet the criteria of last resort, however, the
terrorism organization must have demonstrated that
peaceful methods have been attempted unsuccessfully.
Moreover, these must have been widespread enough to
indicate the popular support normally demonstated by the
previous condition that wars be public acts. In other
words, the lack of widespread public support for the
terrorist's cause is good evidence that the principles
behind the earlier requirement that war be a public act
declared by a lawful authority are not being met.
The magnitude of the difficulty this presents for
the terrorist now becomes clear: the reason that peaceful
methods--st rikes
,
boycotts, mass demonstrations,
guerrilla warfare—are not available to most terrorist
groups, is that there is not popular support for their
cause. Terrorism may indeed be the only option available
to political causes without affiliates. In such cases,
however, it is unlikely that the stringent requirements
of just cause are met. Moreover, even if they are met,
the resort to arms is not justified unless there is
public support for the same. An inability or
unwillingness to muster public support for peaceful
measures convinces us that the use of violence is morally
wrong
.
Nevertheless, we can surely imagine situations where
the criteria of just cause and last resort are met. In
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those cases where a politically autononous group has
suffered a wrong which justifies "letting slip the dogs
of war," and has unsuccessfully attempted a peaceful
resolution, is the use of terrorism in such cases legally
and/or morally justified?
The Terrorist's Means
There are two jus in hello principles which the
terrorist might invoke to justify his intentional attacks
against innocents: reprisals and military necessity. In
our previous discussions we have determined the
conditions where these criteria may legitimately be
invoked; let's now see how well terrorist type examples
can meet these criteria.
The terrorist might argue that terrorism can
legitimately be used in reprisal in order to disuade a
government from policies that result in "institutional
terror." Suppose, for example, that a government follows
a policy of oppression (or genocide) that causes
extensive suffering for a particular segment of the
population. One commentator, defending the terrorist
tactics of the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
,
takes this
view
:
What has not been so well publicized is the fact that the
majority of acts of violence in Northern Ireland were the
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result of institutional violence, i.e. they were caused,
not by the paramilitaries, but by the security forces.^
Even though such government policies of oppression
do not constitute terrorism as we have defined it
(because they are not aimed at gaining political
concessions from a third party)
,
this does not
necessarily rule out terrorist attacks by way of
reprisal. International law specifies that reprisals
conducted in response to violations of the laws of war
need not take the same form as the type of injustice that
they are aimed at remedying. Of course, this is still
problematic in terms of terrorist activities directed
against oppressive governments because the objectionable
policies of these governments may be perfectly legal.
Thus the terrorist must argue that certain moral
principles are more fundamental than civil laws and that
violations of these principles justifies reciprocal
violations in reprisal as the only means of forcing the
oppressive government into changing its unjust policies.
Perhaps an example will be helpful here.
Suppose that a government supports and practices a
policy of apartheid. Assuming that peaceful alternatives
have failed, would those who are oppressed be justified
9 John M. Feehan, Bobby Sands and the Tragedy of Northern Ireland,
Sag Harbour, New York: The Permanent Press, 1985, reprinted in
Terrorism: Opposing Viewpoints
,
ed. by David L. Bender (Greenhaven
Press, 1986), p. 97.
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in adopting terrorism as a means of bringing about
political change?
Speaking practically, it is highly unlikely that in
these circumstances terrorism would be more effective
than peaceful methods. Recall that the object of
terrorism is to generate public outrage at the injustices
suffered by innocents. When dealing with such volatile
emotions there is always a strong possibility of
counterreprisals and increased oppression rather than
positive change in public policy. This is especially
true when terrorism is directed against a stronger or
more powerful segment of the population by members of a
clearly identifiable, weaker segment of the population.
Consider any government that is unmoved by the employment
of peaceful means of initiating political change: Why
would such a government concede to terrorist demands? I
presume that it would be because they recognize no other
method that would reduce the suffering caused against
their innocents by the terrorist activities. Notice that
the suffering of the members of the group that is being
repressed is not relevant to the decision. Governments
that have adopted oppressive practices against an
identifiable segment of the population and have not been
moved by nonviolent pressures are not likely to be
constrained by considerations of justice in dealing with
that same group it has been oppressing. If one
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alternative to conceding to terrorist demands is to
strike back against the group incubating the terrorists'
views, this seems far more likely to be adopted than a
policy of acquiescence. In order for us to imagine an
oppressive state—one that previously has failed to be
moved by peaceful methods--conceding to terrorist
demands, we must imagine a change in those beliefs which
gave rise to the oppressive policies in the first place.
The more likely result is that those who are guilty
of unjust oppressive behavior toward a group based on
some discernible characteristic (such as race or
religion) will have no compunctions against responding
unjustly to terrorist attacks initiated by members of
that group (e. g. with increased oppression). In fact,
terrorist actions by the oppressed population are likely
to be interpretated as evidence of moral inferiority and
a justification of oppression instead of a rationale for
change
.
From a practical viewpoint, then, in those cases
where peaceful pressures have failed to move an
oppressive political body to reform, it is highly
unlikely that terrorism will succeed and, it may very
well have the opposite effect. Interestingly, it is the
liberal state with an official concern for principles of
fairness and justice that is likely to respond equally
favorably to either terrorism or peaceful measures, such
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as mass demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. Then, of
course, terrorism would not be justified as it would be
unnecessary
.
A second difficulty for our hypothetical scenario
stems from our previous discussion of reprisals in
Chapters Six and Ten. Recall that we distinguished
between those reprisals conducted outside of or in lieu
of war that are aimed at political objectives, and
reprisals conducted in wartime that aimed at enforcing
compliance with jus in hello principles and the laws of
war
.
Reprisals that are conducted in wartime are
permitted as exceptions, aimed at remedying specific
violations of the laws of war. The type of reprisal that
the terrorist conducts is aimed at political objectives.
Terrorist acts are the terrorists' means of waging war--
they are not exceptional procedures narrowly aimed at
insuring compliance with war's moral or legal rules. If
the terrorist is going to use reprisals as a
justification for his methods, it will have to be the
type of reprisal that is conducted as an alternative to
war rather than those conducted in wartime.
The criteria for the conduct of reprisals conducted
in lieu of war, however, does not suit the terrorists'
case any better than the previous type. Recall that a
necessary condition for reprisals to be permissible is
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that they be carried out so as to avoid innocent or
civilian deaths, even though doing so would result in
increased risk to those combatants engaged in carrying
out the act of reprisal. 10 Terrorism cannot meet this
criterion because it is intentionally directed at
innocents. We can conclude that terrorist attacks aimed
at innocents cannot be justified under the rubric of
either type of reprisal.
Another possible justification for terrorist tactics
is that they are demanded by military necessity. Recall
that with the exception of taking hostages or harming
those "protected persons" under one's span of control (i.
e. prisoners or civilians in territory one controls)
international laws permit other jus in bello conditions
to be legally set aside because of military necessity.
One example of a much criticized terrorist attack that
might qualify as a case of military necessity is the
attack against a United States Marine Landing Team
located at the Beirut International Airport in October
1983. In this incident a truck containing 12,000 pounds
of explosives was driven through the perimeter and
detonated adjacent to the marine battalion headquarter.
The driver and 241 United States Marines were killed. 11
10
I am using Michael Walzer's criteria from Just and Unjust War as
it was developed and discussed in Chapter 6, pp. 142-3, of this work.
11 See U. S. Department of Defense, Report of the DOD Commission on
Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, 20
December 1983. For a good discussion of why this attack should not
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The object of the attack was to cause the withdrawal
of United States forces from Lebanon. Because of the
superior United States military strength, replete with
naval gunfire and air support, the only military option
available that had a chance of achieving the political
goal was this sabotage type bombing. Could military
necessity, then, justify the terrorist attack on the
marine headquarters?
The difficulty with this example is that it doesn't
constitute either military necessity or terrorism. It is
not terrorism because the attack was against foreign
military forces in a nation beseiged with internal
military struggles. Military soldiers on occupation duty
or engaged in "gunship diplomacy" are de facto combatants
and can be legally (and morally) attacked by other
combatants. And of course, attacks directed narrowly
against combatants are entirely in consonance with the
principles of jus in bello and need not be justified by
military necessity.
Perhaps we can construct a fictitious example which
will help us to focus on the central issues. Imagine a
situation similar to that inside Germany during World War
II. What if, in response to the policy of genocide being
carried out by the German government, the Jewish
be classified as 'terrorism' see Frederic C. Hof, "The Beirut Bombing
of October 1983: An Act of Terrorism?" Parameters XV, 2 (Summer
1985), pp. 69-74.
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Community in Europe formed an underground and, after
peaceful means proved ineffective, prepared to resort to
force in an effort to get the government to renounce
their policy of genocide? Because of the enormous
disparity in military capabilities between the German
government and the Jewish underground, direct
confrontation aimed at a military victory would be
futile. In fact, the only means which would seem to hold
even the possibility of success would be an official
policy of terrorism against German citizens in an effort
to draw attention to the Jewish plight and focus public
pressure on the German Government to desist from her evil
policy. In sum, there is an identifiable political body,
peaceful measures have failed, the magnitude of the
injustice warrants force, and military necessity
justifies setting aside the laws of war. And as we
noted in our previous discussion of military necessity
(Chapter Ten)
,
the humanitarian aspects of the rules of
war can be set aside in political emergencies for the
sake of protecting innocents provided that the emergency
meets the same stringent jus ad bellum criteria that are
required in order to justify the resort to arms in the
first place.
The first aspect of this scenario that appears
problematic is that here, as in the earlier case of
reprisals, the likelihood of success based on terrorist
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tactics is practically nonexistent. We know, in fact,
that the Allies engaged in terror-bombing of German
cities with terrible effectiveness. Nevertheless,
Germany continued to fight tenaciously and even increase
production of war goods until Allied Forces reached
Berlin. But while this conclusion is obvious in
retrospect, it is not so apparent when the alternatives
are considered as subjunctives from the perspective of
the Allies, who were at that time losing the war . 12
Likewise, from the Jewish perspective, even the
possibility of success, given that this is the only
alternative that promises that possibility, seems to
justify a policy of terrorism.
A second problem for this scenario is that the move
from peaceful attempts to terrorism seems to be made
rather hastily. Military necessity justifies setting
aside the laws of war in extreme emergencies when all
other measures have failed. In our example, other
military options which conform to the jus in bello
tradition have been employed only notionally. It is not
at all obvious what kind of effect an organized internal
resistance would have had on Germany during the period
12 i don't mean to imply an approval of the Allied terror bombing of
German population centers. Michael Walzer argues that the bombing of
German cities was justified during 1940 and 1941 when the Allies were
losing. He calls this a "supreme emergency." Later, Walzer argues,
when it became apparent that Germany could not win, the continued
bombing became morally wrong. See Just and Unjust Wars (New York:
Basic Books, 1977), pp. 251-62.
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when her armed forces were committed to combat on two
fronts
.
Perhaps we can better appreciate the nuances of the
alternatives in this case if we keep in mind the
objectives and methods which identify terrorism as such:
viz., the use of violence against innocents in order to
motivate a group into adopting political change in order
to end this violence. Any violence directed against
combatants, of course, would not be terrorism. Nor would
attacks on those guilty persons involved, either directly
or indirectly in carrying out the blatant injustices on
behalf of the government, be considered terrorist acts.
Only that violence directed against innocents, in this
case those noncombatants not personally associated with
the state-directed crimes, would qualify as terrorism.
Moreover, such attacks must be motivated by a desire to
achieve political change, not by a desire for
retribution. Retribution must always be aimed at the
guilty. When directed against innocents, it is not
retribution at all, but simply a criminal act.
With these limiting conditions in mind--i.e. aimed
at innocents for the purpose of effecting political
change—the likelihood of terrorist attacks being
justified under military necessity becomes slim. One
would have to imagine not only that mass peaceful
attempts have failed, but that military action directed
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against combatants and those responsible for the
persecution have also failed.
According to our discussion of military necessity in
the last chapter, the conditions wherein innocents may be
attacked must be such that the end at which such an
attack is aimed would justify harming the same number of
innocent citizens from one's own group to attain it. In
one extreme this is illustrated in practice by Satyagraha
as espoused by Gandhi. Here members of a group
intentionally cause harm to innocent persons with the
objective of motivating another group to change its
oppressive policies in order to put an end the harm being
done. But in Satyagraha the terrorist gives preference
to innocents of the opposing group over innocent
affiliates of his own cause. Suppose that the risk to
each could be distributed equally? In this case it seems
to me that that terrorism would be justified, provided
that the members of both sides were aware of the risks.
In other words, if the German population had not
responded to either the peaceful or military methods
short of terrorism with public outrage, and the members
of the terrorist group, recognizing that they were as
likely to be the victims of violent attacks as those who
were persecuting them, nevertheless believed that the
political cause was worth the risk, then terrorist
methods would be a permissible alternative.
396
The obligation not to intentionally harm innocents
is only defeasible when it conflicts with a positive
obligation to protect innocents and the conditions of jus
ad bellum are met. In other words, the obligation not to
harm innocents is defeasible when it conflicts with the
parallel obligation to protect innocents, and impartial
consequent iali st calculations in terms of innocents
favors the latter. In such cases, impartiality requires
that the innocents who will suffer harm on each
alternative be considered impartially. A political body
can place some of its own innocents in harm' s way in
order to protect the greater body of innocents by
declaring war and appointing certain members of the
community to the role of combatant. Likewise, a
political community can knowingly place innocent members
of the enemy nation in harm' s way for the same purpose
provided that the decision is an impartial one where the
lives of all innocents are given equal weight regardless
of nationality. Such a decision must be a political
decision and it must meet the same jus ad bellum criteria
that are used to change the status of innocents to that
of combatants when the decision is made to resort to arms
in the first place. These stipulations serve to extend
the jus as bellum principles that were required in order
to justify the resort to violence to cover the
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extraordinary methods of violence which are entailed in
terrorism
.
There is one aspect of state sponsored terrorism
during warfare which merits attention. During World War
II the United States conducted terrorist attacks against
Germany and Japan. President Truman, addressing the
American people on August 12, 1945, provided the
following justification:
We have used [the bomb] against those who attacked us
without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have
starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of
war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of
• 1 3
obeying international laws of warfare.
A number of issues come to mind when one reads this
quotation. First, the motive for the attack seems to be
revenge or retaliation rather than some political
objective. Second, the bomb was not used against those
who had attacked pearl harbor and executed American
prisoners; it was used against innocent civilians.
Third, the decision gave special weight to the lives of
friendly combatants over the lives of enemy innocents.
Another often heard justification for the use of
nuclear weapons against Japan is that it resulted in less
loss of lives on both sides than would have been lost by
invasion. 14 The fallacy in this reasoning is that it
13 Quoted in Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 264.
14 It is likely that the United States was concerned with getting
Japan to surrender before the Soviet Union entered a state of war
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assumes that wasthe only acceptable outcome
unconditional surrender by the Japanese. If minimizing
the loss of lives is the relevant factor, then something
less than unconditional surrender would have rendered
both the hypothetical invasion of Japan as well as the
use of the bomb unnecessary.
The decision to place innocents at risk must always
be a last resort. The formal test to determine whether
or not the use of force in a particular situation is
objectively justified under the principle of self-defense
or defense of others is to determine if it meets the
criteria of jus ad helium. While soldiers,
statespersons, and other public roles may give preference
to protecting innocents among their own population to
those of the enemy, reason requires that persons must
give the same weight to acting in ways that do not harm
enemy innocents as one would give to acting so as to not
harm innocents among one's own friendly population. In
other words, the prohibition against intentionally
harming innocent persons is a universal one that applies
to all innocents regardless of nationality; the positive
duty to protect innocents, on the other hand, is not a
universal one— it is derived, at least in part, from the
with Japan so that they would not be involved in the peace
negotiations and reparations. In fact, the use of the two bombs,
Russia's entry into the war, and the unconditional surrender of Japan
all occurred during a two week period.
399
relationship that persons have to one another. Members
of the same family or community often have a duty to
prevent harm from befalling other members of their
community when they are able to do so. They do not have
this same obligation to all persons in the world.
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